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I. Introduction
The receipt of a dividend is perhaps the most basic method by which a
shareholder earns a return on her investment in a corporation.' Because of the
dividend's importance, scholars have long focused their attention on the
fundamental question of when judicial intervention into a company's dividend
policy is warranted.2  Significantly, however, this academic focus has
concentrated almost exclusively on the publicly-held corporation. In that
context, a number of authorities have argued that there is little need for the
judiciary to involve itself in compelling the payment of dividends, primarily for
two reasons.
First, if a public corporation retains profits rather than declaring dividends,
"the price of the firm's shares will rise accordingly. 3 A shareholder desiring a
current return can always create a "homemade" dividend by selling some stock
I. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS § 8.6, at 200
(2d ed. 1998) ("[T]he payment of a dividend is also the basic way in which investors receive
their financial return (short of selling their stock or interest or of the company liquidating)."). A
"dividend" is merely a distribution of corporate profit to shareholders. See infra note 120 and
accompanying text (defining a dividend).
2. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REv. 85,
103-08 (1980) (discussing level of judicial involvement in dividend disputes); Daniel R.
Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699, 715-17 (1981)
(same).
3. Fischel, supra note 2, at 702.
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and capturing the appreciated value.4 Second, if corporate management
pursues a dividend policy that is contrary to shareholder interests, dissatisfied
investors will sell their holdings. Widespread selling will decrease a
company's stock price and will expose management to the threat of removal.
Commentators have argued, therefore, that senior managers' self-interest in
retaining their valuable employment positions will independently restrain poor
dividend decisions without the need for judicial oversight.
It is somewhat obvious that these two rationales are premised on the
existence of a well-functioning market. A market is necessary to convert stock
into homemade dividends, and a market is necessary to put "dissatisfaction'"
pressure on management. Both rationales protect public corporation investors
from suboptimal dividend decisions, and both suggest that there is little need
for judicial interference in public corporation dividend policy.
In the close corporation setting, however, these market-based rationales
are wholly inapplicable. A close corporation, by definition, lacks a market for
its stock.6 As a consequence, a close corporation minority investor' can rarely
capture the appreciation in the value of its shares, as willing purchasers are
typically scarce or nonexistent.' Moreover, the majority shareholder's control
over dividend policy is free of market constraints. When close corporation
dividend policy is at issue, therefore, a "hands-off" attitude by the judiciary
makes considerably less sense. Although other scholars have previously made
this observation, 9 the academic discussion has not proceeded substantially
beyond the observation itself. It is important, therefore, to return to the
fundamental question and to consider it in the close corporation setting-that
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (explaining that the presence of a well-
functioning market warrants less intrusive judicial review).
6. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) ("In a
large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could sell his stock in
order to extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this market is not available for
shares in the close corporation."); infra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that close
corporation stock lacks a market).
7. The terms "majority" and "minority" are used in this Article "to distinguish those
shareholders who possess the actual power to control the operations of the firm from those who
do not." J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7
(1977). Such power is most often determined by the size of the shareholdings. Id.
8. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (explaining that the absence of a market
makes it difficult to liquidate close corporation holdings).
9. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (noting the observations of various
commentators).
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is, when is judicial intervention into a close corporation's dividend policy
warranted?
To some extent, a consideration of this question has been aided by the
development of the shareholder oppression doctrine. The doctrine of
shareholder oppression attempts to safeguard the close corporation minority
investor from the improper exercise of majority control.'0 By identifying and
protecting the "reasonable expectations" of close corporation shareholders,
including the reasonable expectation of dividends, the oppression doctrine
combats majority shareholder efforts to exclude a minority investor from the
company's financial and participatory benefits. Although the doctrine
usefully acknowledges that close corporation shareholders can have reasonable
expectations of dividends, the doctrine provides no guidance on whether an
asserted expectation is "reasonable," and thus enforceable, in the particular
circumstances before a court. 2 One could argue, therefore, that the shareholder
oppression doctrine has simply rephrased the fundamental question. Asking
whether judicial intervention into a close corporation's dividend policy is
warranted, in other words, is functionally equivalent to asking whether a
shareholder's expectation of dividends is reasonable under the circumstances."
This Article squarely addresses the issue of close corporation dividend
policy and the question of when judicial intervention is warranted. More
specifically, this Article analyzes close corporation dividend disputes through
the lens of the shareholder oppression doctrine. By examining when a
shareholder's expectation of dividends is reasonable and enforceable, this
Article moves beyond the mere observation that close corporations require
greater judicial scrutiny. Indeed, this Article discusses the basic types of
dividend disputes that arise in close corporations and provides guidance to
courts for resolving such disputes.
To put this Article in context, one should understand that the vast majority
of corporations in this country are close corporations. 4  Family-owned
10. See, e.g., Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)
(noting that the "thrust" of the oppression-triggered dissolution statute "is protection from the
abusive exercise of power"); id. at 128 ("[I]t is the 'wielding of... power' in a manner which
'destroy[s] a stockholder's vital interest and expectations' that constitutes oppression.").
11. See infra Part II (describing the shareholder oppression doctrine).
12. See infra Part 1Il.C (discussing the limits of the reasonable expectations standard).
13. More precisely, judicial intervention into a close corporation's dividend policy is
warranted when majority conduct frustrates a shareholder's expectation of dividends, and when
a court determines that the expectation was reasonable in the circumstances.
14. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESs ENTERRSES § 257, at 695 (3d ed. 1983) ("Numerically, the vast majority of business
corporations are closely-held.").
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businesses (which close corporations often are) "represent ninety-five percent
of all United States businesses and are responsible for nearly fifty percent of the
jobs in the United States."' 15 Moreover, the number of new business
incorporations in this country has reached peak levels.' 6 As a consequence, the
issues discussed in this Article affect an enormous number of companies as
well as individuals.
Part II of this Article provides needed background information by
discussing the nature of the close corporation, the development of the
shareholder oppression doctrine, and the effect of a denial of dividends on close
corporation shareholders. Part III contends that courts should evaluate close
corporation dividend disputes under the oppression doctrine's reasonable
expectations standard, rather than under the traditional, majority-deference
approach. Because there is no market for close corporation stock, and because
the dividend decisions of majority shareholders are often tainted by conflicts of
interest, this part argues that a judicial framework based on deference to the
majority is unworkable in the close corporation setting. The shareholder
oppression doctrine, however, is premised on the notion that the majority's
dividend decisions-decisions that might otherwise be innocuous in public
corporations-can be devastating to minority investors in close corporations.
The doctrine recognizes, in other words, that majority deference is
inappropriate in the close corporation context. This Part concludes, therefore,
that the reasonable expectations standard is a superior approach for evaluating
close corporation dividend controversies.
Parts IV and V explore the basic types of close corporation dividend
disputes and seek to develop a principled framework for resolving them. Part
IV involves de facto dividend claims-that is, claims that the majority
shareholder is receiving a disproportionate share of the company's profits, often
in the form of salary and other employment-related benefits. Although de facto
dividend disputes may result from the fault of the majority, the fault of the
minority, or from no fault at all, this Part utilizes a hypothetical bargaining
model to conclude that the disproportionate receipt of company profits should
always be viewed as oppressive and worthy ofjudicial intervention. Moreover,
this Part reveals that the judicial relief provided in many de facto dividend
controversies is often incomplete.
Part V focuses on disputes over dividend suppression when de facto
dividends are not involved. Put differently, even when a majority shareholder
15. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990).
16. See U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMIC INDICATORS 18 (1998)
("[N]ew business incorporations are ... at their peak record levels for the last ten years.").
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does not receive a disproportionate amount of the company's profits through
salary or otherwise, a minority shareholder may, at some point, reasonably
expect dividends-particularly when a business has been profitable for some
period of time but has not yet distributed those profits to shareholders. This
Part borrows from the field of financial economics in arguing that an
expectation of dividends should be deemed reasonable when the majority
attempts to reinvest the company's profits in projects that provide below "cost
of capital" returns-that is, projects with expected rates of return that are
insufficient given their levels of risk. As this Part explains, a majority
shareholder will have an incentive to make below cost of capital investments
whenever those investments provide employment benefits to the majority that
more than offset the insufficient financial return. Such investments, however,
disadvantage minority shareholders who, for either voluntary or involuntary
reasons, do not work for the company. By again utilizing a hypothetical
bargaining model, this part advocates an approach that no court presently
follows: whenever the majority seeks to make below cost of capital
investments, oppression liability should arise.
II. The Doctrine of Shareholder Oppression
A. The Nature of the Close Corporation
A close corporation is a business organization that typically has a small
number of stockholders, the absence of a market for the corporation's stock,
and substantial shareholder participation in the management of the
corporation.' 7 In the traditional public corporation, the shareholder is normally
17. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); see also
Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close
Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1143, 1148 (1990) ("Close corporations have a
limited number of shareholders, and most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in the
corporation's day-to-day business.").
There is some variation in the definition of a close corporation. As Professor Eisenberg
states:
Exactly what constitutes a close corporation is a matter of theoretical dispute.
Some authorities emphasize the number of shareholders, some emphasize the
presence of owner-management, some emphasize the lack of a market for the
corporation's stock, and some emphasize the existence of formal restrictions on the
transferability of the corporation's shares.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 338 (8th ed.
2000) (unabridged); see also I F. HODGE.O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 4-7 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS] (noting the
following possible definitions of a "close corporation:" a corporation with relatively few
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a detached investor who neither contributes labor to the corporation nor takes
part in management responsibilities." In contrast, within a close corporation,
"a more intimate and intense relationship exists between capital and labor."'19
Close corporation shareholders "usually expect employment and a meaningful
role in management, as well as a return on the money paid for [their] shares."
20
Moreover, family or other personal relationships often link close corporation
21investors, resulting in a familiarity between the participants.
Conventional corporate law norms of majority rule and centralized control
can lead to serious problems for the close corporation minority shareholder.
22
Traditionally, most corporate power is centralized in the hands of a board of
directors.23 In a close corporation, the board is ordinarily controlled "by the
shareholder or shareholders holding a majority of the voting power.
2 4
shareholders; a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the securities markets; a
corporation in which the participants consider themselves partners inter se; a corporation in
which management and ownership are substantially identical; and any corporation which elects
to place itself in a close corporation grouping). Nevertheless, the typical close corporation
possesses most, if not all, of the attributes described in these various definitions.
18. I CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 1.08, at 31-32 (describing public
corporation shareholders).
19. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus.
LAW. 699, 702 (1993).
20. Id. (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) ("[T]he primary expectations of minority shareholders include an active voice in
management of the corporation and input as an employee." (citations omitted)); 2 CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 7.02, at 4 ("Ownership and management frequently coalesce in
closely held corporations, where not uncommonly all the principal shareholders devote full time
to corporate affairs. Even where one or two shareholders may be inactive, the business is
normally conducted by the others without aid from nonshareholder managers.").
21. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders'Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196 (1988) (discussing relationships between close
corporation investors); see also Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Ind., 616 A.2d 1314, 1320-21
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("[A] close[] corporation frequently originates in the context of
personal relationships. Often such business entities are formed by family members or friends."
(citations omitted)).
22. See I F. HODGE O'NEAL &ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 1:02, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter OPPRESSION] (characterizing majority
rule and centralized management as the "traditional pattern of corporate management," and
noting the dangers that this management pattern presents to close corporation minority
shareholders); Thompson, supra note 19, at 702-03 ("In a closed setting, the corporate norms of
centralized control and majority rule easily can become instruments of oppression.").
23. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 8.01(b) (2002) [hereinafter RMBCA]
("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors .... ");
Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1152 ("in traditional theory, ultimate authority resides with the
board of directors ....").
24. Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1151-52; see, e.g., I OPPRESSION, supra note 22,
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Through this control of the board, the majority shareholder has the ability to
take actions that harm the minority shareholder's interests.25 Such actions are
often referred to as "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out" techniques
26 that "oppress127
the close corporation minority shareholder. Common freeze-out techniques
include the refusal to declare dividends, the termination of a minority
shareholder's employment, the removal of a minority shareholder from a
position of management, and the siphoning off of corporate earnings through
high compensation to the majority shareholder.28 Quite often, these tactics are
used in combination. For example, the close corporation investor generally
looks to salary more than dividends for a share of the business returns because
the "[e]amings of a close corporation often are distributed in major part in
salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits. 2 9 When actual dividends are not
§ 1:02, at 3 ("Indeed, in most closely held corporations, majority shareholders elect themselves
and their relatives to all or most of the positions on the board.").
25. See, e.g., Bostock, 616 A.2d at 1320 ("[B]ased upon its voting power, the majority is
able to dictate to the minority the manner in which the [close] corporation is run." (internal
quotation omitted)); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551,558 (N.C. 1983) ("[W]hen the
personal relationships among the participants break down, the majority shareholder, because of
his greater voting power, is in a position to terminate the minority shareholder's employment
and to exclude him from participation in management decisions."); Kiriakides v. Atlas Food
Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 267 (S.C. 2001) ("This unequal balance of power often
leads to a 'squeeze out' or 'freeze out' of the minority by the majority shareholders." (footnote
omitted)). As a Missouri court explained:
In the instant case [a group of four shareholders], acting in concert, control a
majority of the outstanding stock, though no single shareholder owns 5 1%.
Because this control carries the power to destroy or impair the interests of minority
owners, the law imposes equitable limitations on the rights of dominant
shareholders to act in their own self-interest.
Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
26. See I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 1:01, at 3 n.2 ("The term 'freeze-out' is often used
as a synonym for 'squeeze-out."'). It has been noted that the term squeeze-out means "the use
by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside
information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to
eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants." Id. at I. Similarly, a
"partial squeeze-out" is defined as "action which reduces the participation or powers of a group
of participants in the enterprise, diminishes their claim on earnings or assets, or otherwise
deprives them of business income or advantages to which they are entitled." Id. at 1-2. See
generally I, 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 22, §§ 3:01-3:20, 4:01-4:06, 5:01-5:36, 6:01-6:10
(discussing various squeeze-out techniques).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48 (describing judicial definitions of
"oppression").
28. See I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, §§ 3:04, 3:06, 3:07, at 18-25, 44-71 (outlining
techniques used in freeze-outs); see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505,
513 (Mass. 1975) (noting some of the possible freeze-out techniques).
29. 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 1.08, at 32; see Kleinberger, supra note 17,
at 1148 ("Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather than dividends.").
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paid, therefore, a minority shareholder who is discharged from employment and
removed from the board of directors is effectively denied any return on his
investment as well as any input into the management of the business. ° Once
the minority shareholder is faced with this "indefinite future with no return on
the capital he or she contributed to the enterprise,"3 the majority often proposes
to purchase the shares of the minority shareholder at an unfairly low price. 2
When calculating its taxable income, a close corporation can deduct reasonable salaries
paid to its employees to "reduce the amount of income tax that the company pays." Thompson,
supra note 2 1, at 197 n. 12 (citing I.R.C. § 162 (1986)). A close corporation cannot, however,
deduct any dividends paid to its shareholders. As a consequence, corporate income paid as
dividends is subject to double taxation--once as business income at the corporate level, and
once as personal income at the shareholder level. Id at 197. Because of "[t]he tax system's
discouragement of dividends" in favor of salaries, "most close corporations provide a return to
participants in the form of salary or other employee-related benefits." Thompson, supra note
19, at 714 n.90; see also I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 1:03, at 4-5 ("[A] close corporation, in
order to avoid so-called 'double taxation,' usually pays out most of its earnings in the form of
salaries rather than as dividends.").
30. As the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated:
Balvik was ultimately fired as an employee of the corporation, thus destroying the
primary mode of return on his investment. Any slim hope of gaining a return on his
investment and remaining involved in the operation of the business was dashed
when Sylvester removed Balvik as a director and officer of the corporation.
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987). Similarly, commentators have noted the
following:
An investor taking a minority investment position in a close corporation, expecting
to receive a return on the investment in the form of a regular salary, would face the
risk that, after a falling out among the participants, the directors would terminate
the minority shareholder's employment and deprive that investor of any return on
the investment in the corporation.
I CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 1. 15, at 89; see also Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068,
1072 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("Employment with the corporation was, as a practical matter, the
only way that shareholders could receive any immediate benefit from their shares.").
31. Thompson, supra note 19, at 703; see I CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 1.16,
at 96 ("If, for example, the minority shareholder is fired from the employment that was
providing the return on the investment in the close corporation, the minority may face an
indefinite period with no return on the investment."); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of
Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority
Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 425,448-49 (1990) (discussing valuation of minority shares).
32. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("Majority 'freeze-out' schemes which
withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at inadequate prices.
When the minority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair value, the majority has won."
(citations omitted)); 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 8.13, at 68 ("[A] squeeze out
usually does not offer fair payment to the 'squeezees' for the interests, rights or powers which
they lose."); Thompson, supra note 19, at 703-04 (noting that in a classic freeze-out, "the
majority first denies the minority shareholder any return and then proposes to buy the shares at a
very low price").
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In the public corporation, the minority shareholder can escape these abuses
of power by simply selling its shares on the market. By definition, however,
there is no ready market for the stock of a close corporation.33 Thus, when
dividend suppression or some other action results in the unfair treatment of a
close corporation shareholder, the shareholder "cannot escape the unfairness
simply by selling out at a fair price."
34
B. The Cause of Action for Oppression
Over the years, state legislatures and courts have developed two
significant avenues of relief for the "oppressed" close corporation shareholder.
First, many state legislatures have amended their corporate dissolution statutes
to include "oppression" by the controlling shareholder as a ground for
involuntary dissolution of the corporation.35 Moreover, when oppressive
conduct has occurred, actual dissolution is not the only remedy at the court's
disposal. Both state statutes and judicial precedents have authorized alternative
remedies that are less drastic than dissolution. 36 As the alternative forms of
33. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ("in a large public corporation, the oppressed or
dissident minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested
capital. By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation."); Brenner
v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1027 (N.J. 1993) ("[U]nlike shareholders in larger corporations,
minority shareholders in a close corporation cannot readily sell their shares when they become
dissatisfied with the management of the corporation."); Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Ind., 616
A.2d 1314, 1320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("[A] minority interest in a close[]
corporation is difficult to value because the shares are not publicly traded and a fair market is
often not available."); 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 9.02, at 4-5 ("[A] shareholder
in a close corporation does not have the exit option available to a shareholder in a publicly held
corporation, who can sell his shares in a securities market if he is dissatisfied with the way the
corporation is being operated."); Thompson, supra note 19, at 702 ("[T]he economic reality of
no public market deprives investors in close corporations of the same liquidity and ability to
adapt available to investors in public corporations.").
34. Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1149; cf Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Int'l, Inc., 624
A.2d 613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) ("The interest owned by a minority shareholder
in a closely held corporation is often a precarious one. In fact, it has been characterized by this
court as being one of 'acute vulnerability."' (citations omitted)).
35. See Thompson, supra note 19, at 708-09 (noting that thirty-seven states include
oppression or a similar term in their corporate dissolution statutes). See generally Murdock,
supra note 31, at 452-61 (describing the development of oppression as a ground for
dissolution).
36. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. I (West Supp. 2000) (authorizing any
equitable relief and specifically authorizing a buyout of the shareholder's interest); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A: 12-7 (West Supp. 1999) (providing a nonexclusive list of possible relief that
includes the order of a buyout and the appointment of a provisional director or custodian);
Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993) ("Importantly, courts are not limited to
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relief have broadened over the years, orders of actual dissolution have become
less frequent.3 7 The most prevalent alternative remedy today is a buyout of the
oppressed investor's holdings. 38 Thus, oppression has evolved from a statutory
ground for involuntary dissolution to a statutory ground for a wide variety of
relief.
39
Second, particularly in states without an oppression-triggered dissolution
statute, some courts have imposed an enhanced fiduciary duty between close
corporation shareholders and have allowed an oppressed shareholder to bring a
direct cause of action for breach of this duty.40 In the seminal decision of
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., " the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
adopted such a standard:
the statutory remedies [for oppression], but have a wide array of equitable remedies available to
them."); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (N.D. 1987) (listing alternative forms of
relief for oppressive conduct such as appointing a receiver, granting a buyout, and ordering the
declaration of a dividend); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 n. 12 (W. Va. 1980)
(listing ten possible forms of relief for oppressive conduct such as ordering the reduction of
excessive salaries and issuing an injunction against further oppressive acts). But see Giannotti
v. Hamway, 387 S. E.2d 725, 733 (Va. 1990) (stating that the dissolution remedy for oppression
is "exclusive" and concluding that the trial court is not permitted "to fashion other ... equitable
remedies").
37. See Thompson, supra note 19, at 708; cf Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of
Involuntary Dissolution as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
25, 50-56 (1986) (finding that courts ordered remedies other than dissolution in the majority of
thirty-seven involuntary dissolution cases studied). See generally Murdock, supra note 31, at
461-64 (discussing the development of alternative remedies).
38. See I CLOSE CORPOPATIONS, supra note 17, § 1.16, at 97 (noting that buyouts "are the
most common remedy for dissension within a close corporation"); Murdock, supra note 3 1, at
470 ("The most common form of alternative remedy is the buy-out of the minority
shareholder."); see also Thompson, supra note 21, at 231 ("The increased use of buyouts as a
remedy for deadlock or dissension is the most dramatic recent change in legislative and judicial
thinking on close corporations problems."). A buyout of the oppressed investor's holdings is
typically at "fair value." See infra notes 149, 170 and accompanying text (discussing fair value
buyouts).
39. See Thompson, supra note 21, at 206 ("The inclusion of 'oppression' or similar
grounds as a basis for involuntary dissolution has opened up a much broader avenue of relief for
minority shareholders in close corporations wracked with dissension."); Thompson, supra note
19, at 708-09 ("[1]t makes more sense to view oppression not as a ground for dissolution, but as
a remedy for shareholder dissension.").
40. See Thompson, supra note 19, at 726 (discussing direct shareholder actions); see also
id. at 739 ("It should not be surprising that the direct cause of action is developed particularly in
states without an oppression statute, and [it] provides a vehicle for relief for minority
shareholders in a close corporation where the statutory norms reflect no consideration for the
special needs of such enterprises."). See generally Murdock, supra note 31, at 433-40
(discussing the development of the shareholder fiduciary duty).
41. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
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[W]e hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another. In our previous decisions, we have defined
the standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the "utmost good
faith and loyalty." Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their
management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict
good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-
interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and
to the corporation.42
Following the lead of the Donahue court, several courts outside of
Massachusetts have also imposed an enhanced fiduciary duty running from
shareholder to shareholder in a close corporation.43
The development of the statutory cause of action and the enhanced
fiduciary duty "reflect the same underlying concerns for the position of
minority shareholders, particularly in close corporations after harmony no
longer reigns.",44 Because of the similarities between the two remedial schemes,
it has been suggested that "it makes sense to think of them as two
manifestations of a minority shareholder's cause of action for oppression. '"4 In
the close corporation context, therefore, it is sensible to view the parallel
development of the statutory cause of action and the enhanced fiduciary duty
action as two sides of the same coin-that is, the shareholder's cause of action
for oppression.
42. Id. at 515 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). The Donahue duty of"utmost good
faith and loyalty," however, was later scaled back by the same court. Due to concerns that the
"untempered application of the strict good faith standard enunciated in Donahue... will result
in the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close
corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best
interests of all concerned," the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts suggested a balancing
test in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). If the
controlling group can demonstrate a "legitimate business purpose" for its actions, no breach of
fiduciary duty will be found unless the minority shareholder can demonstrate "that the same
legitimate objective could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less
harmful to the minority's interest." Id.
43. See, e.g., Guy v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(discussing the fiduciary duty between shareholders); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548,
1556-59 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (same); W&W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) (same); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775,779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Fought
v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167,170-71 (Miss. 1989) (same); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220
(Ohio 1989) (same); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984) (same).
44. Thompson, supra note 19, at 739.
45. Id. at 700. See generally id. at 738-45 (describing the "combined cause of action for
oppression").
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C. Measuring Oppression Through "Reasonable Expectations"
The development of a shareholder's cause of action for oppression
requires courts to determine when "oppressive" conduct has occurred. In
wrestling with this issue, the courts have developed three principal approaches
to defining oppression. First, "some courts define oppression as 'burdensome,
harsh and wrongful conduct.., a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his
money to a corporation is entitled to rely."'' 46  Second, some courts link
oppression to breach of an enhanced fiduciary duty owed from one close
corporation shareholder to another.47 Third, a number of courts tie oppression
to the frustration of the reasonable expectations of the shareholders. 48 Of these
three approaches, the reasonable expectations standard garners the most
approval, and courts have increasingly used it to determine whether oppressive
conduct has taken place. 49 The highest courts in several states have adopted the
reasonable expectations approach 5 and commentators have generally been in
favor of the reasonable expectations standard.5
46. Thompson, supra note 19, at 711-12 (quoting Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d
351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)); see, e.g., Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214, 221
(Mont. 1981) (reciting the "burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct" standard); see also
Haynsworth, supra note 37, at 36-39 (describing judicial definitions of oppression of minority
shareholders).
47. See, e.g., supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (describing the enhanced
fiduciary duty imposed by courts).
48. See 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 9.29, at 178 (noting courts' use of the
reasonable expectations standard); see, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179
(N.Y. 1984) (equating oppression with conduct that "defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held
by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise").
49. See, e.g., 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 9.30, at 181 ("One of the most
significant trends in the law of close corporations in recent years is the increasing willingness of
courts to look to the reasonable expectations of shareholders to determine whether 'oppression'
or similar grounds exist as ajustification for involuntary dissolution or another remedy.").
50. See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985) (endorsing a
definition of oppression that incorporates the "reasonable expectations" of minority
shareholders); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 645 P.2d 929, 933-34 (Mont. 1982) (same); Brenner v.
Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1029 (N.J. 1993) (same); In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179 (same);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563-64 (N.C. 1983) (same); Balvik v. Sylvester, 41 I
N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) (same); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 442 (W. Va.
1980) (same). But see Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 265-66
(S.C. 2001) ("We find [that] adoption of the 'reasonable expectations' standard is inconsistent
with [the South Carolina oppression-triggered dissolution statute], which places an emphasis
not upon the minority's expectations but, rather, on the actions of the majority."). A number of
intermediate appellate courts in other states have adopted the reasonable expectations standard
as well. See, e.g., Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa Ct. App.
1988) (analyzing oppressive conduct in view of the "reasonable expectations" of minority
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The New York decision of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc."2 has been
particularly influential in giving some context to the reasonable expectations
framework. In Kemp, the Court of Appeals stated that "oppressive actions...
refer to conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by
minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise.0
3
As the court continued:
A court considering a petition alleging oppressive conduct must investigate
what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be the
petitioner's expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority
conduct should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's
subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled.
Disappointment alone should not necessarily be equated with oppression.
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority
conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were
both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner's
decision to join the venture.
shareholders); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 237 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986) (same); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988,
writ denied) (same). In states without an oppression-triggered dissolution statute, courts have
also used the reasonable expectations standard to determine whether a breach of the enhanced
fiduciary duty has occurred. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d
657, 662-63 (Mass. 1976) (using the reasonable expectations standard); Merola v. Exergen
Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (same). Finally, Minnesota and North
Dakota have explicitly incorporated the reasonable expectations standard into their dissolution
statutes. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3)(a) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that the
"reasonable expectations of all shareholders" is one of the considerations that a court should
take into account when deciding whether to grant equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out);
N.D. CENr. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985) (stating that courts should consider the reasonable
expectations of shareholders when deciding whether to grant equitable relief or dissolution).
5 1. See Haynsworth, supra note 37, at 37 ("The third definition of oppression, initially
derived from English case law, and long advocated by Dean F. Hodge O'Neal as well as other
leading close corporation experts, is conduct which frustrates the reasonable expectations of the
investors."); Thompson, supra note 21, at 211 ("Recognition of the intimate, illiquid
relationship within a close corporation therefore provides the necessary foundation for judging
whether relief should be granted and, if so, what relief is appropriate; the shareholders'
reasonable expectations has become the standard which best facilitates that approach.").
52. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
53. Id. at 1179.
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A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation
would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in
corporate management, or some other form of security, would be oppressed
in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those
expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the
investment. 
54
It is important to understand the distinction between "general" reasonable
expectations and "specific" reasonable expectations. At bottom, the
shareholder oppression doctrine protects close corporation stockholders with a
set of special judicial rules that go beyond the protections that public
corporation law provides. 55 An important corollary to this proposition,
however, is that close corporation shareholders do not lose any of the
54. Id.; see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (defining
reasonable expectations). As the Meiselman court stated:
In order for plaintiff's expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to or
assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by them. Privately held
expectations which are not made known to the other participants are not'reasonable.' Only expectations embodied in understandings, express or implied,
among the participants should be recognized by the court.
Id.
The Kemp court's focus on the shareholder's expectations at the time it decided to join the
venture has been criticized as unduly narrow. See, e.g., 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17,
§ 9.30, at 181 (stating that the Kemp court's focus "on the petitioner's expectations at the time
he decided to join the enterprise is too narrow and may reflect the particular facts of that case,"
and expressing a preference for a broader standard that looks "to the shareholders' reasonable
expectations as they existed at the inception of the enterprise ... and as they developed
thereafter through a course of dealing"); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression &
Reasonable Expectations: OfChange, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes,
86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 762 (2002) ("A reasonable expectations framework that focuses solely on
the time of investment, therefore, is overly restrictive. Instead... the framework should
explicitly adopt a broader perspective that looks for investment bargains between the
shareholders throughout the entirety of their relationship.").
55. Under public corporation rules, courts rarely interfere with employment, management,
and dividend decisions, as the business judgment rule is often invoked to protect the majority's
discretion. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass.
1976) ("[C]ourts fairly consistently have been disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal
corporate operations, such as the selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors or
employees, which essentially involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority
control."); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse ofthe Business Judgment Rule in the Close
Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456,477 (1985) ("The hiring, firing, and compensation
of employees are ultimately board decisions and have always qualified as management decisions
protected by the business judgment rule."); infra note 80 (describing the role of the business
judgment rule). When these matters are challenged in the close corporation context, however,
the majority's decisions are subject to greater scrutiny than a business judgment rule approach.
See infra note 101 (discussing the more searching judicial review that is present in many close
corporation disputes).
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protections that general corporate law provides-that is, at a minimum, they
receive the baseline public corporation protections. In a public corporation, of
course, the mere status of "shareholder" entitles one to a proportionate stake in
the company's earnings as well as to various other rights.5 6 One can assert,
therefore, that every shareholder-whether in a public corporation or a close
corporation-reasonably expects that her position as a stockholder entitles her
to a proportionate share of the company's profits. 5" Whenever this "general"
reasonable expectation is frustrated in a close corporation, oppression liability
should arise.
A proportionate share of the company's earnings, however, is only one
component of the typical close corporation shareholder's investment. Unlike in
a public corporation, the investment return in a close corporation often includes
employment and management benefits as well.58 "Specific" reasonable
56. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2002) (detailing the inspection rights
available to "[a]ny stockholder"); id. § 251 (c) (describing the right of"stockholders" to vote on
mergers or consolidations); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 565 (N.C. 1983) (listing
the following as examples of "traditional rights and remedies to which shareholders have been
entitled": right to receive notice of shareholder's meetings, right to cumulative voting, right to
examine books and records, and right to compel payment of dividends). As the author
previously observed:
Just as in a public corporation, of course, the status of 'shareholder' entitles an
investor to such benefits as a proportionate share of the corporate earnings (e.g., a
proportionate share of the dividends, if declared), a right to any stock appreciation,
a right to inspect company books and records (with a proper purpose), a right to
vote on shareholder issues, and a right to be recognized as a shareholder.
Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the Shareholder
Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 989, 1026 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405,418 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("It is true
that stockholders are owners of the corporation and expect to share in its profits."); Michaud v.
Morris, 603 So. 2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1992) ("Certain basic expectations of investors are
enforceable in the courts, and among those is a right to share proportionally in corporate
gains."); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 397 (Or. 1973) ("It is also
true that the Bakers, as stockholders, had a legitimate interest in the participation in profits
earned by the corporation.").
58. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554,561 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979) ("Unlike their counterparts in large corporations, [close corporation minority
shareholders] may expect to participate in management or to influence operations, directly or
indirectly, formally or informally."); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319
(N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) ("A person who ... buys a minority interest in a close
corporation does so not only in the hope of enjoying an increase in value of his stake in the
business but for the assurance of employment in the business in a managerial position."); Balvik
v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("[I]t is generally understood that, in addition to
supplying capital and labor to a contemplated enterprise and expecting a fair return, parties
comprising the ownership of a close corporation expect to be actively involved in its
management and operation."); Sandra L. Schlafge, Comment, Pedro v. Pedro: Consequences
for Closely Held Corporations and the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1071,
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expectations refer to these "extra" components of the close corporation
shareholder's investment return-extra to the extent that they are in addition to
the stockholder's entitlement to a proportionate share of the company's
earnings. Unlike a status-triggered general reasonable expectation, a specific
reasonable expectation is not held by every close corporation participant who
can be characterized as a "shareholder." To the contrary, a specific reasonable
expectation is personal in nature, 9 as it requires proof that a close corporation
majority shareholder and a particular minority shareholder reached a mutual
understanding about a certain entitlement (for example, employment,
management) the minority is to receive in return for its investment in the
business. 60 By safeguarding specific reasonable expectations of employment,
1094 (1992) ("Section 302A.751 [the Minnesota statute protecting minority shareholders]
recognizes that shareholders in a closely held corporation legitimately expect a return of their
investment, often in the form of a management position and a salary."); supra notes 18, 20 and
accompanying text (noting that close corporation shareholders typically expect to have
employment and management roles in the company).
59. As one court stated:
The original participants in a close corporation enter into their agreement on the
basis of the assessments of each other's talents, assets, intentions and characters
and their agreement must, therefore, be regarded as personal in nature. Unless
there is an unmistakable expression of their intent to the contrary, the agreement
will not 'run with the shares.'
Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1984); see also Bahls, supra note 15, at
326 ("The intent of original shareholders to operate the business is usually personal in nature.
An expectation that one will participate in management of the business does not necessarily
mean that one's son, daughter, ex-spouse, or other transferee will have the same opportunity.");
Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relevant Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 Mmi.
L. REV. 1, 86 n.265 (1982) ("Ordinarily, expectations are personal and therefore would not be
transferable .... Thus, an individual who acquires stock by gift or inheritance would not also
take the expectations of the original owner.").
60. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations. The
Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 810 (2000) ("[Tihe aggrieved
shareholder must offer evidence indicating that the stockholders shared a basic understanding at
the venture's inception of an entitlement to certain specific benefits (e.g., employment,
management participation) due to their commitments of capital to the business."). As one
commentator stated:
Both [public corporation and close corporation] investors expect appreciation in
the value of their investment. Investors in publicly held corporations receive
dividends as a form of return on this investment, while investors in closely held
corporations may expect to receive a salary and a management position as a
condition of their investment (emphasis added)).
Schlafge, supra note 58, at 1077 n.29.
It should be noted that, in many cases, this evidentiary requirement will not be difficult to
satisfy. See Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 56, at 1006, 1009-10 (describing the
apparent laxity of the evidence requirement). Nevertheless, in some oppression disputes, the
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management, or other entitlement, the oppression doctrine is offering special
protection to close corporation shareholders-"special" to the extent that public
corporation shareholders do not receive similar protection. 6'
D. Oppression and the Denial of Dividends
In a public corporation, one could argue that dividend decisions do not
significantly affect the value of an investor's stockholdings. After all,
economic theory suggests that any decision to retain earnings within the
company rather than to pay dividends will have a positive effect on the overall
value of the firm-an effect which translates into an increase in the value of the
company's shares.62 Assuming that retained funds are reinvested at the firm's
cost of capital,63 the theory suggests that a minority shareholder of a public
corporation is largely indifferent as to whether dividends are declared or not
(ignoring taxes and transaction costs).M If a dividend of one dollar per share is
shareholder is unable to proffer sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668
N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996) (refusing to find that a termination of a shareholder-employee
was a breach of fiduciary duty in part because "there was no general policy regarding stock
ownership and employment, and there was no evidence that any other stockholders had
expectations of continuing employment because they purchased stock").
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the lesser protection afforded to
public corporation shareholders). To some extent, of course, the public corporation shareholder
does not need any "special" protection. After all, public corporation shareholders invest only
with the general reasonable expectation that their investment entitles them to a proportionate
share of the company's earnings. See, e.g., Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for
Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary
Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 663 (1992) ("The shareholder
of a publicly traded corporation invests money ... with a view to receiving money, as opposed
to steady employment or associational benefits, in return."). For this limited interest, a market
exit provides adequate protection. See, e.g., I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 2:15, at 38 ("In a
large public-issue corporation, a shareholder who is dissatisfied with the way the business is
being operated can sell his stock at no great financial loss."); Schlafge, supra note 58, at 1073
n. 14 (noting that the interest of the public corporation shareholder is "limited to the amount of
their dollar investment in their shares, which can be sold at any time on the public market, and is
not tied to their salary and other employment benefits").
62. See, e.g., Steven Stem, Comment, Proposals to flelp the Minority Stockholder
Receive Fairer Dividend Treatment from the Closely Held Corporation, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 503,
508 (1961) ("[I]f the directors of a large, public-issue corporation deem it wise to retain
earnings for expansion or for other business purposes, such corporate action is often reflected by
an increased value of the firm's shares on the open market whereby all shareholders benefit
equally.").
63. See infra Part V.A (discussing the cost of capital).
64. The theory, often referred to as the "irrelevance proposition," is developed in a classic
article by Merton H. Miller & Frank Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961). The irrelevance proposition states that a dollar of retained
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paid, a minority shareholder is enriched by one dollar per share. If that same
amount is instead retained in the company, the company's value increases by
one dollar per share and, correspondingly, the value of the minority's stock
increases- by one dollar per share.65 By selling the stock, the minority can
capture that increase in value. The minority's wealth, in other words, increases
by one dollar per share regardless of whether a payout or reinvestment decision
is made, as the dollar takes the form of either a cash dividend or of stock
appreciation.66
earnings "adds a dollar to the value of the enterprise and, if reinvested at the company's current
rate of return, is worth the same to investors whether paid out to them for reinvestment or
retained by management for reinvestment." Brudney, supra note 2, at 87 n.4; id. at 87 (stating
that the irrelevance proposition assumes "a world'in which information flows freely and that is
free of taxes, transaction costs, and institutional imperfections"); infra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing the irrelevance proposition).
Taxes, of course, might affect a shareholder's preference for dividends versus reinvestment.
Presently, a dividend is treated as ordinary income and is taxed immediately as such. Capital
appreciation that is generated from profitable reinvestment, however, is taxed as a capital gain
only when the stock is sold. This difference in tax treatment may be significant to an investor,
particularly when ordinary income and capital gains are taxed at different rates. See, e.g.,
Brudney, supra note 2, at 91 ("The premised equivalence between a dollar of dividends and a
dollar of increment in the price of a share is destroyed by the different rates of federal income
tax . . . ."); id. ("A dollar in dividends is taxable at ordinary income rates, which for individual
stockholders are effectively higher than the capital gains rates ... [and] the tax on ordinary
income.., must be paid sooner than the tax on capital gains, which are realized later than the
dividend."). Moreover, whereas an investor does not personally incur any transaction costs
when a dividend is received, an investor does incur transaction costs (e.g., broker fees) when a
stock is sold to realize capital gains. See id. at 92 n. 19 (mentioning "brokerage commissions on
sales" as one transaction cost that investors typically assume when stock is sold).
65. Once again, this assumes that the retained funds are reinvested at the firm's cost of
capital. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 372-73 (8th ed. 2002) (discussing a reinvestment
hypothetical); supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the irrelevance
proposition).
66. Professor Brudney has stated the following:
The view that dividend policy is irrelevant to share prices rests on the assumption
that a dollar per share of potential dividends retained and reinvested will cause the
price of a share to increase by one dollar .... If these assumptions are true, then so
long as the enterprise has a favorable reinvestment opportunity, the decision to pay
or to withhold a dividend is a matter of indifference ....
Brudney, supra note 2, at 86-87; see, e.g., David Michael Israel, Note, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Declaration of Corporate Dividends: A Reappraisal, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 73, 89
(1975) ("As long as the corporation profitably reinvests its earnings at a rate commensurate with
inherent risks and expectations, the common stockholder will not be prejudiced by the absence
of direct cash dividends. The increasing market price itself is the return on his
investment .... ."); supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the irrelevance
proposition); see also Fischel, supra note 2, at 702-03 ("The irrelevance proposition assumes
that once a firm's investment policy is known, shareholders are indifferent as to a dividend
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In the close corporation, of course, this theory of"dividend irrelevance
67
is harder to accept, as there is no liquid market that allows for the realization of
capital appreciation.68 When funds are retained and reinvested in the company
rather than paid out as dividends, the minority has little ability to capture the
increased value of its shares, as "[tihe holder of a minority interest in a close
corporation may not be able to find anyone willing to purchase that interest at
any serious price. "69  For the minority shareholder to receive a return on
investment, therefore, dividends are needed, as capital appreciation is difficult
(if not impossible) to realize.70
Where all of the shareholders are salaried employees of the close
corporation, the payment of actual dividends is less important. The salary and
payout or retention.").
67. See supra note 64 (discussing the irrelevance proposition).
68. See, e.g., FRANKH. EASTERBROOK& DANIELR. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 230-31 (1991) (noting that "the lack of an active market in shares"
prohibits close corporation shareholders from creating "homemade dividends" by selling stock);
2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 9.20, at 9-96 ("[Tjhe failure to pay dividends is a
much more critical matter to a shareholder in a close corporation than to one in a publicly held
corporation because stock in a close corporation does not have a market which reflects capital
appreciation."); Stem, supra note 62, at 508 ("The increased value of [a close corporation
minority shareholder's] unlisted shares will not be reflected in the market."); supra note 6 and
accompanying text (noting that close corporation stock lacks a market).
69. 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 9.20, at 9-96 to 9-97. As one commentator
observed:
In a publicly held corporation, increased profits or corporate expansion is likely to
be reflected in an increase in the value of the shares of the corporation on the open
market. The corporate investor, however, seldom has an interest in the shares of an
unlisted, closely held corporation since the purchase of such shares would place
him in the same position as the minority shareholder who sells out. Such an
investor cannot depend upon dividend declarations by the controlling interests and
he cannot be assured of a market for his shares should he later desire to sell ....
The minority shareholder has no ... control to offer and, for the above noted
reasons, has difficulty selling his holdings.
Stem, supra note 62, at 508 n.36; see id. at 508 ("[The minority shareholder in a closely held
corporation may not find anyone willing to purchase his stock since few investors will want to
take on his unfavorable bargaining position."); see also Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co.,
60 A. 941, 945 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1905) ("In the case of corporations of this class [close
corporations] sales of stock outside the small coterie of officers and managers are generally hard
to make, excepting upon disadvantageous terms.").
70. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a market); see
also I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 3:04, at 19 ("Even if the minority shareholder is in a
sufficiently strong financial position to hold onto stock during a dividend squeeze, the squeezer
is still deprived of any return on the investment during the years that dividends are withheld.");
cf Israel, supra note 66, at 86 ("The effect of a policy whereby management retains more of the
earnings, while the market fails to respond with capital gains, is to eliminate the shareholder's
return on his investment.").
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other employment-related compensation provides the expected return. 7' Where
the majority shareholder is employed by the company and the minority investor
is not, however, dividends become critical, as they provide the minority
shareholder with its only source of return. 72 Not surprisingly, the wrongful
suppression of dividends is a common ground upon which the courts grant
oppression relief.
73
III. Evaluating Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation
Before a discussion of the basic types of close corporation dividend
disputes can occur, one must consider the appropriate framework for evaluating
the propriety of a majority's dividend decision. The inquiry is complicated,
primarily for two reasons. First, despite the widespread acceptance of the
reasonable expectations approach, a good deal of pre-oppression case law exists
that defers to the majority's business judgment on dividend decisions. Second,
even assuming that the reasonable expectations standard applies, it is often
71. See Landorfv. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (stating that, in a
close corporation, "dividends are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders"); I CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 1.08, at 32 (noting that close corporation shareholders "usually
expect (or perhaps should expect) to receive an immediate return in the form of salaries as
officers or employees of the corporation rather than in the form of dividends on their stock");
supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing employment benefits as expected return);
infra note 197 and accompanying text (same).
72. See, e.g., I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 3:04, at 18-19 ("Withholding dividends is
particularly effective when the participant has no other connection with the corporation such as
employment that might provide an alternative source of income."); Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp.,
79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many closely held firms endeavor to show no profits (to
minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real economic returns of the business to the investors
as salary. When firms are organized in this way, firing an employee is little different from
canceling his shares." (emphasis added)); Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *8
(Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 1992) ("[This failure to pay dividends can be especially devastating in a
Subchapter S [close] corporation setting, as this case is, since the corporation passes its income
through to its shareholders even though the corporation has not made any distributions to the
shareholders."); Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("In a close
corporation, since dividends are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of
salary may be the functional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends.").
73. See, e.g., Crowley v. Communications for Hosps., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996,1006 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991) (granting relief based on the denial of dividends); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256
N.W.2d 761,770-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 645 P.2d 929, 934-
35 (Mont. 1982) (same); Hirschkorn v. Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475,479-80 (N.D. 1982) (same);
Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1080-82 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (same); Patton v. Nicholas, 279
S.W.2d 848, 853-54 (Tex. 1955) (same); see also I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 3:04, at 18
("The withholding of dividends or other return on one's participation in a business enterprise is
an essential part of most squeeze-out efforts.").
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unclear whether a frustrated expectation of dividends is reasonable in the
circumstances.
A. The Traditional Approach to Compelling Dividends
Courts have generally viewed the declaration of dividends as
"discretionary and within the business judgment of the board of directors.
74
Without an abuse of discretion, a court typically will decline to substitute its
own judgment and will avoid ordering a distribution of dividends.7"
Historically, such an abuse of discretion was found "only if there [was]
evidence of fraud or bad faith or a clear case of unreasonableness.,
76
Significantly, the burden to demonstrate such abuses was placed on the
complaining shareholder," and that "onerous" burden was rarely met.78 Indeed,
74. HENN&ALEXANDER,supra note 14, § 327, at 913; see also Fischel, supra note 2, at
716 ("Invoking the business judgment rule, courts have generally held that the decisions
concerning the issuance and amount of a dividend are entrusted solely to the discretion of the
board of directors."); infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
business judgment rule).
75. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 14, § 327, at 913 ("[O]nly when abuse of
discretion is shown will courts substitute their own judgment and order a distribution of
dividends.").
76. Id. at 914; see Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The
decision [to declare a dividend] enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment which will
not be disturbed by a court in the absence of a disabling factor, i.e., fraud or gross abuse of
discretion."); Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 659 (Del. Ch. 1975)
("Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare
dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown."); Gay v. Gay's Super Markets,
Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 580 (Me. 1975) ("To justify judicial intervention in cases of this nature, it
must, as a general proposition, be shown that the decision not to declare a dividend amounted to
fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion on the part of the corporate officials authorized to
make the determination."); Brudney, supra note 2, at 104 ("[T]he prevailing legal doctrine holds
dividend policy to be a matter of managerial discretion or business judgment with which the
judiciary cannot interfere absent fraud or some visible conflict of interest in the particular case
accompanied by demonstrated and unnecessary mulcting of some stockholders."); Israel, supra
note 66, at 74-75 ("Thus, absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or other serious
misconduct, a court will decline to override the collective business judgment of the board of
directors and compel the declaration of a dividend, regardless of the apparent wisdom or
fairness of the dividend policy." (footnotes omitted)).
77. See, e.g., Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d at 580 ("The burden of demonstrating
bad faith, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or abuse of discretion on the part of the directors of a
corporation rests on the party seeking judicial mandatory relief respecting the declaration of
dividends."); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 14, § 328, at 915, 917 (noting that the
complaining shareholder shouldered the burden of proof).
78. See, e.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 14, § 328, at 918 ("Of the many cases
brought, relief has been granted in relatively few instances."); see also id. at 915 (describing the
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION & DIVIDEND POLICY
the business judgment rule79 was (and still is) often employed by courts to
insulate the majority's dividend decision from any meaningful judicial
review. 0
This traditional, majority-centered approach to close corporation dividend
disputes is out of step with modem understandings about the nature of close
corporations and the expectations of investors who commit their capital to such
ventures. The traditional view's reliance on the business judgment rule is an
uneasy fit in the close corporation context, and its minimal inquiry into the
propriety of the majority's decision is inconsistent with the thrust of the
shareholder oppression doctrine. For both of these reasons, courts should reject
the traditional view in favor of the reasonable expectations approach as the
standard for evaluating dividend decisions in close corporations.
B. The Need to Reject the Traditional Approach
I. The Uneasy Fit of the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a corporate law principle that insulates a
manager from liability so long as its decision was made "on an informed basis,
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company., 81 Under the business judgment rule, courts review
the majority's substantive business decision with a minimal level of scrutiny. 2
complaining shareholder's burden of proof to show abuse of discretion as "onerous"); id. at 918
(describing the complaining shareholder's burden of proof as "heavy"); Fischel, supra note 2, at
716 ("Shareholder suits challenging management dividend policy in large corporations have...
been almost uniformly unsuccessful.").
79. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment rule).
80. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975)
("[T]he plaintiff will find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies. Such
policies are considered to be within the judgment of the directors." (footnote omitted)); Israel,
supra note 66, at 73 ("The application of the business judgment rule to the declaration of
corporate dividends is one of the oldest and most widely accepted principles of corporation
law." (footnotes omitted)); Peeples, supra note 55, at 469 ("The declaration of dividends is
always at the discretion of the board of directors. The business judgment rule protects such a
decision." (footnote omitted)); Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of
Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1125 n.126 (1999) ("The business
judgment rule is seldom overcome on dividend questions."); supra note 74 and accompanying
text (discussing the application of the business judgment rule); see also Brudney, supra note 2,
at 100 n.46 ("The directors' decision to retain funds for expansion is generally presumed to have
been made in good faith.").
81. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
82. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 93 ("Statements of the rule vary; its
terms are far less important than the fact that [it] is a specially deferential approach."); James D.
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a. The Absence of a Market for Close Corporation Shares
In dividend disputes in public corporations, business judgment rule
deference is arguably appropriate. A well-functioning market can discipline a
majority shareholder for its "poor" dividend decisions because dissatisfied
minority investors can sell. Significant selling will decrease the company's
stock price"3 and, at some level, will expose company management to the
dangers of displacement through proxy fights or takeovers.8 4 Because senior
managers generally value their positions, this threat of displacement will curb
Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 615, 628 (1997)
(mentioning the "deferential presumptions dictated by the business judgment rule"). As
Professors Cary and Eisenberg have observed, "under the [business judgment] rule the
substance or quality of the director's or officer's decision will be reviewed, not under the basic
standard of conduct to determine whether the decision was prudent or reasonable, but only
under a much more limited standard." WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 603 (7th ed. 1995) (unabridged). In general, that more
limited standard is mere rationality-i.e., a substantive business decision need only be
"rational," as opposed to "reasonable," to be considered proper. See id. ("[Tihe prevalent
formulation of the standard of review of a substantive decision under the business-judgment rule
is that the decision must be 'rational."'); Cox, supra, at 629 (noting that "the standard business
judgment rule approach ... uphold[s] unequal treatment on a showing of rational business
judgment"). Under such a minimal standard of review, almost anyjustification advanced by the
majority to defend its allegedly oppressive actions will survive judicial scrutiny. See CARY &
EISENBERG, supra, at 604 ("The rationality standard of review is much easier for a defendant to
satisfy than a prudence or reasonability standard .... It is common to characterize a person's
conduct as imprudent or unreasonable, but it is very uncommon to characterize a person's
conduct as irrational."); Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh
Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 129, 154 (1990) ("So long as the controlling
stockholder's conduct is not outrageous-that is, a plausible business reason can be
articulated-his decisions are protected by the business judgment rule."); id. at 155 (noting that,
under the business judgment rule, "[c]orporate management has never been obliged to disclose
its true motivation, and can easily manufacture a 'legitimate' corporate purpose for its action"
(footnote omitted) (internal quotation omitted)); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717,720 (Del. 1971) ("A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment,
and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose."); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (granting
defendants' motion to dismiss on business judgment rule grounds).
83. As one commentator noted:
The typical public-issue corporation is interested in a healthy trading of its shares
on the open market. Regular payment of dividends is one method of keeping its
investors satisfied. If the directors fail to keep their shareholders satisfied,
shareholders will want to sell their holdings. This in turn will create a greater
supply for the corporation's shares on the market without a corresponding increase
in demand. The net result would be a depreciation in market value.
Stem, supra note 62, at 507 n.31; see infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between dividend policy and stock price).
84. See infra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a market).
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dividend decisions that fail to maximize shareholder value. 5 When a well-
functioning market exists, therefore it provides an effective restraint on the
majority's dividend decisions and there is a correspondingly diminished need
for additional judicial review. 
6
In close corporations, however, the constraints provided by the market are
absent.87 Without meaningful judicial review, there is insufficient oversight of
the controlling group's dividend decisions. In the close corporation context,
85. See infra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a market); see
also Stem, supra note 62, at 507 ("[D]irectors of a large, public-issue corporation will normally
find it desirable to declare a regular dividend when profits are sufficient in order to keep their
shareholders satisfied and to assure a favorable market for their shares.").
86. As one commentator observed:
Whether to declare a dividend and the amount of such dividend are among the
countless decisions managers must make as agents for shareholders. An inefficient
dividend decision is no different than any other suboptimal managerial decision. If
managers adopt a lower (or higher) payout policy than shareholders desire, the
price of the firm's stock will trade at a lower price than otherwise identical firms
with different dividend policies .... If a firm's share price falls far enough as a
result of suboptimal dividend policy, the firm will become a likely candidate for a
proxy fight or a tender offer .... The risk of such a takeover attempt provides
management with an incentive to set dividend policy in the best interest of its
shareholders. Managers who do not respond to this incentive will be replaced by
more capable managers who will pursue a preferable dividend policy.
Fischel, supra note 2, at 713-14 (footnotes omitted). Professors Hetherington and Dooley
express similar sentiments:
Market restraints are most visible and workable in the case of publicly held
corporations. If management is inefficient, indulges its own preferences, or
otherwise acts contrary to shareholder interests, dissatisfied shareholders will sell
their shares and move to more attractive investment opportunities. As more
shareholders express their dissatisfaction by selling, the market price of the
company's shares will decline to the point where existing management is exposed
to the risk of being displaced through a corporate takeover .... The mere threat of
displacement, whether or not realized, is a powerful incentive for managers of
publicly held corporations to promote their shareholders' interests so as to keep the
price of the company's shares as high and their own positions as secure as possible.
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 7, at 39-40 (footnote omitted); see Chittur, supra note 82,
at 158 (asserting that the business judgment rule is evidence of faith in the free market).
Interestingly, Professor Israel takes a different view:
Nor is it likely that the mechanism of the market place will exert sufficient pressure
on management to force a reevaluation of its dividend and investment policies.
Insulated from the stock market due to the corporation's capacity to internally
generate as. much as 85% of its capital requirements... management is free to
embark upon any policy it deems advisable and need not be responsive to the
shareholder or the market.
Israel, supra note 66, at 95.
87. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of a market for close
corporation stock).
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therefore, the judicial deference embodied in the business judgment rule makes
less sense:
With the large corporation, the business judgment rule can be used to
prevent the courts from second-guessing corporate managers. Their review
is not necessary because other more effective schemes regularly protect the
shareholders. But with the close corporation the same thing is not true. For
instance, in a large corporation, the failure to pay dividends sufficient to
satisfy the shareholders will reflect itself in a lowered stock price and the
danger of a proxy fight or a takeover. Thus there is no incentive for
management to follow such a policy, and it is quite logical to remove
substantially all discretion from the courts on the matter of forcing
dividends from large corporations. In the small corporation, on the other
hand, the dividend policy will most frequently reflect the personal and
perhaps peculiar financial needs of the controlling shareholders. There will
be no market to reflect dissatisfaction with this policy. Furthermore, a
failure to pay dividends may be used by the controlling group in small
corporations to force minority shareholders to sell their shares at a bargain
price. Here it can be seen that it makes considerably less sense to adopt a
judicial hands-off attitude.8"
88. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems.- Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259, 280 (1967); see also Stem, supra note 62, at 507 n.32 ("Since the directors [of a
close corporation] have no desire to create a market demand for their stock, they will not find it
necessary to pay regular dividends in order to appeal to... investors."). Professors Easterbrook
and Fischel have made similar observations:
It could be argued that judges should treat the acts of managers of close
corporations with suspicion ... because of the absence of the disciplinary effects of
the stock market and other market mechanisms. One rationale for the business
judgment rule is that managers who make errors (and even those who engage in
self-dealing) are penalized by market forces while judges who make errors are not.
Thus managers have better incentives to make correct business decisions than do
judges. But if neither managers nor courts are disciplined by market forces, this
justification has less force.
For example, the decision to terminate an employee in a publicly held corporation
is a classic example of the exercise of business judgment that a court would not
second guess. In a closely held corporation, by contrast, termination of an
employee can be a way to appropriate a disproportionate share of the firm's
earnings. It makes sense, therefore, to have greater judicial review of terminations
of managerial (or investing) employees in closely held corporations than would be
consistent with the business judgment rule. The same approach could be used with
salary, dividend, and employment decisions in closely held corporations where the
risks of conflicts of interest are greater.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations andAgency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 291-93 (1986) (emphasis added). As a Connecticut court stated:
The market for corporate control serves to constrain managers' conduct that does
not maximize shareholder wealth. It therefore serves to align the interests of
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Because the market-based rationale for the business judgment rule is absent in
the close corporation context, close corporation dividend decisions call for
more judicial scrutiny than the conventional business judgment rule deference.
b. The Presence of a Conflict of Interest
It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that a decision does not
receive the protection of the business judgment rule if the decisionmaker is
"tainted" by a conflict of interest in the transaction. 89 When a close corporation
majority shareholder makes a decision to forego dividends, it is important to
recognize that a conflict of interest is often present. That conflict stems from
the majority's desire to preserve and enhance its own employment position
within the company.90 Indeed, for many (if not most) close corporation
investors, the desire for employment is the principal enticement motivating
managers more closely with the interests of shareholders in publicly traded
corporations. The market for corporate control does not affect, however, the
incentives of managers of closely held corporations.
Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 n.18 (Conn. 1994). Another
commentator similarly argued:
The close corporation is not comparably reviewed or controlled by the market
because it has no publicly traded stock. There is little possibility of a proxy fight or
a takeover bid .... The absence ofjudicial review remains unsubstituted. Because
of the absence ofjudicial review, the business judgment rule is not an expression of
faith in the free market; worse, it is often an abdication ofjudicial responsibility to
protect the powerless.
Chittur, supra note 82, at 158; see, e.g., Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 7, at 48 ("The
preferred status of the majority [in a close corporation] is more likely to be an inadvertent
product of a failure to appreciate the importance of market forces in the regulatory scheme for
business organizations."); see also Chittur, supra note 82, at 156-61 (arguing that the business
judgment rule is inappropriate for the close corporation); F. Hodge O'Neal, Close
Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 884-85
(1978) (criticizing the application of the business judgment rule to close corporations). In
contrast, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have also noted the following:
On the other hand, the smaller number of participants in closely held corporations
ensures that managers bear more of the costs of their actions and facilitates
contractual arrangements between the parties to reduce the likelihood of self-
dealing. The differences between publicly and closely held corporations, in other
words, do not suggest unambiguously that the level ofjudicial scrutiny should vary
or, if it does, in what direction.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 29 1-92.
89. See text accompanying supra note 81 (discussing the application of the business
judgment rule).
90. See infra Part V.B (discussing the majority's conflicts of interest).
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their decision to commit capital to a venture. 9' Compared to similar
employment in other contexts, a close corporation job is frequently associated
with a higher salary,92 a prestigious management position,93 and intangible
benefits stemming from working for oneself.94 Because of the value of close
91. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) ("As a
matter of fact, providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason why he
participated in organizing the corporation." ); I CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 1.08, at
31-32 ("Providing for employment may have been the principal reason why the shareholder
participated in organizing the corporation."); see also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
353 N.E.2d 657,662 (Mass. 1976) ("A guaranty of employment with the corporation may have
been one of the basic reason(s) why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm." (internal
quotation omitted)); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901,903 (App.
Div. 1985) ("Although the exact amount of the capital contribution is disputed, petitioner
utilized his own funds in getting this new venture underway, not simply as an investment, but to
provide employment and a future for himself."); Alyse J. Ferraro, Note, Ingle v. Glamore Motor
Sales, Inc.: The Battle Between Ownership and Employment in the Close Corporation, 8
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 193, 215 (1990) ("Ingle was compensated for the sale of his shares, but to
believe that the dollar amount received met his expectations would be to dismiss his purpose in
acquiring those shares. Ingle had reasonably expected his employment to continue until he
chose to retire or to acquire his own Ford dealership. . .." (footnotes omitted)); Murdock, supra
note 3 I, at 468 ("That people often invest in a closely-held corporation to provide a job is
almost self-evident .... ); id. ("To deny a minority shareholder employment when ajob was
part of his rationale in investing is oppressive, as is the failure to pay dividends to nonemployee
shareholders when employed shareholders are receiving defacto dividends through salaries."
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); id. at 472 ("[W]hat is at stake in the 'oppression' cases is
often a job--a very attractive job."); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at I 110 (noting that a close
corporation shareholder "often invests for the purpose of having ajob").
92. This assertion, of course, assumes a comparison between similarjobs in businesses at
similar stages of development. See infra note 207 (discussing the higher salaries frequently
associated with close corporation positions).
93. See I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 3:07, at 54 (referring to the "prestige, privileges,
and patronage that come from controlling a corporation and occupying its principal offices"); id.
§ 3:06, at 38 ("[L]osing the prestige of a directorship may be of considerable consequence to the
shareholder."); infra note 208 (discussing disparities in chief executive officer positions); cf
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 65, at 174 ("[Tlhere is obvious psychic income associated with
being a senior manager of a 'Fortune 500' firm or other well known corporation.").
94. See Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (N.Y. 1989)
(Hancock, J., dissenting) (noting "the challenge, the independence, the prestige, the feeling of
achievement, and the other intangible benefits of being part of the management of a successfully
run small company"); Bahls, supra note 15, at 290-91 (noting that close corporation ownership
includes "the social status and challenge of operating one's own company and the satisfaction of
providing employment to one's children"); id. at 319 n.212 (mentioning the "loss of satisfaction
and other qualitative perks associated with operating a business"); O'Neill, supra note 61, at
668, 671 (describing the "psychological payoffs" that an "owner-manager" anticipate§ as a result
of investing in a venture, including "the pleasure of being one's own boss, the feeling of
satisfaction in creating a viable enterprise and even the excitement of taking a substantial risk");
Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1110 ("Additionally, the employee may simply derive satisfaction
from working in a business that he himself takes a substantial part in managing."); see also
Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("[A] job in the family
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corporation employment, the majority's decision to forego dividends may be
dictated by the majority's personal desire to preserve and enhance its own
employment capital, rather than by an interest in maximizing shareholder value.
For example, the majority shareholder may retain profits and forego dividends
in order to fuel company growth, as growth often has the effect of increasing
the majority's employment compensation.95 Even if this conflict is not as direct
as the law typically requires for rebutting the business judgment rule,96 its
presence casts at least some doubt on the wisdom of giving great deference to
the majority and of avoiding a deeper review of the majority's decision.97
2. The Thrust of the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine
The shareholder oppression doctrine is premised on the notion that
majority shareholder decisions in close corporations can disadvantage minority
shareholders in ways that would not be possible in a public corporation context.
The doctrine recognizes that matters traditionally entrusted to majority business
discretion-for example, employment, management, and dividend decisions-
can be manipulated to effectuate a minority shareholder freeze-out.98 More
business probably provides considerably more security than one might find in other
employment.").
95. See infra Part V.B (discussing conflicts of interest between minority and majority
shareholders).
96. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,721-22 (Del. 1971). In Sinclair
Oil, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that because a decision to pay dividends affected
all shares equally, there was no self-dealing by the controlling shareholder to rebut the business
judgment rule. Id. Following the logic of Sinclair Oil, a decision to forego paying dividends
presumably affects all shares equally as well. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the dividend irrelevance theory). Such a decision, therefore, is unlikely to rebut the
business judgment rule under traditional public corporation doctrine. But see Smith v. Atl.
Prop., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (finding liability for a controlling
shareholder of a close corporation who refused to pay dividends, and stating that "[t]he
judgment ... necessarily disregards the general judicial reluctance to interfere with a
corporation's dividend policy ordinarily based upon the business judgment of its directors").
97. As one commentator observed:
A better solution to unwarranted retention would be to delimit the parameters of the
business judgment rule as it applies to the declaration of corporate dividends,
thereby minimizing management's potential for abuse of its powers. This departure
from the historic application of the business judgment rule to dividends would be in
conformity with the traditional legal approach to a conflict of interest between
management and shareholder.
Israel, supra note 66, at 98.
98. See, e.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460,467 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In the context of a closely
held corporation, many classic business judgment decisions can also have a substantial and
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specifically, one of the lessons conveyed by the shareholder oppression doctrine
is that the majority's control over the firm's dividend policy can be devastating
to a minority investor in a close corporation.99
Because employment discharges, management removals, and dividend
denials can severely harm the value of a close corporation shareholder's
investment, 00 the oppression doctrine calls for legitimate scrutiny of a
majority's decision to take one or more of such actions. The doctrine conveys,
in other words, that such decisions require a more probing judicial review than
the conventional business judgment rule allows.'0 ' Thus, the thrust of the
shareholder oppression doctrine is at odds with a judicial approach that gives
great deference to the majority's actions. Because the traditional right to
compel dividends operates with such a "majority-deference" view,'0 2 that law is
a poor choice for close corporation disputes. In contrast, by inquiring into
whether the majority's actions have frustrated the minority's investment
expectations, the reasonable expectations approach requires more than a mere
adverse affect on the 'minority's' interest as shareholder.").
99. See supra notes 28-32, 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of freeze-
out tactics).
100. See supra notes 28-32, 57-58,67-73 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
freeze-out tactics).
101. See, e.g., Smith, 422 N.E.2d at 801, 804 (stating, in a close corporation dispute, that
"[t]he judgment... necessarily disregards the general judicial reluctance to interfere with a
corporation's dividend policy ordinarily based upon the business judgment of its directors");
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 645 P.2d 929, 935 (Mont. 1982) ("When it is also considered that in close
corporations dividend withholding may be used by controlling shareholders to force out
minority shareholders, the traditional judicial restraint in interfering with corporate dividend
policy cannot be justified." (citation omitted)); Grato v. Grato, 639 A.2d 390, 396 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994) ("[J]udicial consideration of a claim of majority oppression or freeze-out in
a closely held corporation is guided by considerations broader than those espoused in
defendants' version of the 'business judgment rule.'"); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) ("[T]he statutory language embodies a
legislative determination that freeze-out maneuvers in close corporations constitute an abuse of
corporate power. Traditional principles of corporate law, such as the business judgment rule,
have failed to curb this abuse. Consequently, actions of close corporations that conform with
these principles cannot be immune from scrutiny."); O'Neill, supra note 61, at 692 ("The
burden-shifting scheme devised in Wilkes [a close corporation oppression decision] effectively
deprives majority shareholders of the protection of the business judgment rule by requiring
close judicial scrutiny of the majority's action whenever the minority is harmed."); id. at 690
n. 155 ("Courts in some jurisdictions have refused to apply the business judgment rule to close
corporations in an effort to correct the squeeze out problem."). But see Brenner v. Berkowitz,
634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993) (noting, in a close corporation dispute, that "the court is
hesitant to overturn the corporation's valued exercise of its business judgment," and observing
that "[t]he Chancery Division properly concluded that it could not second-guess the
corporation's exercise of its business-judgment").
102. See supra Part IIL.A (discussing the traditional approach to compelling dividends).
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surface inquiry into the majority's conduct. As such, it is a more appropriate
standard. °3 In jurisdictions that have adopted the shareholder oppression
doctrine, it should be deemed that such adoption has, in the close corporation
context, displaced the case law representing the traditional approach.' 4
3. Summary
Because the reasonable expectations standard avoids reliance on the
business judgment rule, it is a more appropriate standard for a close corporation
context where the discipline of a market is absent and where the majority is
tainted by self-interest. Similarly, because the reasonable expectations
approach involves a deeper inquiry into the majority's employment,
103. The reasonable expectations approach is also a more appropriate standard for
shareholder oppression disputes-including disputes over dividends-because it views
oppression from a minority perspective rather than from a majority perspective. See generally
Moll, Shareholder Oppression, supra note 60, at 789-809 (arguing that a "modified" minority
perspective of oppression is superior to a majority perspective of oppression). In other words,
the traditional right to dividends focuses on the propriety of the majority's conduct. If the
majority's conduct is sufficiently improper to be characterized as "fraud" or "bad faith," liability
is found. See supra Part III.A (describing the traditional judicial approach to compelling
dividends). The reasonable expectations approach, however, moves away from an emphasis on
the majority's conduct. Instead, it focuses primarily on the effect that such majority conduct has
on the minority shareholder. If the majority's actions frustrate a reasonable expectation of the
minority, oppression liability is found, even if the majority's actions would not typically be
characterized as improper. See, e.g., Peeples, supra note 55, at 504 (observing that the
reasonable expectations analysis "[c]hannel[s] the inquiry away from assessing fault");
Thompson, supra note 21, at 219-20 ("The increasing use of the reasonable expectations
standard reflects a move away from an exclusive search for egregious conduct by those in
control of the enterprise and toward greater consideration of the effect of conduct on the
complaining shareholder, even if no egregious conduct by controllers can be shown."); id. at
210 ("The increasing legislative and judicial tendency to define oppression by reference to the
reasonable expectations of shareholders.. . [has] pushed the focus of the dissolution remedy
beyond fault of the controlling shareholders."); see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019,
1029 (N.J. 1993) ("Focusing on the harm to the minority shareholder reflects a departure from
the traditional focus, which was solely on the wrongdoing by those in control, and reflects the
current trend of recognizing the special nature of close corporations." (citations omitted)).
104. Many oppression decisions suggest that this "displacement" of the traditional view
has, in fact, occurred. Rather than inquiring into whether the majority shareholder committed
fraud or bad faith in choosing not to declare dividends, many courts are instead asking whether
the majority has frustrated the minority's reasonable expectation of sharing in the profits of the
company. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179-81 (N.Y. 1984)
(examining whether majority actions frustrated the minority's reasonable expectations). Even
where courts still articulate the traditional "abuse of discretion" standard as discussed in Part
III.A, it is often employed with a broader, more minority-friendly view of what constitutes
abuse. See, e.g., Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *6-9 (Del. Ch. Feb. II, 1992)
(finding a claim where plaintiff alleged a squeeze-out).
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management, and dividend decisions, the approach is consistent with the
underlying premises of the shareholder oppression doctrine. For these reasons,
courts should view the shareholder oppression doctrine as having superseded
the traditional approach to compelling dividends.
C. The Limits of the Reasonable Expectations Standard
As previously discussed, close corporation shareholders, at a minimum,
possess a general expectation that their status as "stockholders" entitles them to
a proportionate share of the company's profits.'0 5 Because close corporations
lack a market that reflects capital appreciation, the investor usually receives its
share of the profits through dividends (either as "true" declarations or as "de
facto" distributions through, typically, employment compensation). 0 6 In a
sense, therefore, one can view the general expectation of sharing
proportionately in the company's profits as a general expectation of dividends.
The mere fact that a general expectation of dividends is possessed,
however, does not mean that a minority shareholder can demand its
proportionate share of the profits--that is, can demand a dividend-at any time.
The oppression doctrine only enforces "reasonable" expectations and,
depending on the particular circumstances before the court, a demand for
dividends may not be reasonable. For example, where the majority chooses not
to declare a dividend in an effort to retain profits for company expansion, or for
an investment opportunity, or for any other legitimate business purpose,
premising oppression liability on the frustration of the minority's general
expectation may be inappropriate. 0 7 In such circumstances, a minority's
105. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the "general" reasonable
expectation).
106. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
dividends in the close corporation).
107. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed:
[W]hen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit against the majority
alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the majority, we
must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders in the
individual case. It must be asked whether the controlling group can demonstrate a
legitimate business purpose for its action.
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); see, e.g., Gay v.
Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 580 (Me. 1975) ("If there are plausible business
reasons supportive of the [dividend] decision of the board of directors, and such reasons can be
given credence, a Court will not interfere with a corporate board's right to make that decision.");
Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) ("Where majority or controlling
shareholders in a close corporation breach their heightened fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders by utilizing their majority control of the corporation to their own advantage,
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general expectation of dividends is arguably unreasonable, and the majority's
"frustration" of that unreasonable expectation should not give rise to oppression
liability.'08 Simply put, the minority's interest in dividends has to be balanced
against the majority's legitimate right to make business decisions for the
company.' 9 Although it is fair to say that all close corporation shareholders
possess a general expectation of profit participation, a court cannot give effect
to that expectation-that is, a court cannot deem that expectation to be
reasonable-in all circumstances.
Obviously, if explicit evidence exists indicating that the majority and
minority shareholders agreed to defer dividends in particular circumstances," 0 a
court should rely on that evidence in assessing the reasonableness of a minority
investor's assertion that the majority's conduct has frustrated its general
expectation."' For example, if the evidence indicated that all of the investors
without providing minority shareholders with an equal opportunity to benefit, such breach,
absent a legitimate business purpose, is actionable." (emphasis added)); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,
560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977) ("[T]hose in control of corporate affairs have fiduciary duties
of good faith and fair dealing toward the minority shareholders .... [T]hat duty is discharged if
the decision is made in good faith and reflects legitimate business purposes rather than the
private interests of those in control.").
108. See supra note 107 (discussing whether an expectation of dividends is reasonable in
the circumstances).
109. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 ("The majority... have certain rights to what has
been termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation which should be balanced against the
concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority."); Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d
1382, 1387 (N.J. 1996) ("[M]inority shareholders' expectations must ... be balanced against
the corporation's ability to exercise its business judgment and run its business efficiently.");
Willis v. Bydalek, 997 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [I st Dist.] 1999, petition denied)
("The minority shareholder's reasonable expectations must be balanced against the
corporation's need to exercise its business judgment and run its business efficiently."); Hillman,
supra note 59, at 60 (suggesting that an oppression standard should "develop a satisfactory
method for balancing the competing interests and expectations of majority and minority
shareholders"); Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority
Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?, 97 DICK. L.
REv. 227, 258 (1993) ("The courts must balance the interests of minority shareholders against
the majority's interest in making business decisions and limiting the minority shareholder's
power."); see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 572 (N.C. 1983) (Martin, J.,
concurring) (observing that the oppression inquiry requires "a consideration and balancing of all
the circumstances of the case in determining whether relief should be granted and, if so, the
extent, nature and method of such relief").
110. See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("In
conjunction with this expansion, the shareholders, including plaintiff, signed a buy-sale
agreement as to corporate stock, which among other things, prohibited payment of cash
dividends during the ten-year term of the loan.").
I 1. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 450.1489(3) (Michie 2002) (noting that oppressive conduct
"does not include conduct or actions that are permitted by an agreement"); In re Topper, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The Court may determine the understanding of the parties
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reached an understanding that the corporation would not pay dividends during a
period of corporate growth, that evidence should, in most instances, lead a court
to reject a claim of oppression liability during that period, at least a claim that is
based upon an alleged frustrated general expectation."
2
Unfortunately, in most close corporation disputes, such explicit
understandings or agreements are absent.' 3  A court has only the outer
parameters of the general expectation to go on-the basic notion that all
shareholders reasonably expect that they are entitled to participation in the
company's profits. In many respects, it is analogous to a court attempting to
interpret a skeletal agreement between the shareholders. It is clear that the
majority and minority participants have reached an understanding that all
stockholders are entitled to a proportionate share of the company's profits," 1
4
as to the role the complaining shareholder is expected to play from agreements and evidence
submitted."); see also M[NN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3a) (West 1992) ("[Any written
agreements... between or among shareholders or between or among one or more shareholders
and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties' reasonable expectations concerning
matters dealt with in the agreements."); Hillman, supra note 59, at 78 ("The clearest type of
expectation is one which is set forth in a shareholder's agreement signed by all of the parties.");
cf In re Apple, 637 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (App. Div. 1996) (noting that a buyout agreement
explicitly bound each shareholder to sell "after ceasing for any reason, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, to be in the employ of the corporation," and stating that, as a result, the terminated
close corporation minority shareholder "cannot be heard to argue that he had a reasonable
expectation that he would be employed and would be a shareholder for life"); Woodard v.
Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. 1964) ("Where there exists a valid express
contract covering the subject matter, there can be no implied contract.").
112. See supra note I ll and accompanying text (discussing the effect of agreements on
reasonable expectations). If the majority is paying itself de facto dividends in violation of this
understanding, of course, oppression liability should arise. See infra Part IV (discussing de
facto dividend disputes).
113. See, e.g., Chittur, supra note 82, at 160 (noting that the expectations of a close
corporation shareholder "may not be articulated with lawyerly precision"); O'Neal, supra note
88, at 883-84 ("A person taking a minority position in a close corporation often leaves himself
vulnerable to squeeze-out or oppression by failing to insist upon a shareholders' agreement or
appropriate charter or bylaw provisions ...."); id. at 886 ("The participants typically enter into
'agreements' among themselves, which sometimes are reduced to writing in the form of a formal
preincorporation agreement or a shareholders' agreement, but which often are oral, perhaps just
vague and half-articulated understandings."); see also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) ("The expectations of the parties in the
instant suit with regard to their participation in corporate affairs are not established by any
agreement."); Chittur, supra note 82, at 131 ("[P]eople generally avoid complex and expensive
planning in small businesses."); id. at 139 (stating that "inadequately planned close corporations
will always remain part of the picture," and noting that "[t]he most careful plan may fail to
visualize some conflicts, even if it does not generate novel ones of its own").
114. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the "general" reasonable
expectation).
874
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION & DIVIDEND POLICY
but it is unclear when a particular shareholder can demand distribution of its
share through dividends."15
One way to resolve these uncertainties is to ask hypothetically what the
shareholders would have agreed to had they contemplated the particular
circumstances at issue.' 6 That is, what understandings would the shareholders
115. Similar problems arise in dealing with specific reasonable expectations. See supra
notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing basic understandings that close corporation
shareholders usually reach). At the inception of a close corporation venture, there is often
sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a basic understanding between the shareholders
that investment in the company entitled a shareholder to employment or management
participation. See Moll, supra note 56, at 1006-10 (discussing basic understandings that close
corporation shareholders usually reach). Because reasonable expectations derive from such
shared understandings between close corporation investors, that same evidence suffices to
establish that the shareholders had specific reasonable expectations of employment or
management. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[T]he
'reasonable expectations' test is indeed an examination into the spoken and unspoken
understanding upon which the founders relied when entering into the venture."); Hillman, supra
note 59, at 78 ("[O]nly expectations embodied in understandings, express or implied, among the
participants should be recognized."); Thompson, supra note 21, at 224 (observing that a
reasonable expectations standard is based "on the parties' understandings"). There is generally
no evidence, however, indicating whether the parties intended this basic understanding or
expectation to persist in the post-inception circumstances before the court. For example, do the
parties still share a basic understanding of employment after the venture's inception when the
minority shareholder has engaged in misconduct, or when the minority shareholder's
performance is inadequate? Put differently, is the basic expectation of employment still"reasonable" under these circumstances? As mentioned, there is usually no evidence indicating
how the shareholders wanted these questions to be answered.
116. As Professor Farnsworth observes:
It is sometimes suggested that if a court cannot determine the actual expectations of
the parties, it should implement the expectations that it thinks they would have had
if they had considered the matter, thereby remedying 'the shortsightedness of
individuals, by doing for them what they would have done for themselves if their
imagination had anticipated the march of nature.'
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 500 (3d ed. 1999); see, e.g., Gunderson v.
Alliance of Computer Prof Is, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) ("In the
absence of specific agreements, reasonable expectations may be determined by reference to the
understandings that would normally be expected to result from associative bargaining." (internal
quotation omitted)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 83 (1986) ("Under the standard theory, when a contractual
term is missing, the court may insert that term which it believes rational parties would have
agreed upon had they focused on it."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 293 ("If a court
is unavoidably entwined in a dispute, it must decide what the parties would have bargained for
had they written a completely contingent contract."); id. at 291 ("Properly interpreted, fiduciary
duties should approximate the bargain the parties themselves would have reached had they been
able to negotiate at low cost."); id. at 298 ("The right inquiry is always what the parties would
have contracted for had transaction costs been zero."); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1131 (noting,
in a shareholder oppression context, that "[it] would seem to be the courts' job to either enforce
the spirit of the deal between the parties, even in cases where no formal contract exists, or to ask
what protections the parties would have contracted for had they considered a particular question
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likely have reached if, at the outset of the venture, they had bargained over the
possibility of the majority refusing to declare dividends for business reasons,
personal reasons, or for no reasons at all?" 7 Put differently, to convince the
objectively reasonable investor to commit a substantial part of his savings to a
close corporation," 8 what understandings would the shareholders likely have to
reach regarding the distribution of dividends?
This Article contends that the understandings resulting from these
hypothetical bargains should be accepted as valid and accurate statements about
the rationale of shareholders that invest in close corporations. More precisely,
this Article asserts that the understandings should be accepted as the
presumptive terms of the dividend "deal" that typical close corporation
shareholders strike. In the absence of evidence indicating that the parties
actually reached a consensus contrary to these understandings," 9 the majority's
violation of the hypothetical understandings should give rise to oppression
liability. As this Article discusses the basic types of dividend disputes in close
corporations, this hypothetical bargaining model will be employed to provide
guidance for resolving the disputes.
IV The Problem of De Facto Dividends
Perhaps the clearest case for judicial intervention into a close
corporation's dividend policy involves the majority shareholder's receipt of"de
facto" dividends to the exclusion of the minority shareholder. A dividend is
merely a distribution of corporate profit to shareholders.120 As mentioned, a
close corporation often chooses vehicles other than traditional dividend
declarations to distribute its profits to investors. For example, salary and other
employment-related compensation are typically used as mechanisms for
at the corporation's inception" (footnote omitted)); see also Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79
F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A 'fiduciary' duty to investor-employees, which protects the
return on investment, then may approximate the terms the investors would have accepted had
they bargained expressly."); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 246 ("Completely
overlooked in all of this rhetoric was the basic question-which outcome would the parties have
selected had they contracted in anticipation of this contingency?").
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical bargains).
118. See infra note 222 (noting that close corporation shareholders often commit a large
portion of their personal wealth to the venture).
119. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
explicit evidence).
120. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 478 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a dividend as "[t]he
distribution of current or accumulated earnings to the shareholders of a corporation pro rata
based on the number of shares owned").
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distributing close corporation profit because the company can deduct
reasonable employee compensation, but not reasonable dividend payments,
from its taxable income.121 A "de facto" dividend, therefore, is simply a
distribution of corporate profit to shareholders that a company disguises, often
for tax reasons, as some other form of compensation or perquisite.
122
Because close corporations often distribute their business returns in the
form of de facto dividends, declarations of "true" dividends are rare. 2 ' So long
as all of the investors are receiving their proportionate share of the de facto
dividends, this absence of true dividends is generally unobjectionable as a
corporate matter. In such circumstances, the investors are receiving their
proportionate share of the company's profits and, consequently, their general
reasonable expectations are met. When the majority receives de facto
dividends but excludes the minority from them, however, the absence of true
dividends becomes problematic. Without true or de facto dividends, the
minority has been effectively excluded from its proportionate share of the
company's profits. Such situations likely frustrate the minority's general
reasonable expectation and warrant judicial intervention.'24
In de facto dividend cases, however, some important distinctions could be
drawn. In many of the published oppression decisions that address the issue,
the minority's exclusion from de facto dividends results from "majority fault"-
121. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the tax implications of salary
and dividends).
122. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270,277 (Alaska 1980) ("Regardless
of how the corporation labels these [salary and compensation] expenditures, if they were not
made for the reasonable value of services rendered to the corporation, some portion of these
payments might be characterized as constructive dividends."); Hirschkom v. Severson, 319
N.W.2d 475, 477 (N.D. 1982) ("[Tlhe corporation paid no dividends .... Rather, the corporate
directors distributed the profits via salary increases, bonuses, and benefits .... ").
123. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661, 662 n.13
(Mass. 1976) (involving a minority shareholder who was terminated from employment and
removed from management in a company where no dividends were paid); In re Burack, 524
N.Y.S.2d 457,459-60 (App. Div. 1988) (same); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359,362 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (same); see also Silling v. Erwin, 881 F. Supp. 236, 238 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (observing
that a close corporation "never declared a dividend in its forty-five year history"); Bonavita v.
Corbo, 692 A.2d 119,125 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("Absent employment... the normal
corporate benefit which one ... might expect would be the payment of dividends. This
corporation, however, pays no dividends."); In re Schlachter, 546 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div.
1989) ("[T]he record reveals that the corporations have never paid any dividends."); In re
Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (App. Div. 1989) ("[A]s is common with closely held
corporations, no policy of declaring dividends appeared to exist."); O'Neal, supra note 88, at
887 (noting that it is "usually the case" that a close corporation pays no dividends).
124. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 277 (involving the frustration of the general
reasonable expectation); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (N.Y. 1984)
(same); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020-22 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same).
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that is, the majority shareholder takes some sort of unjustified action, such as a
wrongful termination of the minority's employment, that creates the
exclusion. 125  In such cases, the equities favor the aggrieved minority
shareholder and the need for judicial intervention seems clear. Significantly,
however, the minority's exclusion from de facto dividends can also result fiom
"minority fault"-that is, the minority's misconduct or incompetence can
prompt a justified majority action, such as the termination of the minority's
employment. 126 The judiciary has rarely confronted these cases, and the
propriety ofjudicial intervention is less clear. Finally, some disputes involve a
"no fault" exclusion from de facto dividends, such as when a minority
shareholder has been passive since the inception of the venture. 2 7 Each of
these scenarios will be discussed in turn.
A. Exclusion from De Facto Dividends: Majority Fault
As mentioned, many of the published oppression decisions involve a
classic freeze-out where the majority shareholder unjustifiably terminates the
minority shareholder's employment. 2 As a result, the minority is no longer
entitled to salary and other employment-related compensation. The majority,
however, will typically maintain its employment with the company and will
continue to receive a salary and bonuses. 29 When a company is paying de
facto dividends through employment rather than declaring true dividends, this
state of affairs is obviously detrimental to the minority. The amounts received
as salary and bonuses constitute not only compensation for the value of the
actual labor services performed for the company, but also a distribution of
125. See, e.g., Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *l1-2, *7-8 (Del. Ch. Feb.
11, 1992) (firing shareholder); Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 01 0268BLS,
2002 WL 532605, at *8-9 (Mass. Super. Feb. 12, 2002) (same); In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at
1176, 1180-81 (same); Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998) (removing shareholders from board of directors and depriving them of profits).
126. See, e.g., Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1020-22 (involving a minority shareholder who
embezzled funds from the company).
127. A "no fault" exclusion from de facto dividends might also involve a shareholder who
quits or resigns from its position of employment with the corporation. See, e.g., Erdman v.
Yolles, 233 N.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (involving a shareholder who was
excluded from de facto dividends after he resigned from the company); In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d
at 1176, 1180-81 (same); Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1086, 1090 (Or. 1977) (same).
128. See Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d I, 10 (S.D. 1997) (describing freeze-out
situations as "typical of oppression cases"); supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing
majority fault situations).
129. See, e.g., Leslie, 2002 WL 532605, at *8-9 (involving de facto dividends); In re
Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1176, 1180-81 (same).
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profit to the shareholder. 30 By terminating the minority's employment and
maintaining its own job, therefore, the majority has created a situation where it
continues to receive a return on its investment while the minority shareholder
does not. '3 It is the functional equivalent of the majority shareholder choosing
to declare a dividend only for itself. Such a non-uniform declaration is
impermissible under general corporate law principles.'32
Moreover, from a hypothetical bargaining standpoint, the investors surely
would not have agreed to an arrangement where the majority, solely at its whim
and without any valid reason, could exclude a minority shareholder from
distributions of profit that other shareholders (including the majority) are
continuing to receive. "' Such an arrangement would give the majority the
130. See, e.g., Leslie, 2002 WL 532605, at *9 ("[T]his Court concludes that the $45,000
'employee bonus' payments that [the controlling shareholders] awarded themselves.., are
nothing more than distributions or dividends of the kind previously made to shareholders.");
Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. 1983) (distinguishing between salary
payments that reflected "reasonable compensation," and "excess" salary payments that "shall be
treated as profits"); Murdock, supra note 3 1, at 468 ("The courts have recognized the reality that
compensation paid to those in control has a two-fold function: to recompense services and to
provide a return on investment."); supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing
compensation in close corporations).
131. See, e.g., Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many
closely held firms endeavor to show no profits (to minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real
economic returns of the business to the investors as salary. When firms are organized in this
way, firing an employee is little different from canceling his shares." (emphasis added));
Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("In a close corporation, since
dividends are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the
functional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends."); see also Bonavita v. Corbo,
692 A.2d 119, 128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("When defendants terminated the salary
payments that had been made to Gerald Bonavita, they had an obligation to provide, or at least
try to provide, some alternative benefit to the holder of Bonavita stock. They were not free
simply to ignore those interests and operate the corporation for the sole benefit of [the
controlling shareholder]."); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1176, 1180 (N.Y.
1984) (involving a close corporation that, after two shareholders ceased working for the
company, oppressively changed its policy of distributing earnings from one based on share
ownership to one based on services rendered to the corporation: "It was not unreasonable for
the fact finder to have determined that this change in policy amounted to nothing less than an
attempt to exclude petitioners from gaining any return on their investment through the mere
recharacterization of distributions of corporate income.").
132. See Manne, supra note 88, at 274 ("[T]he directors may not declare a dividend to
some holders of a class of shares but not to others holding shares of the same class."); see also
Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Ass'n, 76 N.E. 707, 708 (I1. 1906) ("Dividends among
stockholders of the same class must always be equal and without discrimination .... "); Leslie v.
Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *8-9 (Mass. Super.
Feb. 12, 2002) ("What must not be done is to make payments only to the majority shareholders,
payments having different names or styles but being in reality dividends.").
133. See Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and a
Proposed Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CoRP. L. 817, 840 (1985) ("Never should the minority
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unfettered right to freeze a minority investor out of the company's business
returns for so long as the majority desires. Given the absence of bargaining
power disparities at the inception of a close corporation venture,13 4 it seems
likely that minority investors would have refused to invest in the company if the
majority had insisted on such unfettered discretion. Put differently, to induce
minority investors to commit capital to the venture, the majority shareholder
would likely have to agree that it would not pay dividends ("true" or "de facto")
in a disproportionate manner.
In majority fault disputes, therefore, judicial intervention into a close
corporation's dividend policy is clearly warranted. By and large, the courts
have agreed, presumably because frustration of the minority's general
reasonable expectation is so clear where the majority wrongfully excludes the
minority from de facto dividends but continues to receive those dividends
itself.'35
participant be understood as assenting to the effective confiscation of his or her
investment .... ").
134. See Moll, supra note 56, at 1074-75. Indeed, the author has previously stated the
following:
[T]he close corporation investor, ex ante, has the bargaining leverage to demand
[protective] terms. After all, a prospective shareholder-employee of a close
corporation has viable alternative options if the majority shareholder refuses to
enter into a protective bargain. For example, the prospective shareholder-employee
can invest her capital in other close corporations willing to provide more favorable
terms, or the shareholder-employee can avoid close corporations all together by
simply entrusting her capital to the stock or bond markets. In addition, given that
the pool of potential investors for a particular close corporation (with its own
particular line of business) is, presumably, relatively small, the majority shareholder
has an incentive to make concessions to secure the potential investor's much-
needed capital, as another prospective investor for that particular venture may not
come along for quite some time (if ever). Simply put, because the bargaining
leverage at the outset favors the prospective shareholder-employee, nothing
compels the shareholder-employee to invest on unfavorable terms.
Id.; see also O'Neill, supra note 61, at 663 ("At the outset, the shareholder faces an extremely
diverse array of other ... investment opportunities encompassing not only stock in other...
corporations, but also interests in mutual funds and debt securities of corporations, financial
institutions and governmental authorities."); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1109 (noting that close
corporation investors "would seem well advised to trust their capital to diversified mutual funds
rather than a small corporation").
135. See, e.g., Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *1-2, *7-8 (Del. Ch. Feb.
II, 1992) (recognizing an oppression claim); Leslie, 2002 WL 532605, at *8-9 (same); In re
Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1176, 1180-81 (same); Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98,
106 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
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B. Exclusion from De Facto Dividends: Minority Fault
Where the minority's own misconduct or incompetence has led to its
exclusion from de facto dividends, more difficult questions arise. On the one
hand, although a termination of the minority's employment or a removal of the
minority from management is likely justifiable when the majority can establish
the minority's misconduct or incompetence,136 unfairness to the minority may
136. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554,561-62 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979) ("Plaintiff's discharge from employment with the corporation... was
because of his unsatisfactory performance. The circumstances under which the parties'
expectations in these areas were disappointed do not establish oppressive action toward plaintiff
by the controlling shareholders."); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020 (Sup. Ct.
1984) ("[The minority shareholder's] discharge, as well as his subsequent exclusion from
corporate management, were not oppressive. It was clearly not wrongful for the corporate
victim of a theft to exclude the thief from the councils of power."); Meiselman v. Meiselman,
307 S.E.2d 551, 564 (N.C. 1983) ("For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations analysis,
he must prove that.., the expectation has been frustrated [and] the frustration was without fault
of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control."); id. at 572 (Martin, J., concurring) ("If it
is determined that plaintiff's rights or interests require protection because of plaintiff's own
conduct, it would be improper to grant equitable relief. He who seeks equity must do equity.");
Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1079 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("[The minority's] resignation was the
result of his deteriorating relationship with [the majority] and ofhis own action in responding to
a bank request in a way that ... harmed the corporation. We are not persuaded that [the
majority's] actions in those regards are the kind of conduct that the law treats as oppressive
conduct against minority interests."); see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 10.19, 1029 (N.J.
1993) ("A court could reasonably determine that unfairness would result if a minority
shareholder were permitted to seek judicial intervention after years of acquiescence or
participation in the alleged misconduct."); I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 1:01, at 2 ("Minority
shareholders may be so uncooperative and act so unreasonably and improperly that controlling
shareholders are justified in moving to eliminate them from the enterprise .... );2 OPPRESSION,
supra note 22, § 7:15, at 94 n. 15 ("As a practical matter, there is something anomalous about
permitting a shareholder's laziness, absenteeism and/or inefficiency to confront the controlling
shareholders with a Hobson's choice of retaining him at full pay or risking dissolution and all
the adverse financial and ,tax consequences that come in its wake ... ." (internal quotation
omitted)); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 295 ("It is hard to imagine.., how closely
held corporations could function under a requirement that all shareholders have an 'equal
opportunity' to receive salary increases and continue in office regardless of their conduct."
(emphasis added)); Hillman, supra note 59, at 55 (noting the "allocation of adverse economic
consequences on the basis of fault" as a possible policy objective); id. at 77 (noting that a
prerequisite for relief under an expectations-based analysis should be that "the failure to achieve
the expectation was in large part beyond the control of the participant"); id. at 80 ("Requiring
that the dissatisfied shareholder not be responsible for the failure to achieve his or her own
expectations may appear to be one of the more arguable of the prerequisites for relief. The
absence of such a condition, however, would enable a dissatisfied shareholder to obtain relief by
simply sabotaging the expectations."); Miller, Should the Definition, supra note 109, at 233-34
("[Rielief may be denied to minority shareholders whose behavior justifies the majority's
conduct."); Sandra K. Miller, How Can the Reasonable Expectations Standard be Reasonably
Applied in Pennsylvania?, 12 J. L. & COM. 51, 68 (1992) ("The minority's expectations may be
frustrated where his misconduct is perceived as being the cause leading up to the frustration of
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still arise if the actions result in the minority ceasing to receive its share of the
company profits. After all, while misconduct or incompetence directly relates
to one's ability to serve as an effective manager or employee, such "unfitness"
has nothing to do with one's right to a financial return on a previously-made
investment in the business. 37 Under such a view, a company that distributed
profits solely as salary might have to declare "true" dividends in order to
provide a return to a shareholder who was terminated, even justifiably, from its
employment position. 3 ' On the other hand, the shareholders may have had le-
gitimate business reasons for structuring the company as one that distributed
profits via de facto dividends rather than true dividends.'39 Should the
company have to change that profit-distribution scheme-that is, declare true
dividends-simply because of a blameworthy shareholder whose own actions
caused the original de facto dividend scheme to become inequitable?
If explicit agreements or understandings between the shareholders speak to
this problem, they should clearly govern the situation. As mentioned, however,
explicit agreements or understandings are absent in most close corporations
and, as a consequence, one can only make hypothetical inquiries. 140 That is,
what understandings would the shareholders likely have reached if, at the outset
of the venture, they had contemplated the possibility of a justifiable exclusion
from the company's method of distributing profits?
Unless very special circumstances are present, it is hard to imagine close
corporation shareholders agreeing that a complete freeze-out is permissible
under any set of facts. After all, when the majority justifiably terminates a
minority shareholder from employment and consequently cuts the minority
shareholder out of the company's earnings distribution scheme, the net effect is
the same as a malicious freeze-out. The majority denies the minority its
his expectations."); D. Prentice, Protection of Minority Shareholders, 1972 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 124, 145 (1972) ("Prima facie exclusion from corporate affairs should give rise to a
remedy .... Circumstances might exist, however, justifying such exclusion. For example,
where it can be proven that the excluded member was the author of his own fate then he should
not be afforded any relief.").
137. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
shareholder rights and employee rights).
138. See infra note 147 and accompanying text (describing when the declaration of true
dividends may be required).
139. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (observing
that a de facto dividend policy "was basic to the financial structure of the business," and stating
that paying true dividends would run "clearly against the original intent of the shareholders"
because it would provide a disproportionate share of the income to some of the stockholders);
see supra note 29 (discussing the tax implications of"true" dividends and "de facto" dividends).
140. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting that explicit agreements are
typically absent in close corporations).
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proportionate share of the business returns for an indefinite period of time, and
there is no market available for the minority to exit the situation.' 41 Most
likely, an understanding that the majority could render a shareholder's
investment worthless for an indeterminate period of time is not one that close
corporation shareholders would reach, even if the minority shareholder's
misconduct or incompetence precipitated the situation. 1
42
Perhaps another way of articulating the same idea is to assert that close
corporation shareholders would likely reach an understanding that the
punishment needs to fit the crime. As mentioned, while misconduct or
incompetence may be grounds for the forfeiture of a specific reasonable
expectation of employment or management, 143 such notions of unfitness are
unrelated to the general reasonable expectation of sharing in the business
returns.144 It is the making of the financial investment itself-not any notion of
satisfactory performance in an employment or management position-that
gives rise to the general expectation of sharing proportionately in the
company's profits. 45 Simply put, misconduct or incompetence in an active
participation role (employment, management) should forfeit the shareholder's
right to that active participation in the company. Allowing that same conduct to
forfeit the shareholder's right to passive participation in the company (profit-
sharing), however, goes too far.' 46  Either a buyout of the shareholder's
interests should occur, or a court should force the company to declare true
dividends. 47 Although the company may be compelled to change its profit-
141. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing freeze-out techniques).
142. Cf Bradley, supra note 133, at 840 ("Never should the minority participant be
understood as assenting to the effective confiscation of his or her investment .... "). At best,
one could imagine the shareholders agreeing to a temporary (and brief) exclusion from
dividends, either as additional punishment or because the company needs some time to
implement changes to its profit-distribution scheme so as to include the now-passive
shareholder. See infra notes 147-48, 162 and accompanying text (discussing minority fault and
its effect on hypothetical bargains).
143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing minority fault).
144. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554,561-62 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979) (concluding that a minority shareholder's termination was not oppressive in
light of the minority's "unsatisfactory performance," but noting that the minority's expectation
of dividends was a separate issue that could potentially establish an independent oppression
claim); infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text (discussing Gimpeo.
145. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the "general" reasonable
expectation).
146. See, e.g., Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 561-62 (discussing the effect of minority fault);
Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1021-22 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same).
147. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at
*2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991), vacated by Sawyer v. Curt & Co., 1991 WL 160333
(Minn. Aug. 2, 1991) ("We believe [that] when those in control of a closely held corporation
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distribution mechanism as a result of the minority shareholder's fault (that is,
from "de facto" to "true" dividends), such a forced change is one that the
shareholders would likely have agreed to had they discussed the alternative of a
wholesale exclusion from the profits of the company. 148 It bears repeating that
the company can avoid this change in structure if it (or the majority
shareholder) is willing to buy out the minority's holdings at "fair value."
1 49
terminate the employment of a moving shareholder, a good faith effort must be made to buy-out
the shareholder at a fair price or [to] adjust the income distribution mechanism to insure the
shareholder an equitable investment return."); Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1022 ("[T]he majority
must make an election: they must either alter the corporate financial structure so as to
commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable offer to buy out [the minority's]
interest.").
148. In most cases, the change will require a company that relied exclusively on de facto
dividends to become a company that incorporates, at least in part, the distribution of true
dividends. In theory, however, a company could still avoid the declaration of true dividends so
long as it altered the de facto dividends scheme to include the justifiably-terminated
shareholder. A company that distributed profit as salary and other employment-related benefits,
for example, could continue to distribute such de facto dividends to the working shareholders so
long as a proportionate de facto dividend was given to the terminated shareholder-perhaps in
the form of services or consulting fees. See, e.g., Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1017 n.3 (observing
that a terminated minority shareholder was still allowed the use of a company car).
Alternatively, a company could declare true dividends on a limited basis by issuing a special
class of stock solely to the terminated shareholder and by declaring a dividend only for that
class. The amount of the dividend would equal what the investor would have otherwise
received as its proportionate share of the de facto dividends. Finally, the company does not
have to change its profit-distribution scheme at all if it (or the majority shareholder) is willing to
buy out the holdings of the excluded minority shareholder at fair value. See infra note 149 and
accompanying text (discussing buyouts).
149. As mentioned, the prevalent remedy for shareholder oppression is a buyout of the
oppressed investor's holdings. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the
prevalence of the buyout). Support for the buyout remedy exists in half the states, although the
relevant statutes and judicial decisions differ in their operation. See Thompson, supra note 19,
at 718 (discussing remedies for oppression). In some states, statutes permit the corporation or
the shareholders to purchase the shares of a minority shareholder seeking involuntary
dissolution. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.630 (1989) (allowing purchase to avoid
dissolution); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990) (same); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1189 (West 1990) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (subd. 2) (West Supp. 2003)
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) (West Supp. 2003) (same); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ I104-a, 1118 (McKinney Supp. 2003) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (2001)
(same); RMBCA § 14.34(a) (1993) (same). In other states, statutes authorize a court to order a
buyout as one of several possible remedies in dissolution proceedings or in other litigation
between shareholders. See, e.g., Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1816 (1996) (listing possible
remedies); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434 (West Supp. 2002) (same); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-14-31 0(d)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1994) (same); MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 41,42 (1993)
(same). Courts have also ordered buyouts as part of their general equitable authority. See, e.g.,
Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (ordering a buyout); Davis v.
Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380, 383 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1988, writ denied)
(affirming a buyout); Thompson, supra note 19, at 720-21 ("Courts increasingly have ordered
buyouts of a shareholder's interest by the corporation or the other shareholders even in the
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Gimpel v. Bolstein'" is a rare precedent that confronts the issue of a
minority shareholder's exclusion from a company's profit-distribution scheme
as a result of the minority's own fault.' 5' In Gimpel, the close corporation at
issue had declared no true dividends since its inception." 2 Instead, the
corporation distributed profits to the shareholders via de facto dividends, as
there was a "policy of distributing profits in the form of salaries, benefits and
perquisites, without declaring dividends."'15 3 According to the court, this de
facto dividend policy "was basic to the financial structure of the business,"' 54
and for years it was carried out "apparently by consent of all shareholders, but
in any event without objection from anybody." 's
Robert Gimpel, a minority shareholder in the company, was terminated
from his employment position as a result of his embezzlement of $85,000 from
the business. 16 The company continued to adhere to its policy of not declaring
absence of specific statutory authorization."). The buyout remedy is not limited to dissolution
proceedings; indeed, in the absence of a statute, buyouts have been ordered where a breach of
fiduciary duty has been found. Id. at 723.
A buyout remedy provides a shareholder with the "fair value" of its investment. See id. at
718 ("Several of the largest commercial states permit a corporation or its majority shareholders
to avoid involuntary dissolution by purchasing the shares of the petitioning shareholders at their
'fair value."'); see also RMBCA § 14.34(a) (1993) ("In a proceeding under 14.30(2) to dissolve
a corporation ... the corporation may elect or, if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may
elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the shares."
(emphasis added)); Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 381 ("An ordered 'buy-out' of stock at its fair value is
an especially appropriate remedy in a closely-held corporation .... "). In a sense, therefore, the
majority has to change the company's profit-distribution scheme only to the extent that it is
unwilling to bear the expense of a fair value buyout. See 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 10:09,
at 60 ("The buy-out feature in these statutes is desirable because it permits shareholders who
want to preserve the enterprise as a going concern to buy out dissenters, and at the same time it
provides an oppressed shareholder a fair price for his holdings."); see also supra note 148
(discussing other ways to avoid changing the company's profit-distribution mechanism). But
see Hillman, supra note 59, at 70-75 (stating that "[t]he assumption that those who desire to
avoid a dissolution of the corporate enterprise may easily do so by purchasing the interest of a
dissatisfied minority shareholder ignores a number of problems which may be encountered by
those who wish to continue the venture," and discussing those problems).
150. Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
151. See id. at 1020 (discussing the effect of minority fault).
152. Id. at 1017, 1020.
153. Id. at 1023; see also id. at 1020 ("All concerned received all income from the
corporation in the form of salary for their corporate positions."); id. at 1022 ("To the extent that
the salaries paid to majority shareholders have been fixed so as to include amounts in lieu of
dividends, the salaries must be adjusted downward.").
154. Id. at 1020; see id. (noting the founding shareholders' "reliance upon a no-dividend
policy").
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1017 ("[T]he court deems it established that in 1975 Robert was, in fact, a
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dividends, and Robert eventually sued. He alleged, in relevant part, that the
"profits of the corporation are distributed to the majority interests in the form of
salaries, benefits and perquisites, with no dividends being declared," and that,
as a result of his termination, he "derives no benefit whatsoever from his
ownership interest."'1
57
The Gimpel court recognized that Robert's misconduct justified his
termination from company employment.' 58 Significantly, however, the court
realized that Robert's general reasonable expectation still deserved protection:
[T]he court is nonetheless constrained to recognize that Robert cannot be
forever compelled to remain an outcast .... While his past misdeeds
provided sufficient justification for the majority's acts to date, there is a
limit to what he can be forced to bear, and that limit has been reached. The
other shareholders need not allow him to return to employment with the
corporation, but they must by some means allow him to share in the
profits. 1
59
The court concluded that the company "must either alter the corporate financial
structure so as to commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable
offer to buy out Robert's interest."' 60
thief, that he stole from the family company, and was discharged from all company employment
when his theft became known.").
157. Id. at 1018; see also id. at 1017 ("Since (his termination], Robert has received no
benefits from his ownership position with this obviously profitable company. The company has
continued to adhere to its policy of not paying dividends and, while the other shareholders have
received substantial sums as salary, benefits and perquisites, Robert has received not a penny.").
158. See id. at 1018 ("Clearly it was proper to dismiss a thief."); id. at 1020 ("[T]he only
expectations he could reasonably entertain were those of a discovered thief: ostracism and
prosecution."); id. ("Robert's discharge, as well as his subsequent exclusion from corporate
management, were not oppressive. It was clearly not wrongful for the corporate victim of a theft
to exclude the thief from the councils of power.").
159. Id. at 1021 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 1022; see also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561-62
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (concluding that a minority shareholder's termination was not
oppressive in light of the minority's "unsatisfactory performance," but noting that the minority's
expectation of dividends was a separate issue that could potentially establish an independent
oppression claim); In re O'Neill, 626 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div. 1995) (laying out lower
court conclusion regarding minority shareholder employment).
The [lower] court concluded ... that while [the minority shareholder] could not
expect to participate in the day-to-day operations of the corporation [after the
minority's employment was terminated for a criminal conviction], he was entitled
to his rights as a shareholder, and the court directed [the majority shareholder] to
either alter the corporation's financial structure to commence the payment of
dividends, or offer to purchase (the minority shareholder's] interest in the
corporation.
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Gimpel is a noteworthy opinion to the extent that the court explicitly
acknowledged the competing concerns of the terminated shareholder's
general reasonable expectation and the company's pre-existing de facto
dividend scheme. Even though the shareholder's own misconduct caused
his exclusion from this pre-existing scheme, the court recognized that
such fault could not justify the wholesale defeat of his general reasonable
expectation of sharing proportionately in the venture's profits.161 In
short, the Gimpel analysis properly captures the notion that a minority
shareholder's misconduct or incompetence can serve to "forfeit" the
minority's specific expectation of an employment or management
position, but that such minority fault should not permanently alter the
minority's basic rights as a shareholder of the company. If a court
161. It is important to note that the Girmpel court seems to have considered the minority
shareholder's fault to be relevant to the general expectation inquiry. Robert, the minority
shareholder, was discharged from his employment with the company in 1974 because of his
alleged embezzlement of $85,000 of company funds. Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. He
received no judicial relief until the Gimpel decision in 1984. Id. at 1021-22. In that decision,
the court explicitly noted that Robert, since his termination, "ha[d] received no benefits from his
ownership position with this obviously profitable company." Id. at 1017. Thus, Robert had
been excluded from ten years of de facto dividends by the time the Gimpel opinion was
rendered. Nevertheless, the court provided no compensation for these past dividends, and the
court's language suggests that this remedial omission was intentional. Indeed, the court stated
that Robert's "past misdeeds provided sufficient justification for the majority's acts to date," id.
at 1021 (emphasis added), and the relief awarded was entirely forward-looking. Id. (providing
the majority with six months to elect between "alter[ing] the corporate financial structure so as
to commence payment of dividends," or "mak[ing] a reasonable offer to buy out Robert's
interest").
The Gimpel court, therefore, arguably adopted a punitive approach towards Robert's
misconduct that affected more than just his specific expectation of employment. Although the
court ultimately recognized that the minority shareholder's misconduct could not justify an
indefinite exclusion from the returns of the business, the court did seem to believe that Robert's
fault was relevant to his general expectation claim--relevant to the extent that Robert's
misconduct justified a ten-year time period of exclusion from dividends.
As an alternative to this "punitive" theory, perhaps the court allowed this ten-year
exclusion because the value of Robert's proportionate share of those dividends was
approximately equal to the $85,000 that Robert embezzled. Viewed in this manner, the court's
failure to provide Robert compensation for the ten years of missed dividends was not because it
felt that minority fault should affect the shareholder's general expectation. Instead, the remedial
omission should be viewed as a quick and dirty accounting convention that recognized that
Robert had already been "advanced" $85,000 in dividends. See id. at 1017 ("[F]or the purposes
of this motion the court deems it established that in 1975 Robert was, in fact, a thief[who] stole
from the family company."). Admittedly, this alternative explanation is a stretch, particularly
because it is unclear whether Robert was permitted to actually keep the $85,000 in embezzled
funds. See id. (noting that Robert's father allegedly "adjusted any disputed financial
transaction"). Moreover, the court never quantifies the total amount of de facto dividends paid
by the company over the ten-year period, and it never mentions what Robert's proportional
share of that total sum would be.
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nonetheless believes that minority fault should have some effect, it could
account for such fault in ways that are less harsh than a complete denial
of relief. 
62
162. For example, a "blameworthy" minority shareholder who asserts a de facto dividend
claim could be required to carry the burden of proof. The typical de facto dividend claim
involves the contention that a majority shareholder has received de facto dividends through
excessive employment compensation. In many of these cases, the majority shareholder was
actually involved in determining the amount of its compensation-a classic conflict of interest.
See, e.g., Cole Real Estate Corp. v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 310 N.E.2d 275, 277-78 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1974) (noting that the majority shareholder "set her own salary level ... without
consultation with the board of directors"). Because of this conflict, the law would generally
place the burden of proof on the majority to demonstrate that its compensation was not
excessive-i.e., to demonstrate that it did not receive any de facto dividends. See, e.g., Crowley
v. Communications for Hosps., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996, 999-1000 (Mass. App. Ct. 199 1). When
minority fault is involved, a court could conceivably alter this traditional corporate law principle
and place the burden of proof on the minority.
A court could also account for minority fault in the way that relief is structured. See supra
note 161 (discussing the relief provided in the Gimpel case). Perhaps some combination of
minority and marketability discounts could be employed to reduce the amount owed to the
minority shareholder in a buyout award. See, e.g., 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 7.21, at 115-
16 (discussing discounts); Bahls, supra note 15, at 301-04 (same); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A: 12-7 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that the court may award fair value "plus or minus any
adjustment deemed equitable by the court"). Alternatively, perhaps the terms of a buyout could
be manipulated to prevent the possibility of a corporation facing a significant cash drain. As
one judge stated:
If it is determined that the granting of relief will be unduly burdensome to the
corporation or other shareholders, the trial court should consider this in
determining whether to grant relief and, if so, whether this should affect the
purchase price or value attached to plaintiff's shares or the method of payment.
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 572-73 (N.C. 1983) (Martin, J., concurring); see
also Bahls, supra note 15, at 328 n.258 ("Several state statutes permit the courts to order
installment payments."); Hillman, supra note 59, at 83 (discussing the possibility of
"structur[ing] installment payments with a commercially reasonable rate of interest over an
extended period of time"); cf Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1996) (appointing a "special fiscal agent" to consider the appropriate terms and conditions for a
court-ordered buyout, including the interest rate, the payment schedule, and the need for any
security).
When a buyout is awarded in a majority fault context, however, it is calculated as the fair
value of the minority's shares. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing buyouts).
No additional "penalty" sum is added to the award to account for the majority's wrongdoing. If
majority fault is typically ignored in the damages phase of an oppression dispute, perhaps
minority fault should be ignored as well. But see Bahls, supra note 15, at 302 (arguing that a
minority discount to a buyout award is inappropriate in part because the lower buyout price
would benefit a majority shareholder whose fault led to the oppression finding).
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C. Exclusion from De Facto Dividends: No Fault
Even if no majority or minority "fault" is involved, de facto dividends are
still problematic when the minority investor is not receiving its proportionate
share. Typically, a "no fault" exclusion from de facto dividends arises when a
minority shareholder has quit or retired from its former employment position
with the company,16 although it could also arise when a minority shareholder
has been passive since the inception of the venture.' 4 Where a majority
shareholder receives de facto dividends but fails to pay the minority investor its
proportionate share, the majority is paying a dividend only to itself. As
mentioned, such a non-uniform declaration is impermissible under general
corporate law principles. 65 Passive minority shareholders-investors who
depend solely on dividends for their investment return-would not have
assented to such an arrangement. Simply put, if such a disproportionate
dividend is oppressive where the minority has acted with misconduct or
incompetence,'66 it is certainly oppressive where the minority's actions are free
of such fault.1
67
163. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing a "no fault" exclusion from de
facto dividends).
164. A "passive from inception" shareholder is not the norm in the close corporation
setting. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ("[The primary
expectations of minority shareholders [in close corporations] include an active voice in
management of the corporation and input as an employee."); supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text (explaining that close corporation shareholders typically participate in
employment and management).
165. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that non-uniform dividend
declarations are improper).
166. See supra Part IV.B (discussing minority fault).
167. See, e.g., Erdman v. Yolles, 233 N.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)
(concluding, in a dispute involving a minority shareholder who quit his employment with the
company, that "profits of the corporation were distributed through salary increases and that...
plaintiff was improperly denied his 1/4 share").
The Oregon decision of Zidell v. Zidell arguably reaches the wrong result in a "no fault" de
facto dividends dispute. Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977). In Zidell, the corporation's
"customary practice [was] to retain all earnings in the business rather than to distribute profits as
dividends." Id. at 1088. While working for the company, the plaintiffminority shareholder had
agreed with this policy. Id. After the minority resigned from his employment position,
however, he demanded that dividends be declared. Id. Dividends were paid, but in an amount
that the minority characterized as "unreasonably small," and that the court referred to as "modest
when viewed as a rate of return on [the minority's] investment." Id. at 1088, 1090.
The court stated that the minority had shown that "those stockholders who are working for
the corporations are receiving generous salaries and bonuses, and that there is hostility between
[the minority] and the other major stockholders." Id. at 1089. Despite this apparent showing of
de facto dividends, the court refused to order additional dividends beyond the minimal amounts
that had previously been paid. Id. at 1090. The court apparently found it significant that the
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D. Remedying an Exclusion from De Facto Dividends
When a shareholder is excluded from de facto dividends, the
shareholder effectively misses profit distributions that it is entitled to
receive. Proper judicial relief should, therefore, provide compensation
for these missed distributions and prohibit such exclusions in the future.
For example, a court's award should encompass (1) a damages award
equal to the past de facto dividends that the excluded shareholder did not
receive (plus interest),168 and (2) an order that future dividends (true or de
facto) shall be paid to the excluded shareholder in the same proportional
amount that other shareholders receive.
Significantly, this remedial structure should not change even if a
court. awards a buyout of the minority's holdings. A buyout of the
minority will remove the aggrieved shareholder from the company. Thus,
it is certainly true that the need for a court order of future dividends to
the excluded minority shareholder is obviated. A buyout award,
however, does not provide the aggrieved minority shareholder with
compensation for the past de facto dividends that it failed to receive.
Although a proper company valuation for buyout purposes adds the de
facto dividend amounts back into the corporation's income, 6 9 that
adjustment is because the valuation is typically based upon the
minority had resigned, as it specifically noted that the minority "left his corporate employment
voluntarily" and "was not forced out." Id.
Although the case appears to be a classic example of the controlling shareholders
impermissibly paying de facto dividends to themselves, it may be unfair to criticize the court's
conclusion. The opinion states that the minority "[did] not contend that these salaries [paid to
the working shareholders] are excessive in his briefs on appeal." Id. at 1088. The minority,
therefore, arguably did not sufficiently place the de facto dividends issue before the court.
168. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained:
When the trial court has determined an amount that would have been reasonable
compensation for Harry, Isadore, and Joseph's services to the corporations, if
amounts in excess of that amount, either in salaries or other benefits were paid,
those excess amounts shall be treated as profits which were distributed to the three
brothers and shall be used, along with other excess payments (i.e., auto, boat and
entertainment payments which have already been determined to be non-business
related), to calculate the amount which is to be distributed to Ms. Ferber as her
share of profits.
Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. 1983); see, e.g., Erdman v. Yolles, 233
N.W.2d 667, 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that "profits of the corporation were distributed
through salary increases and that. plaintiff was improperly denied his 1/4 share," and
awarding damages for that amount).
169. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the need for an earnings
adjustment).
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company's earnings. 170 In other words, de facto dividends are profits that
have not been recorded as such on the company's books, typically for tax
reasons.7 1 Before performing a valuation that is based on the amount of
profits that a company generates, the company's books must be adjusted
to account for these mischaracterized profits (that is, the de facto
dividends must be added back into earnings).
72
It is critical to recognize, however, that this is truly a "paper"
adjustment to the company's stated profit figures. That is, the
shareholders who received their proportionate share of the de facto
dividends do not actually return those sums. 17 Thus, this well-accepted
170. As mentioned, a buyout remedy provides the shareholder with the "fair value" of his
investment. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing buyouts). For buyout
purposes, the "fair value" of a close corporation is most commonly derived by calculating
investment value-a calculation that is usually based upon the earnings of a corporation. See
Thompson, supra note 21, at 233 ("The most common method for determining fair value is to
calculate investment value, usually based on the company's earnings."); id. ("[T]he most
commonly utilized formula [for calculating investment value] treats company earnings as
determinant of investment value."); see also SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS:
THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 40 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
VALUING A BUSINESS] ("Generally, earning power is the important internal variable affecting the
going-concern value of the business.").
171. De facto dividends are usually recorded as expenses (e.g., salary or other employee
compensation payments) rather than profits. See supra note 29 and accompanying text
(discussing the tax consequences of dividends).
172. As one court observed:
The term 'adjusted pretax income' is arrived at by adding to pretax income for the
most recent fiscal year of the company... all compensation paid to Dick
Hendley... during that year. Dick Hendley's salary is added back to income
because Mr. Hendley performed no services for the company during that year; his
compensation was more in the nature of a distribution of profits.
Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1327 (D.S.C. 1987); see,e.g., In re Raskin v. Walter Karl,
Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that in calculating the earnings of an
enterprise, any excess compensation that has been paid to shareholder-employees and corporate
officers should be added to reported corporate earnings to determine the company's real earning
power); infra note 174 and accompanying text (describing the need to restate earnings).
Professor Murdock similarly observes:
[I]f the majority is taking excessive salaries to the exclusion of the minority, the
earnings of the corporation will be thereby reduced and any valuation technique
predicated upon earnings, such as capitalized earnings or discounted cash flow, will
be 'unfair' unless earnings and cash flow are adjusted to reflect the situation that
would exist absent the oppressive conduct.
Murdock, supra note 31, at 428; see id. at 477 ("[Tbo truly reflect the companies' earning
power, the net income is adjusted by eliminating from the corporate expenses a portion of the
officer-shareholders' salaries that is considered excess compensation." (internal quotation
omitted)).
173. See, e.g., Hendley, 676 F. Supp. at 1327 (performing calculations); In re Raskin, 514
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valuation adjustment does not provide the minority shareholder with
compensation for the value of the de facto dividends that it missed;
instead, it simply restates the company's earnings to insure the accuracy
of an earnings-based company valuation.1
7 4
Perhaps another way to see this point is to imagine that the majority
has excluded the minority shareholder from true dividend payments that
the other shareholders have received. A buyout award would not require
any adjustment to the company's stated earnings figures because sums
distributed as true dividends are profits of the company that have already
been recorded as profits on the company's books. If the buyout was of a
shareholder who had received the dividend payments, the shareholder
would keep those sums and would receive its proportionate share of the
company's earnings-based value. The minority shareholder excluded
from the dividend payments should receive no less-that is, it should
receive its portion of the prior dividend payments and its share of the
company's value. Nothing changes when de facto dividends are involved
other than a bookkeeping adjustment to correct the stated profit figures so
N.Y.S.2d at 121 (same).
174. See Murdock, supra note 3 1, at 477; id. at 488-89 (noting that courts have seen "the
need to adjust income and assets for nonfunctional compensation in valuing the shares of the
minority for buy-out purposes"); supra note 172 and accompanying text. One noted valuation
authority has stated the following:
In closely held companies, compensation and perquisites to owners and managers
may be based on the owners' personal desires and the company's ability to pay-
rather than on the value of services these individuals perform. How much to adjust
the earnings base to reflect discrepancies between compensation paid and value of
service performed depends, in part, upon the purpose and objective of the appraisal.
Owners of successful closely held businesses may distribute what normally would
be considered profits in the form of compensation and discretionary expenses. This
practice may be an effort to avoid the double taxation that arises from paying a
corporate income tax and then paying a personal income tax on what the closely
held business pays to the owner in the form of dividends. It is not uncommon to
find an owner/manager of a successful closely held company earning a greater
amount in annual compensation than the amount an equivalent nonowner employee
would earn as compensation.
VALUING A BUSNESS, supra note 170, at 121. Similarly, as commentators have explained:
The item that most often begs adjustment on the income statements of a privately
held entity is the compensation to the owners. Actual compensation tends to be
based on what the entity can afford or how the owners desire to be compensated,
and may bear little or no relationship to the economic value of the services actually
performed by the owners.
SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES 92 (2d
ed. 1993) [hereinafter VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES].
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that a profit-driven valuation is accurate.'75 Thus, the mere award of a
buyout in the context of an exclusion from de facto dividends is
incomplete. A court's relief should encompass (1) a damages award
equal to the past de facto dividends that the excluded shareholder did not
receive (plus interest), 7 6 and (2) a buyout via a company valuation that
adds the de facto dividend amounts back into income to reflect the
company's real earning power.' 77 Unfortunately, many courts have failed
to recognize the need to award both of the relevant components. 
78
V. The Problem of Dividend Suppression: Forcing Distributions in the
Absence of De Facto Dividends
At some level, disputes involving de facto dividends are relatively easy to
resolve. After all, these disputes typically involve a majority shareholder who
takes a disproportionate amount of the company's profit. Such conduct, simply
put, is clearly unlawful, and one can characterize it as unlawful in a number of
different ways-for example, fraud on the minority investors, bad faith to the
minority investors, an illegal dividend to the majority, or plain and simple theft
by the majority. Where de facto dividends are not involved, however, dividend
disputes are much more complicated. For example, where a company has
earned profits for a period of time without distributing them to anyone, when, if
ever, should a minority shareholder be able to force a dividend? Put
differently, if all shareholders are treated equally-that is, if no one receives a
disproportionate amount of the company's profits-is it ever reasonable for the
minority shareholder to expect a dividend? 79
175. See supra notes 172, 174 and accompanying text (discussing the need for an earnings
adjustment).
176. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing damage awards).
177. See, e.g., Hendley, 676 F. Supp. at 1327 (performing calculations); In re Raskin, 514
N.Y.S.2d at 121 (same).
178. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017-18, 1022 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
(ordering the payment of true dividends in the future or a buyout of the minority's holdings, but
providing no damages award to the minority for the prior de facto dividends that the minority
was excluded from); supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing Gimpet). But see Davis
v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 378, 382-83 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied)
(upholding a trial court award of damages for "informal dividends" that the majority received to
the exclusion of the minority, and affirming the trial court's additional order for a fair value
buyout of the minority's holdings).
179. This Article assumes that an active shareholder (i.e., a shareholder who is also a
company employee) is not receiving a "disproportionate amount of the company's profits" if it is
paid a reasonable salary by the company, even if the company also has passive shareholders
(who, by definition, are not paid a salary by the company). In other words, this Article defines a
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A. The Cost of Capital Inquiry
Modem economic theory provides a conceptual answer to this question. A
company's board of directors should reinvest profits in a new project (and
therefore forego dividends) only when the expected retums from the project
equal or exceed the firm's cost of capital." 0 That is, a company should pursue
"reasonable" salary as fair compensation for the value of the labor services that an active
shareholder performs for the company. When this Article refers to the receipt of a
"disproportionate amount of the company's profits," it is referring to de facto dividends-i.e.,
sums over and above reasonable compensation for the value of the labor services performed.
This assumption, however, could be challenged. For example, imagine that a company,
over a period of years, only earns enough to pay the reasonable salaries of its active
shareholders. After paying these reasonable salaries, there are little to no additional sums
remaining to pay out as dividends. From the standpoint of a passive investor, the active
shareholders are receiving a disproportionate amount of the company's "profits," at least to the
extent that the active shareholders are the only investors who are financially benefiting from the
company. A passive investor might take this position even if the amount of the active
shareholders' compensation could otherwise be described as "reasonable" based on the value of
the contributed labor. See Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761, 763, 767-68, 770 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1977) (affirming the chancellor's conclusion that a profit-sharing compensation
arrangement was "within the outer limits of reasonable compensation," but noting the
chancellor's suggestion that the arrangement should be modified if it precluded the ability to
pay a dividend); id. at 770 ("[W]e deem it an untenable position to argue that non payment of
dividends is justified on the basis that such a concept of profit distribution would imperil the
continued well being of the corporation. If such retention of profits were indicated they should
have been more diligent in seeing that [salary] distributions based upon percentage of profits
should also be curtailed."); cf Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124-26, 128 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1996) (noting, in a dispute involving a corporation with substantial retained earnings,
that there was no claim that the salaries paid to the controlling shareholder and his family were
excessive, but finding oppression because the "operation of the corporation benefits only [the
controlling shareholder]" and "provides no benefit of any kind to [the minority shareholder]").
At some level, this difference in characterization stems from what one means by
"reasonable" compensation. Should reasonable compensation be an amount derived solely from
the value of the labor services that a shareholder performs for the company-i.e., what the
company would have to pay someone to do the tasks? Or should reasonable compensation be
derived (1) from the value of the labor services performed for the company, and (2) from the
need to leave the company with the financial ability to provide a minimal return to passive
shareholders? Under this latter conceptualization, compensation would not be "reasonable" if it
left the company with little to nothing to pay as a return to the passive investors, even if it would
otherwise be an appropriate sum based on the value of the labor contributed to the company.
180. As Professor Brudney observes:
Under the irrelevance proposition if management has investment opportunities that
offer the equivalent of the firm's current rate of return, it is free to retain or
distribute earnings indifferently. If management has projects that offer more than
the current rate of return, then its duty is to reinvest earnings in those projects to
maximize shareholder wealth. If, however, management has no investment project
that offers prospects as good as those in which it has invested already, then it
should distribute the earnings as dividends.
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an investment only if the investment's return justifies its risk. Otherwise,
"shareholders are unfairly compensated for the risk of the investments and are
better off receiving dividends and choosing their own investment vehicles." 1
8'
The theory suggests, therefore, that even a profitable investment (an investment
with a positive rate of return) should not be pursued unless the expected return
is high enough to compensate for the risk.'82
A simple example helps to convey this point. Suppose that a person
wishes to invest $100 and is considering two investment options. The money
Brudney, supra note 2, at 97; see, e.g., id. at 87 n.5 (defining "a favorable opportunity to invest
a dollar" as an investment "at a rate no less favorable than that at which the market capitalizes
the enterprise's stock," and observing that "[i]f no such opportunity is seen, a management
dedicated to maximizing shareholder wealth will contract the enterprise, either by declaring a
dividend or repurchasing its stock"); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1112 ("The board of directors
should reinvest profits only when the new projects promise expected returns at a level equal to
or in excess of the corporation's cost of capital."); infra note 186 and accompanying text
(defining "cost of capital"); see also RICHARD A. BREALEY& STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 64 (4th ed. 1991) ("Rapid growth is good news, not bad, so long as the
business is earning more than the opportunity cost of capital."); Brudney, supra note 2, at 97, 99
n.43 (characterizing the cost of capital analysis as a model where "dividends become a mere
residual of investment policy," and noting that "in the interest of maximizing shareholder
wealth, legal norms would restrict management to making investment decisions and leaving
dividends to be determined as a mere residual of investment policy, and concomitantly
management would be forbidden from making dividend decisions on any other grounds").
The text proposition assumes that the project is within the company's existing line of
business such that the firm's cost of capital is the appropriate figure. See infra note 239
(discussing company cost of capital and project cost of capital).
181. Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1112.
182. Id. at 1112 n.63. The net present value rule and the internal rate of return rule are two
important capital budgeting techniques that are based on the cost of capital notion and the
"risk/return" relationship. As Professor Ragazzo has observed:
To apply the net present value method, one determines the expected returns of a
potential investment and discounts those returns to present value using a discount
rate that appropriately measures the corporation's level of risk. As a result,
expected returns in riskier corporations have lower present values than expected
returns in less risky corporations. Investments are justified when the present value
of the investment exceeds the present cost of the investment.
In contrast, the internal rate of return method asks at what discount rate the net
present value of the expected returns of an investment is zero. Only if the internal
rate of return generated by the project is higher than the rate of return normally
required for corporate investments (which should equal or exceed the corporation's
actual discount rate) should the project be undertaken. These capital budgeting
methods are similar, and both reflect the concept that an investment that is likely to
produce positive future returns can still be unwise unless those returns are
sufficient to justify the risk of the investment.
Id. (emphasis added); see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 20, 89 (describing the net
present value and internal rate of return rules).
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could be invested in relatively safe U.S. government securities, 183 or the money
could be invested in a company that sells widgits (Widgits, Inc.). Assume that
the government securities are expected to pay a five percent return, Widgits,
Inc. is expected to pay a ten percent return, and that all transaction costs are
ignored. Even though the expected return from investing in Widgits, Inc. is
twice as much as the expected return from investing in government securities,
the investment may still be unwise. Indeed, an investment in Widgits, Inc.
presumably carries more risk, as the company is exposed to the general risks of
competition and business failure. 8 4 A rational investor would commit capital
to Widgits, Inc. only if the investor believed that the expected five percent
additional return sufficiently compensated it for the greater risk of such an
investment. 185
When a rational shareholder commits capital to a company, therefore, the
investment is premised on the notion that the expected returns from the
company will, when factoring in the risk of the company's business, equal or
exceed the expected returns from other investment possibilities when their risks
are considered. More succinctly, when investing in a company, the rational
shareholder believes that the risk-adjusted expected returns from the company
183. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 163 (describing United States Treasury
obligations as "instruments considered to have virtually no possibility of default").
184. See id. at 166 ("Company [risk] characteristics could include, for example,
management's ability to weather economic conditions, relations between labor and
management, the possibility of strikes, the success or failure of a particular marketing program,
or any other factor specific to the company.").
185. See id. at 163 ("Over and above a risk-free return, investors must expect some
additional rate of return to induce them to invest in non-Treasury bonds, in equities, or in
similar securities-to compensate them for the additional risk incurred in such an investment.").
In the real world, of course, there are an endless number of investment choices, and the
relationship between the risk and return of different securities is more complex than this overly-
simplified example. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most widely-accepted
explanation of the risk-return relationship. According to the model, "the expected return of an
investment portfolio (ERp) is equal to the risk-free rate of return (R) plus the beta (which is a
measure of the systematic or market-based risk of the portfolio and excludes company- and
industry-specific risk) of the portfolio (Bp) multiplied by the difference between the expected
rate of return on the market portfolio (ERm) and the risk-free rate of return." Ragazzo, supra
note 80, at 1108 n.45; see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 161-64 (discussing CAPM);
VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 164-68 (discussing the relationship between risk and
return). As a formula, the CAPM is expressed as ERp = Rf + Bp(ERm - Rf). Despite its
complexity, the CAPM conveys (among other things) the basic proposition that investors
require additional return for taking on additional risk. See id. at 166 ("A fundamental
assumption of the capital asset pricing model is that the risk premium portion of the expected
return of a security is a function of that security's systematic risk."); BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 180, at 162 ("The expected risk premium on an investment with a beta of 0.5 is, therefore,
half the expected risk premium on the market [beta of 1.0]; and the expected risk premium on an
investment with abeta of 2.0 is twice the expected risk premium on the market.").
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will equal or exceed the risk-adjusted expected returns from other possible
investments. A particular company's "cost of capital" is a reflection of this
idea-it signifies the minimum return on financial capital that shareholders
demand for the risk of investing in that company's line of business."s6 Put
differently, it is the return that shareholders could get themselves, on a risk-
adjusted basis, by investing elsewhere.' 87 In our example, if Widgits, Inc. had a
cost of capital of ten percent, and if it was approximately twice as risky as an
investment in government securities, the ten percent cost of capital signifies
that shareholders could get a similar risk-adjusted return on their financial
capital by investing elsewhere, namely in "safer" government securities paying
a rate of return of five percent.'
Conceptually, therefore, there is an answer to the question of whether it is
reasonable for a shareholder to expect dividends in the absence of de facto
distributions. When the expected returns from possible investments fall short
of the company's cost of capital, the majority should declare dividends rather
than retain profits, as the shareholders are better off making their own
investment choices.8 9 Conversely, when the expected returns from investment
186. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 40 (defining "cost of capital" as "the
amount of expected return that is required to attract investment," and stating that "[t]he cost of
capital depends on the general level of interest rates and the amount of premium for risk (above
the return available on a safe, fixed-income investment) that the market demands,.as well as the
risks attributable to the subject business"); id. at 153 (defining "cost of capital" as "the expected
rate of return available in the market for other investments of comparable risk and other
investment characteristics"); BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 13 (noting that the
"opportunity cost of capital" is "the rate of return offered by comparable investment
alternatives"); id. at 74-75 ("The opportunity cost of taking the project is the return shareholders
could have earned had they invested the funds on their own .... The opportunity-cost concept
makes sense only if assets of equivalent risk are compared."). In this context, a company's "cost
of capital" is also referred to as its "discount rate." See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at
153 (indicating that "cost of capital" and "discount rate" are synonymous); id. at 196 (observing
that "[t]he discount rate is the cost of capital and applies to all prospective economic income");
id. at 157-58 (defining a "discount rate" as an "'opportunity cost,' that is, the expected rate of
return (or yield) that an investor would have to give up by investing in the subject investment-
instead of in available alternative investments that are comparable in terms of risk and other
investment characteristics"); id. ("The discount rate is the cost of capital for that particular
category of investment. The discount rate is determined by market conditions as of the
valuation date as they apply to the specific characteristics of the subject contemplated
investment."); id. at 161 (stating that the discount rate represents the rate of return "necessary to
induce investors to commit available funds to the subject investment, given its level of risk").
187. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (defining "cost of capital").
188. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing cost of capital).
189. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 66, at 89 ("When corporate managers are faced with the
alternative of either declaring a dividend or retaining earnings... the investor is deprived of a
part of his profit if the return on ploughback is less than the corporation's overall return on its
capital .... ); supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (discussing cost of capital); infra
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projects equal or exceed the company's cost of capital, the majority should
retain profits to commit to those projects rather than pay dividends. 19 By
doing so, shareholders are earning more on their financial capital than they
could in their own investment vehicles.' 9'
Articulated from a hypothetical bargaining perspective, these are the
understandings that the shareholders would likely have reached if they had
discussed when, in the absence of de facto distributions, actual dividends
should be declared.' 92 Simply put, when the company can reinvest its profits at
a risk-adjusted rate greater than the shareholders could earn elsewhere, the
majority and minority shareholders would probably concede that reinvestment
is superior to dividends, particularly because these circumstances should
translate to more valuable dividends down the road.' 93 If a majority
shareholder insisted on greater flexibility in making dividend decisions than
note 239 (explaining company cost of capital and project cost of capital).
190. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (discussing a company's risk-return
calculus); infra note 239 (explaining company cost of capital and project cost of capital).
191. In the context of public corporations, Professor Brudney has characterized the cost of
capital inquiry as a method where "dividends become a mere residual of investment policy."
Brudney, supra note 2, at 97. He then argues that such an inquiry may not make sense if
dividend decisions have an independent impact on market price. Id. at 99 n.43. In the close
corporation, of course, there is no market to independently react to a dividend decision. A cost
of capital inquiry, therefore, is an appropriate theoretical framework:
[I]n the interest of maximizing shareholder wealth, legal norms would restrict
management to making investment decisions and leaving dividends to be
determined as a mere residual of investment policy, and concomitantly management
would be forbidden from making dividend decisions on any other grounds. [S]uch
regulation would require judicial or administrative assessment of managerial
judgments about expected returns and risks involved in proposed investment
opportunities .... Difficult as judicial review of such decisions might be, it could
at least be conducted within a theoreticalframework for assessing the propriety of
the behavior.
Id. at 99-100 n.43 (emphasis added). Professor Israel similarly notes:
If corporate earnings can be efficiently employed internally, the value of the
shareholder's earnings are maximized. If the corporation can earn only a low rate
of return, however, the stockholder himself should be free to determine where those
funds, paid to him as a dividend, should be deployed. In addition to increasing the
shareholder's return on his investment, this would facilitate the efficient
distribution of capital within the economy.
Israel, supra note 66, at 97.
192. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical bargains).
193. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 60 ("Investors are willing to forego
cash dividends today in exchange for higher earnings and the expectation of high dividends
sometime in the future."). The text reference to "more valuable dividends down the road" refers
to future dividends with a present value that exceeds the present value of the dividend that is
currently being contemplated.
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these understandings would provide, it is fair to assert that a reasonable
minority shareholder would have refused to invest in the company.'
94
B. Corruption of the Cost of Capital Inquiry: Conflicts of Interest Between
the Majority and Minority
In the abstract, one would assume that the interests of both the majority
and minority shareholders are served by investing only in projects with an
expected return that exceeds the firm's cost of capital. If the return on
investment for both the majority and the minority depends solely on the
corporation's expected returns-that is, if return on financial capital is the
investors' only concem-the shareholders' incentives are aligned. If expected
returns from the company's new projects exceed the firm's cost of capital, it is
in the majority and minority's mutual interest to reinvest in the company. If
such expected returns fall short of the company's cost of capital, it is in their
mutual interest to declare a dividend so that they can more profitably invest
their money elsewhere.' 9 Simply put, where the shareholders' incentives are
aligned, there is little need for a rigorous judicial inquiry. The majority's self-
interest can be relied upon to protect the minority's interests as well. 96
The problem, however, is that return on investment in the typical close
corporation is not solely based on the corporation's expected returns. Instead,
return on investment in a close corporation is usually a combination of return
on financial capital and return on human capital.' 9 Close corporation
194. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91 (discussing cost of capital).
195. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (discussing cost of capital).
196. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 2, at 102 ("If each shareholder's wealth is seen as
maximized by the same dividend policy that maximizes other shareholders' wealth,
management's dividend decisions become matters of businessjudgment (except as management
itself has interests that diverge from shareholders' interests) that affect all shareholders
equally."); infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (discussing the interests of majority and
minority shareholders). Of course, judicial review would still be required for dividend decisions
which amount to fraud or bad faith. See, e.g., Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577,
581 (Me. 1975) (describing, as an example of bad faith, "the existence of a desire by the
controlling directors to acquire the minority stock interests as cheaply as possible" (citing
Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692,695 (1947)); Fisher v. Steelville Cmty. Banc-Shares,
Inc., 713 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Mo. App. Ct. 1986)("[A]llegations that amajority shareholder, who
controlled the corporate directors, caused dividends to be withheld and depressed the value of
the stock of a minority shareholder for the purpose of acquiring that stock state a cause of action
against the majority shareholder."); supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
review of dividend decisions).
197. See, e.g., Bahls, supra note 15, at 330 ("Shareholders in close corporations expect
proportional distribution of the earnings of the corporation while it is operating."); Hillman,
supra note 59, at 79 n.248 ("Obviously, an individual commits capital to a venture with the
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employment, in other words, is valuable,' 98 and it is often the largest
component of the shareholder's overall return on investment.199 As a
consequence, it is often rational for a majority shareholder to care more about
increasing the return on its human capital than increasing the return on its
financial capital. Put differently, because the lion's share of the majority's
investment return likely derives from the benefits of employment, 00 the
majority will have an incentive to act in ways that preserve and enhance those
benefits. At times, however, those actions are not ones that the majority would
expectation that a return will be forthcoming, either through an appreciation in the value of his
holdings or, more typically for a close corporation, through a distribution of corporate
earnings."); supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the "general" reasonable
expectation); see also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass.
1976) ("The minority stockholder typically depends on his salary as the principal return on his
investment ...."); Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)
("[E]mployment is, of course, a frequent and perfectly proper benefit of stockholders in a close
corporation."); id. at 126 ("[T]he primary benefit that [the defendant close corporation
shareholder] receives from the corporation is continued employment for himself and his
family."); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554,561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979) ("[T]here generally is an expectation on the part of some [close corporation] participants
that their interest is to be recognized in the form of a salary derived from employment with the
corporation." (citation omitted)); Murdock, supra note 31, at 468 ("The courts have recognized
the reality that compensation paid to those in control has a two fold function: to recompense
services and to provide a return on investment."); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at I 110 (noting that a
close corporation shareholder "often invests for the purpose of having ajob, and the salary and
other benefits he receives is conceived to be part of the return on his investment"); id. at 1109
("In a closely held corporation, a shareholder-employee has interests in his job and stock that
are often economically intertwined."); id. at I 110 ("[The discharge of an employee in a closely
held corporation usually involves appropriation of a portion of his investment by the remaining
shareholders.").
198. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of close
corporation employment).
199. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975)
("Typically, the minority shareholder in a close corporation has a substantial percentage of his
personal assets invested in the corporation. The stockholder may have anticipated that his salary
from his position with the company would be his livelihood." (citation omitted)); Muellenberg
v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1385 (N.J. 1996) (noting that participation in the business is the
"principal source of employment and income" for many close corporation shareholders); In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that a shareholder's
"participation in [a close] corporation is often his principal or sole source of income"); I
OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 1:03, at 4 (stating that a close corporation shareholder "may put
practically everything he owns into the business and expect to support himself from the salary
he receives as a key employee of the company. Whenever a shareholder is deprived of
employment by the corporation ... he may be in effect deprived of his principal means of
livelihood"); cf Coffee, supra note 116, at 17 ("[T]he manager's most important asset is his or
her job.").
200. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of close
corporation employment).
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take if return on financial capital were the only concern, as the actions often
take the form of below cost of capital investments. 2° ' Of course, when a
passive minority shareholder is present (either a true passive shareholder or a
formerly active shareholder whose employment with the company has ended),
return on financial capital is the only concern.20 2 Thus, for passive shareholders
whose return on investment does not include an employment component, below
cost of capital investments are problematic. When the majority works for the
company and the minority does not, therefore, the interests of the shareholders
skew. An understanding of this divergence is necessary to appreciate the utility
of the cost of capital inquiry.
1. The Desire for Growth
Reasonable compensation for an employment position in a business is, at
203some level, related to the size of the company. In general, as a company
grows larger, both the upper and lower limits of a reasonable salary for a
particular position increase. 204 Intuitively, the president of a company with
$100 million in annual sales can earn more than the president of a comparable
company with $10 million in annual sales without exceeding the constraint of
"reasonable" compensation.
Given this relationship between company size and managerial
compensation, it may be in a majority shareholder's interest to grow the firm-
not because growth is necessarily profit-maximizing for shareholders, but
201. See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing the desire for growth).
202. The reference to "passive" shareholders is used to distinguish those shareholders who
are employed by the company from those shareholders who are not. See supra note 179
(discussing passive shareholders). A shareholder's "passivity" can result from never working
for the company, see supra text accompanying note 127 (discussing passive shareholders), or
from a voluntary or involuntary termination of employment from the company. See, e.g., In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (N.Y. 1984) (involving a shareholder who
resigned from employment, and a shareholder who was terminated from employment).
203. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 65, at 174 ("[Llevels of compensation are
positively correlated with firm size."); see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1024
(N.J. 1993) (observing that the trial court found that the majority shareholder's salary-which
had increased from $125,000 to $474,206-"was reasonable in light of the company's
impressive growth"); Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 60 A. 941,947 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1905)
(noting the idea that a corporation's "business had expanded, and that therefore the services of
this ... manager ... now might receive ... a higher rate of compensation because of the greater
success or increase of the business-the growth of the assets of the corporation"); see infra note
205 and accompanying text (discussing company growth).
204. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
company size and compensation levels).
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because growth increases the perquisites and prestige associated with
management positions. 0 5 Indeed, the increased return on employment capital
provided by growth can outweigh any relative losses that result from investing
at less than the company's cost of capital.
For example, imagine a close corporation that operates a restaurant. The
majority shareholder works full-time for the business as the chief executive
officer and draws a $50,000 salary. (Assume that this salary does not include
any de facto dividends-i.e., it is reasonable in light of the value of the labor
services that the majority performs for the company). °6 Assume further that
the majority could earn only $40,000 in comparable employment outside of the
close corporation .207 The corporation is considering whether to distribute
205. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 2, at 95 ("It has also been suggested that management
prefers retention over distribution as a concomitant of its preference for growth in sales and size
(and associated managerial perquisites) over growth in profits."); Coffee, supra note 116, at 29
("Why is growth maximization the goal of managers?... [G]rowth provides managers with
greater compensation, greater psychic income, and greater security."); Israel, supra note 66, at
93 ("It has been widely noted that executive compensation is more often related to corporate
size than to profitability .... Therefore, corporate growth is management's uppermost priority
and maximum profitability tends to be relegated to secondary importance."); id. at 94
("[M]anagement's prestige tends to be enhanced more by corporate size than by its rate of
return .... Power, prestige and one's identification with the corporate enterprise he or she
manages are all motivationally significant and strongly influence management's dividend and
investment policies."); id. at 94 ("Management's desire for growth is often adverse to the
shareholder's quest for profit. Management strives toward maximum retention of corporate
earnings despite low profitability .. "); supra note 203 (discussing the relationship between
company size and compensation levels); infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing
management's desire for growth); see also Coffee, supra note 116, at 8 (observing "a long-
standing managerial bias in favor of corporate growth"); id. at 20 ("[E]mpire building may be
rational for managers but inefficient for shareholders."); id. at 22 (suggesting that "managers are
overly biased toward earnings retention (possibly because they wish to maximize growth)"); id.
at 30 ("[Tlhere is, if anything, additional reason today to believe that they correctly describe the
manager's own preferences as biased in favor of growth over profitability."). But see Fischel,
supra note 2, at 712-14 (rejecting the significance of the "managerialist" hypothesis that
managers prefer growth over profitability in part because of the market constraints on public
corporation management).
This self-interested view of management's preferences is typically referred to as the
"managerialist" theory. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 65, at 174 (discussing
managerialists). The theory focuses on the behavior of managers in publicly-held corporations.
See id. (describing the "managerialists" as a "school of economics" that argues that, "in the case
of the publicly held corporation, corporate managers tend not to pursue profit maximization, but
rather size or growth maximization"). Nevertheless, as this Article attempts to demonstrate, the
theory's insights are directly relevant to the closely-held corporation as well.
206. See supra note 179 (discussing "reasonable" compensation).
207. This disparity in salary is due primarily to two factors. First, as the owner of a small
business, the majority shareholder can set its own salary at the higher end of the range of
reasonable compensation for that type of position. In another corporation where the shareholder
lacks majority control, it is likely that the shareholder will also lack the power to set its own
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salary. Instead, the shareholder will bargain with other actors for its salary and, as a result, the
compensation paid may be lower in the range. See I OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 3:07, at 57
n.5 ("[Tlhe special prerogatives enjoyed by a majority in a close corporation not infrequently
block the sale of a close corporation because the majority has difficulty obtaining such lucrative
employment elsewhere." (citing J.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and
Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 ILL. L.F. 1, 20 n.72)); VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note
170, at 121 ("It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful closely held
company earning a greater amount in annual compensation than the amount an equivalent
nonowner employee would earn as compensation."); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1109-10 ("The
shareholder may invest for the purpose of having ajob that produces higher compensation than
could be garnered through employment by third parties."); see also Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d
119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("[W~hile there is no claim that the [close corporation]
salaries are excessive, neither was there a showing that if the 'inside' employment were
terminated those family members could earn as much elsewhere."); Nelson v. Martin, 958
S.W.2d 643,644 (Tenn. 1997)) (noting that the annual compensation of a shareholder-employee
of a commercial printing business "was in excess of $250,000"), overruled by Trace-Med of
America, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002).
Second, the majority owner of a small business can use its control to obtain a high-level
executive position that generally commands a greater salary. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 116,
at 17-18, 74 (suggesting that senior executive positions are limited and are associated with
greater compensation); see also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657,
659-60 & n.9 (Mass. 1976) (observing that all of the close corporation participants were
directors of the company and that the offices of president, treasurer, and clerk were held by each
of the participants over the years); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384 (N.D. 1987)
(noting that both participants in a close corporation were directors of the company and
observing that one shareholder-employee served as the president while the other served as the
vice-president). In another corporation where the shareholder lacks majority control, there is no
guarantee that such a high-level position could be obtained, even if the shareholder possessed
the requisite skills. Indeed, within any given company, there may be several employees who are
qualified to serve as the chief executive officer. Nevertheless, there is only one chief executive
officer position. As Professor Coffee observes:
[B]ecause lateral mobility among senior corporate executives is limited ... the
manager cannot assume the existence of an external market rate of return applicable
to his or her labors, as the lower-echelon employee may be able to assume. Rather,
the still prevailing pattern is one in which there are 'ports of entry' within the
corporate hierarchy, but little opportunity exists for lateral movement at an
equivalent level.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 17-18; see also id. at 74 ("Although lateral mobility is today
increasing, the still-prevalent pattern is one under which new managers enter the firm at
relatively low-level 'ports of entry' and gradually move upward along steep seniority ladders.");
id. at 38 n. 102 ("To be sure, most executives are promoted from within, and the executive labor
market is still largely an internal one."); infra note 208 (discussing lateral mobility among
executive positions). Professor Coffee, however, has also stated the following:
[A]n active market for senior executive services exists, and many CEOs came to
their present firm without prior service there. To be sure, internal promotion is the
more common route, but the existence of a substantial rate of interfirm transfers is
inconsistent with the claim that an executive must make substantial investments in
firm-specific human capital to advance within the corporate hierarchy.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 38.
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$100,000 in surplus as a dividend, or whether to invest that $100,000 in
expansion of the existing restaurant (for example, larger seating area, larger
kitchen). Expansion is projected to pay a return of $12,000 a year, and it is not
expected to increase the number of hours worked by the majority to any
significant degree. The corporation's cost of capital is 15%. For the moment,
assume that expansion will not affect the majority's salary.
On these facts, the rational majority shareholder would choose to pay a
dividend rather than to expand. On the assumption that the shareholders can
earn the cost of capital themselves in other investment vehicles, the
shareholders require at least a $15,000 return on a $100,000 investment. With
expected returns of only $12,000, or 12% a year, the expansion project falls
short by $3,000, or 3% a year. Foregoing expansion in favor of a dividend is in
the interest of all shareholders-majority and minority-who care solely about
their return on financial capital.
Now assume that expansion will allow the majority to increase its salary
from $50,000 to $55,000. This increase includes no de facto dividends and is
still considered reasonable compensation in light of the additional revenues and
earnings generated from the expansion. Outside of the close corporation,
assume that the majority could still earn only $40,000 in comparable
employment, as chief executive officer positions are simply not available at
other similar companies!0 Thus, without expansion, close corporation
208. in other words, while it may be true that chief executive officers of similar restaurants
earn $55,000, there is only one chief executive officer position at each company. Such
comparable positions, therefore, may be unavailable. See supra note 207 (discussing lateral
mobility among executive positions). Put differently, part of the value of being a majority
shareholder in a close corporation is that the majority can name itself to a high-level executive
position that generally commands a greater salary. In another company, that position may
already be held by someone else. See supra note 207 (discussing lateral mobility among
executive positions).
Even if comparable positions are available at other firms, it is worth noting that the
majority shareholder's skill set may not transfer well to these positions. As Professor Coffee
observes:
Such [firm-specific] capital could arise either because of specific job training or
technological skills the manager acquires, which are not equally valuable to other
firms; it also may arise because of the significance of 'corporate cultures,' which
necessitate that special interpersonal skills be acquired to function in individual
corporate environments.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 17 n.42. Professor Coffee further states the following:
Firm-specific human capital consists not only of specialized training or knowledge,
but also the ability to work within the existing corporate culture and organizational
structure .... [l]ts existence implies that the senior manager may be left in an
exposed position, because to the extent he has invested heavily in firm-specific
human capital, he typically has little lateral mobility.
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employment is paying the majority shareholder $10,000 more than the
shareholder could earn outside of the company ($50,000-$40,000). With
expansion, the employment "spread" increases, as the majority is earning
$15,000 more than it could earn outside of the company ($55,000-$40,000).
Overall, expansion has increased the return on the majority's employment
capital by $5,000-i.e., the majority's close corporation position now
commands a $15,000 "market premium" rather than a $10,000 "market
premium. 209
Given this additional information, notice how the majority's incentives
change. Expansion now provides the majority shareholder with a $5,000 gain
on its employment capital that more than offsets the $3,000 loss on its financial
capital. On these numbers, a rational majority shareholder would choose
expansion, even though expansion is still a poor investment choice from the
standpoint of return on financial capital.210 Stated more broadly, the majority
will prefer expansion because its total return on investment (the aggregate of
the return on its employment capital and the return on its financial capital)2 ''
increases as a result. Of course, passive minority shareholders will prefer
dividends because expansion produces no gain on their employment capital (by
definition) and generates an inferior return on their financial capital. Where
such divergence between the majority and minority interests is present, the
potential for conflicts over dividend policy is apparent.
212
2. The Desire for Surplus
Aside from the desire for growth, a close corporation majority shareholder
also has a desire for surplus which may cause it to forego dividends in favor of
Id. at 74-75; see also id. at 12 n.29 ("More recent theorists have emphasized that employees
develop firm-specific capital on the job, which factor converts the corporation into an internal
job market.").
209. See supra note 207 (discussing lateral mobility among executive positions).
210. In fact, on these numbers, expansion is in the majority's interest so long as expansion
pays more than a 10% return on the $100,000 investment. That is, if the expected return from
expansion was $10,000, or 10% a year, the investment falls $5,000 short of what the
shareholders could earn elsewhere (the 15% cost of capital on the $100,000 investment in a
close corporation). That $5,000 loss is offset by the $5,000 gain on the majority's employment
capital. Anything more than a 10% return on the $100,000 expansion project, therefore, is in
the majority's interest.
211. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing return on investment in a close
corporation).
212. Cf BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 64 ("Rapid growth is good news, not bad,
so long as the business is earning more than the opportunity cost of capital.").
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below cost of capital investments. This desire for surplus stems from two
related incentives. First, the majority shareholder has a general incentive to
insure that the company maintains sufficient resources to pay its employment
compensation in future years.2"3 Second, a majority shareholder has a specific
incentive to increase its salary to the upper limit of its reasonable compensation
range.24 Because of the value of close corporation employment,215 in other
words, a rational majority shareholder will desire a sizable company surplus to
insure that the employment position and its perquisites are maintained, if not
enhanced. Given this context, the majority will be wary of dividends.
2 6
At some level, this conservative dividend policy is appropriate. It is
perfectly proper for the majority shareholder to care about the future viability of
the enterprise and the enterprise's ability to meet its obligations. Moreover, the
majority's own economic interests should, in theory, prevent it from following
an overly conservative dividend policy. After all, the majority has an economic
213. See, e.g., Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 126 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)
("Since the primary benefit that [the controlling shareholder] receives from the corporation is
continued employment for himself and his family, the maintenance of a $5,000,000 earned
surplus, large cash balances, and the non-payment of dividends is certainly in his best
interest."); cf Coffee, supra note 116, at 8 n. 16 (referring to the manager's "undiversifiable
investment of human capital in the corporation"); id. at 78-79 ("The unique problem with
human capital is that the usual market solutions for risky investments--i.e., insurance or
diversification-simply are not feasible.").
214. Company growth allows the majority shareholder to shift the reasonable compensation
range for its position into a higher "bracket." For example, assume that chief executive officers
of manufacturing concerns with approximately $10 million in sales earn, on average, from
$100,000-$500,000. It is fair to assert that the average compensation for chief executive
officers of comparable businesses with $100 million in sales falls within a range whose lower
and upper limits are higher (e.g., from $ 1,000,000-$5,000,000). See supra notes 203-04 and
accompanying text (discussing the relationship between company size and compensation levels).
Aside from efforts to shift the compensation bracket through growth, however, a majority
shareholder has a separate incentive within its existing compensation bracket to increase its
salary to the upper limit of that range. Using the prior example, if chief executive officers of
manufacturing concerns with approximately $10 million in sales earn, on average, from
$100,000-$500,000, the majority shareholder has an incentive to push its salary toward
$500,000, even if the range itself stays constant.
215. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of close
corporation employment).
216. As Professor Coffee notes:
All this data comes into clearer focus once we begin from the premise that senior
management, having a fixed investment in the firm, will act in a more risk-averse
manner than the shareholders.... Thus, the less risk-averse shareholder wants a
high payout, while the manager wants to hoard cash and assets to protect against
future contingencies.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 22; see also infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority shareholder's conservative tendencies regarding dividend and investment policy).
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incentive to maximize its total return on investment-return on its employment
capital as well as its financial capital.217 Where the company has no above cost
of capital investment opportunities, this maximization is theoretically
accomplished at the point where (1) the company has retained just enough
funds to pay the majority's present and future employment compensation (and
other fixed company obligations); and (2) the company has distributed the
remaining funds as dividends such that the majority can invest its share in other
vehicles paying at least the cost of capital. At this optimal point, the majority is
maximizing its return on employment capital as well as its return on financial
capital. That is, just enough funds are left in the company to accomplish the
majority's compensation goals (and to pay fixed obligations), while the
company distributes all other available funds so that the shareholders can earn
cost of capital returns.
In actuality, however, there is good reason to believe that the typical
majority shareholder will be overly conservative in its desire for surplus and its
reluctance to pay dividends. Although in theory the above-described optimal
point for retention and distribution may exist, in actuality such a point is
difficult (if not impossible) to identify with any degree of accuracy. Simply
put, the future is uncertain and, as a consequence, it is unclear how much
surplus is required to insure that the majority's compensation goals are met. If
the majority's return on employment capital were comparable to its return on
financial capital, perhaps the effect of this uncertainty could be ignored.
Because the return on employment capital is usually the far larger component
of the majority's overall investment return,2 " however, it is fair to assert that
this uncertainty will cause the majority to err on the side of conservatism, most
likely to an excessive degree.2 9 Like the desire for growth, therefore, the
217. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing the components of investment
return in a close corporation).
218. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing return on employment capital
in a close corporation).
219. As Professor Israel notes:
Management does not pursue a policy of maximization of profit as vigorously as
might be expected. Rather than seeking out the most profitable investment
opportunities, it tends to reinvest corporate earnings within the enterprise, either in
expansion of existing enterprises or in diversification. Each management thereby
maximizes the funds kept under its direct control.
Israel, supra note 66, at 88. Professor Israel further observes:
Should the corporate executive pursue an aggressive investment policy in an
attempt to maximize the profitability of the firm, the stockholders will receive the
profits which may result from taking [the] chance, while [the executive's] position
in the firm may be jeopardized in the event of serious loss. Therefore, a
conservative investment policy permeates the decision-making process... and the
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desire for surplus is apt to push the majority away from dividends and towards
the only profitable investment opportunities that the company has, even if those
opportunities provide a below cost of capital return.22 °
C. The Need for the Judiciary to Make the Cost of Capital Inquiry
As a result of these conflicts of interest, one cannot trust the close
corporation majority shareholder to ask the right question when deciding
whether to pay dividends. Rather than asking whether the financial return from
a contemplated project exceeds the company's cost of capital, the majority is
often asking whether the financial and employment return from the project
exceeds the company's cost of capital.221
In some contexts, however, even this distrust might not call for judicial
review. In the public corporation, for example, managers have similar desires
to preserve and enhance their employment capital--desires that push them
222towards growth and below cost of capital investments. These desires,
imprimatur of self-interest is impressed upon dividend and investment policy.
Id. at 91 (internal quotation omitted) (footnote omitted); see id. at 94-95 ("Management strives
towards maximum retention of corporate earnings despite low profitability with the result that
weak management [tends] to perpetuate itself... [in] its conservatism beyond what would be
permitted by stockholder-oriented decision rules." (internal quotation omitted)).
220. See infra note 222 (discussing management's desire for growth); cf Israel, supra note
66, at 94 (noting that, in public corporations, "prevention of loss is of more vital concern than
maximization of profit").
221. To be clear, it is likely that the majority is primarily (if not only) asking about the
employment return that it, as opposed to the other shareholders, would receive from the project.
222. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 116, at 21, 28 n.76 (observing that public corporations'
rate of return on retained earnings "was well below that on debt or equity," and noting that this
suggests that "managements have tended to retain earnings when they should pay dividends");
Israel, supra note 66, at 89 (commenting on data that indicated that "the rate of return on
retained earnings was generally less than what the investor could have earned by simply placing
his dividends in a risk-free savings account or government security"); supra note 205 and
accompanying text (discussing management's desire for growth); see also JAMES D. Cox ET AL.,
TEACHER'S MANUAL TO SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 51 (3d ed. 2001)
(mentioning findings that seasoned equity offering firms "that have rapid increases in sales and
capital expenditures have lower subsequent stock returns," and observing that "this suggests that
management is investing in less positive net present value projects"); Brudney, supra note 2, at
95-96 ("[W]hen management invests retained earnings the investment tends to produce lower
returns than does the investment of newly acquired funds."). Professor Coffee has also noted
the following:
Professor Jensen has collected evidence that during the late 1970s the oil industry
was earning low to negative returns on exploration and development expenditures
and that the announcement of increased such expenditures elicited a negative stock
market reaction. Yet, such expenditures advanced managerial interests and so were
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however, are constrained by the market and the effect that the market price can
have on the continuance of a managerial position. Systemic below cost of
capital investments, in other words, fail to maximize shareholder value and
ultimately translate into a lower stock price for the company.223 As mentioned,
continued in the face of shareholder opposition, until the intervention of hostile
bidders.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 55 n.163 (citation omitted).
In public companies, growth can also increase managerial security by diversifying the
company's business. The idea is that losses in one business area will be offset by gains in
another, thereby diminishing the risk of bankruptcy and the loss of managerial positions that
usually accompany bankruptcy. As Professor Coffee observes:
Some economists... have argued that corporate managers maximize sales or
growth, not profits. In part, such an empire-building policy is pursued, they claim,
to increase the security of the corporation's managers, because the acquisition of
additional divisions and product lines both reduces the risk of insolvency and
provides opportunities for personal advancement.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 20; see Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1]12 n.64 (noting that
diversification "help[s] reduce the corporation's level of risk, which in turn reduces the risk of
bankruptcy and helps to safeguard the positions and substantial salaries ofthe corporation's key
executives"); see also Israel, supra note 66, at 93 ("Managerial security is also served by a
policy of corporate growth, even if the enterprise's profitability is only marginally enhanced.")
In the close corporation context, growth through diversification of business lines is
infrequently observed. Economic theory would suggest, however, that diversification at the firm
level might make sense in a close corporation. Because close corporation shareholders typically
commit a large portion of their personal wealth to the venture, they have little remaining
resources to sufficiently diversify their portfolio. See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1109
("[M]any investors in small businesses invest a significant portion of their life savings in the
business. This practice defeats their ability to diversify their investment portfolios and exposes
them to company- and industry-specific risk."); see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328
N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) ("Typically, the minority shareholder in a close corporation has a
substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation."); In re Topper, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that a close corporation minority shareholder "put
his life savings into the venture"); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 237 (observing
that "[i]nvestors in close corporations often put a great deal of their wealth at stake"); I
OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 1:03, at 4 (noting that a close corporation investor "may put
practically everything he owns into the business"); VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 172
("Most owners of closely held businesses or interests in closely held businesses do not diversify
their investment portfolios nearly to the extent to which investors diversify their holdings of
publicly traded securities."). Thus, the continued solvency of the close corporation is of great
importance.
223. As Professor Fischel states:
An inefficient dividend decision is no different than any other suboptimal
managerial decision. If managers adopt a lower (or higher) payout policy than
shareholders desire, the price of the firm's stock will trade at a lower price than
otherwise identical firms with different dividend policies.
Fischel, supra note 2, at 713; see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between investor satisfaction and a company's stock price); see also KLEIN &
COFFEE, supra note 65, at 372-73 (demonstrating how a below cost of capital investment
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a decreased stock price gives rise to investor pressure for managerial
replacements, and it makes the company more attractive as a takeover target
(again threatening managerial positions).224 In a public corporation, therefore, a
manager's self-interest in keeping its position may lead to some abuse of
dividend policy, but not to excessive abuse.225 Even though public corporation
management may not ask the right question in making a dividend decision, the
presence of market constraints lessens the need for judicial scrutiny. 26
negatively affects a stock's value).
224. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 116, at 7 ("[S]ubstantial managerial layoffs are now
likely after either a hostile takeover or a friendly 'white knight' transaction or restructuring.");
Fischel, supra note 2, at 713 ("If a firm's share price falls far enough as a result ofsuboptimal
dividend policy, the firm will become a likely candidate for a proxy fight or a tender offer.");
supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between investor
satisfaction and dividend decisions).
225. That is, while some below cost of capital investments enhance a manager's
employment capital, excessive below cost of capital investments threaten such employment
capital by raising the risk of displacement. See supra notes 83-85, 223-24 and accompanying
text (discussing the risk of displacement). As Professor Coffee has observed:
[T]he claim that managers want to pursue growth or other security-enhancing
objectives within the boundaries established by external profit constraints on the
firm is at least in part a statement that managers will seek to reduce risk up to that
point where the shareholders may oust them if they pursue this objective further.
Coffee, supra note 116, at 30. In a close corporation, this "point of ouster" for the majority
shareholder does not exist, as there is no market for corporate control and no ability to outvote
the true majority shareholder. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra note 226 (noting
the significance of a market). Without judicial scrutiny, therefore, nothing constrains
management's self-interest in growth and stability.
226. As Professor Fischel has stated:
Any systematic suboptimal dividend policy will have negative consequences in the
managerial services market, the capital market, the product market, and, if
prolonged, may trigger a proxy fight or a takeover. With such powerful market
forces controlling management discretion, there will rarely, if ever, be a need for
courts to entertain challenges to the dividend policy of a publicly held corporation's
management.
Fischel, supra note 2, at 715-16; see id. at 712-14 (rejecting the significance of the
"managerialist" hypothesis that managers prefer growth over profitability in part because of the
market constraints on public corporation management); supra note 86 and accompanying text
(describing the effect of a market).
Moreover, there is at least some possibility of shareholder coordination in a public
corporation that can block excessive managerial abuses. Although this constraint may be more
theoretical than real, see, e.g., Israel, supra note 66, at 95, the absence of a true "majority"
shareholder in the typical public corporation creates the possibility that a coordinated
shareholder effort could exert control to stop a pattern of below cost of capital investments. By
contrast, the shareholder with true majority control often carries out the abuses in a close
corporation. No amount of coordination can prevent them. Thus, the presence of both "market"
and "coordination" constraints in the public corporation context reduce the need for judicial
scrutiny.
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Even in close corporations, distrust of the majority may not call for
judicial review. As mentioned, where the company employs all of the
shareholders, the majority's selfish interests may wind up protecting the
minority's interests as well.227 The majority will only decide to retain earnings
for investment purposes if the total return on the investment (return on financial
capital and return on the majority's human capital) exceeds the firm's cost of
capital. So long as the investment affects the human capital of the majority and
the minority by approximately the same amount, this calculus also serves the
minority's interests."' If the majority decides to retain and invest rather than to
pay dividends, the minority will presumably have no problem with the decision,
even if the investment's expected financial returns fall below the company's
cost of capital.229 When the interests of the majority and minority are aligned,
in other words, the need for judicial scrutiny is less pressing.
In most close corporation dividend disputes, however, the majority
shareholder is employed by the company while the minority shareholder is
not.23° Interests diverge in these situations, as the minority receives no benefit
from majority decisions that favor employment capital. It is here where the
inability to trust the majority to ask the right cost of capital question is
problematic, as there are no market or other constraints to curb excessive
majority abuses. 3 In the typical close corporation dividend dispute, therefore,
a rigorous judicial review is needed.232
Obviously, this review must go beyond the superficial inquiry that is often
associated with the business judgment rule.233 If the majority puts forth a
227. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing salary as investment return).
228. Using our prior example, see supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text, if the
minority also had a $5,000 gain on its employment capital (or even a gain greater than $3,000),
it would choose to reinvest and expand as well given that its overall investment return increases
as a result. Notice, however, that this assumes that the majority will allow the minority to
realize this gain-that is, it assumes that the majority will actually increase the minority's
employment compensation. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 121 (observing that
minority stockholders lack the power to change compensation).
229. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (providing an example where the majority
and minority interests are aligned).
230. See, e.g.,InreKemp& Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173,1176 (N.Y. 1984)(involving
a minority shareholder who no longer worked for the company); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same).
231. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (discussing market and coordination
constraints in the public corporation context).
232. Cf Brudney, supra note 2, at 103 n.56 ("[A] dividend policy which systematically
favors certain stockholders over others, if harmful or unbeneficial to the enterprise, may
properly be held to reflect managerial dereliction.").
233. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment
rule).
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legitimate business purpose for retention of funds (for example, need for
expansion), most courts end the inquiry. 3 It is these business purposes,
however, that the courts must scrutinize to insure that their financial returns
justify their risks. The courts, in other words, should resolve close corporation
dividend disputes by making the cost of capital inquiry. Even when the
majority proffers a business purpose for retention, a court should inquire into
whether the expected financial returns from retention exceed the company's
cost of capital.235 If the returns fall short, the majority's decision to retain and
invest violates the understandings that the shareholders likely would have
reached if they had discussed the issue. As a consequence, a court should deem
the general reasonable expectation frustrated, and oppression liability should
236arise.
D. The Role of Time in the Cost of Capital Inquiry
In applying the cost of capital inquiry to close corporation dividend
disputes, the length of time that a business has been operating will often be
relevant. With high growth companies, for example, dividends are rarely paid
234. See, e.g., Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 581-82 (Me. 1975)
(accepting, without scrutiny, the majority shareholder's assertion that dividends could not be
paid because of the need to expand the corporation's facilities); id. at 580 ("if there are plausible
business reasons supportive of the decision of the board of directors, and such reasons can be
given credence, a Court will not interfere with a corporate board's right to make that decision.");
Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977) (citing Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343
A.2d 577, 581-82 (Me. 1975)) (same).
Conversely, if a majority shareholder is unable to put forth a legitimate need for the
retention of funds, a minority shareholder has a chance of prevailing. See, e.g., Naito v. Naito,
35 P.3d 1068, 1080 (Or. Ct. App. 200 1) (ordering dividends to be paid from a corporation with
over $5 million in retained earnings after noting that "the corporation did not contemplate any
new ventures that would call for extraordinary resources"); id. at 1082 (downplaying the
controlling group's list of company projects-a list that was expanded "shortly before trial"-
because it was "designed more to use up the available cash on paper than to be a realistic
assessment of what the corporation intended to do").
235. See Israel, supra note 66, at 99 ("Good faith alone would not be sufficient to defend
management's failure to declare dividends. Proof derived from examination of the corporation's
expected rate of return on ploughback would be evaluated to determine whether the anticipated
return on reinvested earnings is sufficient to compensate the investor for dividends not
received."); see also Brudney, supra note 2, at 97-98 (characterizing the cost of capital inquiry
as a method where "dividends become a mere residual of investment policy," and stating that
"[t]o the extent that the law seeks to induce, if not compel, management to maximize
shareholder wealth in circumstances where stockholders cannot persuade management to do so
by market action or by votes, management should be penalized if it fails to make dividend
policy a resultant of investment opportunities").
236. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical bargains).
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in the early years of the business.237 In such companies, this emphasis on
reinvestment of earnings is often consistent with the cost of capital inquiry, as
attractive investment opportunities are generally more prevalent in the
beginning stages of a company's life cycle, particularly where competitors have
not yet entered the market.238 Moreover, in the early years of a company's
development, retention of some earnings is prudent until a sufficient surplus is
built up to handle contingencies. As long as surplus-building typically involves
the reinvestment of company profits in vehicles with less risk than projects
within the company's line of business (for example, placing company funds
into a money market account), such activity can also satisfy the cost of capital
inquiry.239 In the early years of a business, therefore, the absence of dividends
may not run afoul of the cost of capital framework. This lack of dividends is
consistent with the expectations of many shareholders at this stage in a
company's existence, as reasonable investors understand (or certainly should
237. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 60 ("Some companies have such
extensive growth opportunities that they prefer to pay no dividends for long periods of time.").
238. See id. (discussing company growth).
239. A company cost of capital, in other words, is the relevant benchmark only for projects
that fall within the company's line of business. After all, the cost of capital inquiry looks at
both risk and return. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (defining cost of capital).
Investment opportunities with less risk than the company's ordinary business (e.g., money
market or other savings accounts) can still satisfy the cost of capital inquiry, even though they
provide a correspondingly lesser return. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 181
("[T]he company cost of capital rule can also get a firm into trouble if the new projects are more
or less risky than its existing business. Each project should be evaluated at its own opportunity
cost of capital."); id. at 182 ("Many firms require different returns from different categories of
investment."); id. at 183 ("The company cost of capital is the correct discount rate for projects
that have the same risk as the company's existing business but not for those projects that are
safer or riskier than the company's average."); see also JOHN D. AYER, GUIDE TO FINANCE FOR
LAWYERS 291-92 (2001) (distinguishing company cost of capital from project cost of capital).
Presumably there is some limit on how long surplus-building activities can occur. The
investment of company funds into a money market account, for example, would likely satisfy
the cost of capital inquiry because of the low risk of the investment. Nevertheless, surely
management cannot direct the bulk of a company's available investment capital to such low-risk
investments forever. It is fair to say that a shareholder investing in a company is seeking returns
that are consistent with the risk profile of that company's business. If a company continually
deviates from that risk profile to any significant degree, a principal reason for the shareholder's
investment is likely frustrated. The hard issue for a court, of course, is determining whether a
company, given its peculiar characteristics and the nature of its business, has already built up an
adequate surplus for its foreseeable needs. Although difficult, courts have made such
determinations. See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 660 (Del. Ch.
1975) (determining whether a corporation was financially able to pay a dividend); Cole Real
Estate Corp. v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 310 N.E.2d 275,282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (same);
Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 60 A. 941,944-46 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1905) (same); Naito v.
Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1078, 1080, 1082 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (same).
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understand) that reinvestment of profits is necessary to help establish the
business.2'4
With the passage of time, however, the continuance of a no-dividend or
low-dividend policy becomes increasingly more suspect. In a competitive
business environment, high current rates of growth "can rarely be sustained
indefinitely.0 4 1 Indeed, in the later stages of a company's development, above
cost of capital investment opportunities tend to be few and far between.242 For
many companies, therefore, these later stages are the time period when the cost
of capital inquiry would indicate that dividends are appropriate. 3
240. Cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 7, at 51 (noting that a withdrawal of capital in
the formative stages of a new business "might be particularly disruptive").
241. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 54; see also id. at 60 (noting the "inevitable
deceleration of rapid growth").
242. As Professors Klein & Coffee state:
Most mature firms have limited opportunities to earn acceptable returns by
expansion of their existing business or by entering new businesses and are reluctant
to invest in the securities of other firms. When such mature firms retain their spare
cash rather than paying it out as dividends, they will therefore be likely to invest
that cash in projects with low rates of return.
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 65, at 374; see Brudney, supra note 2, at 95 ("Possibly a mature
firm's capacity to expand tends to be limited, so that at the margin new investment will produce
a lower return than the existing business."); see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 60
("Eventually growth must slow down, releasing funds that can be paid to the stockholders.").
243. Under a cost of capital inquiry, a majority shareholder would be justified in retaining
and reinvesting profits for a project so long as the project's expected returns equaled or
exceeded the company's cost of capital. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text
(discussing the cost of capital inquiry). Taken to its logical extreme, a majority shareholder
would never have to pay a dividend under this inquiry as long as above cost of capital
investments were perpetually available. If the shareholders had bargained over this possibility,
however, they likely would have reached an understanding that a permanent avoidance of
dividends was impermissible, even if such avoidance was due to an unending supply of above
cost of capital opportunities. After all, reasonable minority shareholders do expect a return on
their financial capital at some point. Without a market for capital appreciation, only dividends
(true or de facto) provide that return. Thus, while above cost of capital investments will
presumably increase the amount of earnings that are available for dividends in the future, the
minority typically realizes no return on its invested capital until those dividends are actually
declared. From a hypothetical bargaining standpoint, therefore, the cost of capital inquiry is
acceptable to close corporation minority investors only because they assume that dividends will
ultimately be paid.
Put differently, although minority investors may be willing to defer their receipt of
dividends for some period of time, they are not willing to do so forever. At some point,
minority investors must realize a return on financial capital. It is fair to assert that if the
majority had not assented to an understanding that a permanent avoidance of dividends was
impermissible, passive minority shareholders would have refused to invest in the company. Cf
Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 126, 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (ordering a buyout
of a minority shareholder's interest where a refusal to pay dividends was a "policy from which
[the controlling shareholder] does not intend to deviate"); Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper
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Obviously, not every company is a growth company, and even growth
businesses differ significantly. Depending on the particular firm, therefore, the
cost of capital inquiry may indicate that dividends are proper at an earlier or
later date than the above generalizations would suggest. Nevertheless, in
conducting a cost of capital inquiry into a firm's dividend policy, the length of
time that a business has been operating will often be a relevant consideration.
As a general matter, it is fair to state that it becomes increasingly more difficult
to justify the retention of profits and the absence of dividends as a company
matures.
E. The Ability of the Judiciary to Make the Cost of Capital Inquiry
As this Article has explained, there are two general inquiries that courts
need to make in close corporation dividend disputes. First, where a plaintiff
alleges the payment of de facto dividends, a court needs to inquire into whether
the majority shareholder has taken profits while excluding a minority investor
from its proportional share.2 " Second, where de facto dividends are not present
but a shareholder still challenges a corporation's dividend policy, a court needs
to inquire into whether the majority is making below cost of capital
investments.245
Even if one accepts that these are the two relevant inquiries, the judicial
administrability of such inquiries is still in question. It is often stated that the
judiciary lacks institutional competence to review a corporation's dividend
decisions, as such decisions are shaped by factors that are peculiarly within the
Co., 60 A. 941, 945 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1905) ("[A] time will come when it is not fair to the
stockholders, even though the directors may be acting in good faith, to indefinitely extend the
corporate business .... [T]he only sure benefit to stockholders to be derived from the
successful prosecution of the corporate business must come from the distribution of dividends in
cash .... ); id. at 948 ("The success of a great business.., is measured by what the
stockholders get, and not by mere accumulation of assets.").
In a competitive business environment, of course, it would be highly unusual to find a
company with an unending supply of above cost of capital investments. See supra notes 241-
42 and accompanying text (noting that above cost of capital investment opportunities tend to
become scarce as a company matures). Nevertheless, the conceptual possibility again
demonstrates that there is a temporal component to the cost of capital inquiry. Simply put,
when a company has been profitable for a number of years, an expectation of dividends may
become reasonable, even if above cost of capital investments are still available.
244. See supra Part IV (discussing the problem of de facto dividends).
245. See supra Part V.A (discussing the cost of capital inquiry). Obviously, the courts
should also continue to make the traditional inquiries into whether fraud, bad faith, or other
abuse of discretion is present in the majority's dividend decision. See supra Part liI.A
(discussing the traditional approach to compelling dividends).
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knowledge and experience of a company's management. 246  In disputes
involving de facto dividends, this argument carries very little weight. Taking
profits while excluding other investors from their share of those profits is plain
and simple theft-self-dealing of the first order-that courts look for in both
close and public corporation disputes (not to mention in a host of other non-
corporate contexts).247 Spotting and rectifying theft is arguably a core function
of courts in general, and it makes little sense to treat dividend disputes
differently.
Where de facto dividends are not involved, however, the judicial
incompetence argument has more force. Given that dividend decisions involve
projections about the future affairs of a company, one could argue that courts
have no superior information or judgment to second-guess the decisions of
241company insiders. Of course, where a market is involved to discipline overly
conservative dividend policies, this argument for a "hands-off' judiciary is
easier to accept. In the close corporation, a hands-off approach by the judiciary
246. As Professor Fischel notes:
Management may base the dividend decision on a variety of factors... [including]
whether funds are needed for investment, payment of creditors, or maintenance and
upkeep of existing facilities, and whether needed funds can be cheaply or readily
obtained from the capital market .... Decisions based upon these factors are
particularly within the competence ofmanagement .... Under these circumstances,
any judicial second-guessing of the dividend decision is likely to reduce
shareholder welfare.
Fischel, supra note 2, at 716-17; see, e.g., Brudney, supra note 2, at 99 n.43 ("Even upon the
assumptions of the irrelevance proposition... such regulation would require judicial or
administrative assessment of managerial judgments about expected returns and risks involved in
proposed investment opportunities-matters within the special competence. of management, but
not of courts or administrative agencies."); Fischel, supra note 2, at 724 ("[J]udges are unable to
evaluate the issues raised by management's decision whether and to what extent a dividend
should be declared."); see also id. at 716 ("[M]anagers are better equipped to make business
decisions than uninformed and inexperienced judges or shareholders."); Israel, supra note 66, at
76 ("[A]s an institution, the judiciary is fundamentally ill-equipped to make business decisions
or to evaluate the wisdom of such decisions made by others."); cf Raynolds v. Diamond Mills
Paper Co., 60 A. 941, 944 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1905) ("This work of examining the situation of a great
business corporation owning large plants, mills, and machinery, and with large business
transactions on its hands ... in order to find out whether dividends are being unfairly and
unjustly and unreasonably withheld from the stockholders, is an exceedingly difficult task.").
247. See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 80, at 1115 (stating that majority shareholder self-
dealing-the majority's effort to "appropriate to itself a disproportionate share of the
corporation's income stream"-is present in publicly-held and closely-held corporations); id. at
1136 (noting that Delaware courts "rigorously" apply an entire fairness test to self-dealing
transactions); supra text accompanying note 179 (noting that disputes involving de facto
dividends are clearly unlawful).
248. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's competence to
review dividend decisions).
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effectively grants the majority an unreviewable discretion, even though that
authority can be used to the detriment of minority investors.249 Before
accepting a judicial "punt" in disputes where de facto dividends are not
involved, therefore, it is important to examine whether cost of capital inquiries
are truly different from other financial issues that courts routinely handle in
valuation and other "fair price" disputes.25°
In the typical dividend lawsuit, the majority shareholder claims that
dividends are inappropriate because the company's excess funds are to be used
for a particular project that the majority favors.2s' For a court to assess whether
the expected returns from that project exceed the company's cost of capital, it
needs information on both of these variables. That is, the court must determine
the company's cost of capital, and the court must assess the expected returns
from the project. By no means are these inquiries simple, but it is fair to assert
that they are routinely made in other valuation disputes. For example, cost of
capital calculations are performed as a standard step in many valuations of
closely-held businesses, whether for buyout or other purposes.252 Granted, the
court usually does not have the expertise to perform the cost of capital
calculations itself; instead, the court relies on, and assesses the merits of, the
calculations of the parties' expert witnesses.23  This reliance on expert
testimony for knowledge that is beyond the ken of the averagejudge orjuror is,
249. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing freeze-out techniques in
close corporations).
250. In statutory appraisal proceedings, for example, courts routinely assess whether
dissenting shareholders received a "fair value" for their ownership stake. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (analyzing "fair value" under the appraisal
statute). Similarly, as part of an entire fairness review of a fiduciary's self-dealing conduct,
courts examine whether the transaction at issue involved a "fair price." See, e.g., Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (examining a transaction by focusing on "two basic
aspects" of fairness-fair dealing and fair price).
251. See, e.g., Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 581-82 (Me. 1975)
(involving a majority shareholder who desired to use funds for the expansion of the company's
facilities).
252. See, e.g., VALUING A BusiNESS, supra note 170, at 163 ("[The cost of capital is one of
the most important variables in the valuation of a business or a business interest."); id. at 153-
58 (discussing the need to calculate the cost of capital in valuations using the income approach);
id. at 162-64 (explaining how to calculate the cost of capital for a particular company or
investment); id. at 175 (noting that there is a common procedure for developing discount rates
for privately-held companies); see also id. at 153 (indicating that "cost of capital" and "discount
rate" are synonymous).
253. See, e.g., Balsamides v. Protarneen Chems., Inc., 734 A.2d 721, 725, 727-29 (N.J.
1999) (assessing the approaches of two experts in a close corporation dispute involving a fair
value buyout). See generally VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 761-80 (discussing
expert witness testimony in valuation disputes).
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of course, commonplace in litigation in general.254  In valuation disputes
specifically, expert reports are ubiquitous.255 Determining a company's cost of
capital, therefore, is no more beyond the competence of the judiciary than any
other valuation issue that requires an assessment of expert opinion.
Assessing the expected return from a particular project is complicated by
the fact that it is a future-oriented analysis. As a consequence, assessments of
expected return are simply guesses-educated guesses to be sure, but still
guesses-about the likely success or failure of a project.256 Nevertheless, as
part of their capital budgeting strategy, companies routinely make such
calculations before embarking on a project,257 and the concept of valuation
itself is often viewed as a function of expected investment returns.25 ' Indeed,
one valuation technique that is well-accepted in financial and legal circles is the
discounted cash flow (DCF) model.25 9 In operation, the DCF analysis is
premised on discounting a stream of estimated future cash flows from an
investment back to the present at an appropriate "discount" rate (or cost of
254. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise . ").
255. See, e.g., Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992) ("It is
frequently the case in appraisal proceedings that valuation disputes become a battle of
experts."); Balsamides v. Protarneen Chems., Inc., 734 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. 1999) (observing
that valuation disputes "frequently become battles between experts").
256. See, e.g., VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 37 ("[Fluture benefits and their
predictability... are more difficult to establish.").
257. See ROBERTS. HARRIS & JOHN J. PRINGLE, INTRODUCTORY CO'OaRATE FINANCE 298-
300 (1989) (examining the methods and the several main activities involved in the capital
budgeting process). See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 243-55 (discussing
forecasting techniques); HARRIS & PRINGLE, supra, at 306-32 (discussing techniques for
estimating future cash flows).
258. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 197 ("All economic, financial, and
regulatory literature makes it clear that valuation is a function of expected prospective economic
income. The past history is relevant only to the extent that it may, in some cases, provide useful
guidance in projecting future economic income.").
259. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (allowing
courts to use valuation techniques that "are generally considered acceptable in the financial
community," and implicitly encouraging the use of the discounted cash flow model); In re
Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485,490 (Del. Ch. 1991) ("The Delaware courts
have affirmed the validity of this [discounted cash flow] method of valuation repeatedly.");
Joseph Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the Delaware Appraisal
Proceeding, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 1,48-49 (1994) ("Consistent with its general acceptance and vast
application in the financial community, the 'discounted cash flow' method has become the
valuation 'methodology of choice' in Delaware appraisal proceedings."(footnotes omitted)).
See generally VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 149-98 (discussing discounted economic
income valuation methods, including the discounted cash flow model).
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capital). 260 A positive net present value (the present value of the investment's
expected cash flows minus the cost of the investment) indicates that the
investment has a rate of return that exceeds the discount rate.26'
The DCF model is simply a subcategory of the broader discounted
economic income method of valuation where some measurement of economic
income anticipated from an investment (for example, cash flow, net income) is
discounted back to present value at an appropriate rate.262 The cost of capital
inquiry suggested by this Article is a subcategory of this broader method as
well, as the projected income from an investment is discounted back to present
value at the company's cost of capital. If the net present value is positive, it
indicates that the investment has a rate of return that exceeds the company's
cost of capital.263  To the extent that courts accept the DCF analysis as a
legitimate valuation method, therefore, they have accepted the premise of the
cost of capital inquiry as well. That is, the valuation of a stream of projected
cash flows (the DCF model) is functionally identical to the valuation of a
260. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 180, at 52 (noting that the discounted cash
flow method "discount[s] the cash flows.., by the return that can be earned in the capital
market on securities of comparable risk"); Calio, supra note 259, at 49 ("The basic premise of
the discounted cash flow method is that the value of all assets is equal to the present value of the
expected cash returns, or cash flows, from that asset while it is held."); id. ("This [discounted
cash flow] method takes all future streams of potential benefits and converts them into a current
value: a single number of current dollars that is equivalent to the stream of benefits over
time."); see also VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 153 (indicating that "cost of capital"
and "discount rate" are synonymous); infra note 262 (discussing the discounted economic
income method of valuation).
261. See, e.g., HARRIS & PRINGLE, supra note 257, at 283-85 (defining the net present
value of an investment as "the present value of the inflows less (net of) the required outlay"); id.
at 290 ("[I]f the internal rate of return exceeds the required rate of return ... net present value
will be greater than zero, so both rules signal a decision to accept the investment."); supra note
182 (explaining the net present value and internal rate of return rules).
262. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 152 ("[T]he basic concept of the income
approach is to project the future economic income associated with the investment and to
discount the projected income stream to a present value at a discount rate appropriate for the
expected risk of the prospective economic income stream."); id. ("In this approach, the value of
the subject investment (i.e., the subject business interest) is the present value of the economic
income expected to be generated by the investment .... "); id. ("[T]he investor 'anticipates' the
'expected' economic income to be earned from the investment. This expectation of prospective
economic income is converted to a present worth-that is, the indicated value of the subject
business interest."); see also id. (noting that cash flow, net income, net operating income,
interest, and dividends are some of the measurements of economic income that are commonly
analyzed in the discounted economic income method of valuation). See generally id. at 149-98
(discussing the discounted economic income method of valuation).
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing the discounted cash flow
analysis).
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stream of projected investment returns (the cost of capital inquiry).2  If courts
are sufficiently competent to assess valuations based on projections of future
cash flow, they would seem to be sufficiently competent to assess valuations
based on expected investment returns.26
Despite the similarities between the DCF and cost of capital frameworks,
it is important to note that courts typically use the DCF model to value
companies rather than to value particular projects.266 Such an inquiry into a
company's value may pose lesser administrative difficulties for courts than a
cost of capital inquiry into a specific investment. Within any one particular
company, for example, dividend disputes may occur on an ongoing basis. Each
time the majority decides to retain funds for a particular project, there may be a
question as to whether that project's expected returns exceed the firm's cost of
capital. A court may find itself assessing future streams of income on multiple
projects-a task that may be more difficult and ongoing than a one-time
assessment of a firm's future stream of income in a company valuation.267
Nevertheless, given the importance of dividends to a close corporation minority
shareholder and the great potential for majority abuse,268 such inquiries are
necessary to protect the minority's rights. If a majority shareholder is found to
have frustrated the minority's general expectation by investing in a below cost
of capital project, a court fearful of recurring litigation between the parties over
subsequent projects could simply order a fair value buyout of the complaining
269minority investor.
264. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 152 (noting that cash flow and net
income are some of the measurements of economic income that are commonly analyzed in the
discounted economic income method of valuation).
265. As one commentator observed:
Quantitative methods permeate the discipline of business administration, and
management... is becoming a science. Prior to this development of this kind of
expertise, judicial hesitancy in reviewing business decisions [was] perhaps
understandable. But it would seem that both legislature and court should now
better than ever be able to define more precise legal standards for the protection of
minority shareholders.
William S. Stewart, Judicial Review of Divided Policy in Suits by Minority Shareholders, 12
AM. BUs. L.J. 43, 48 (1974).
266. See Calio, supra note 259, at 48-54 (describing how the discounted cash flow method
is used to calculate a corporation's value and noting that Delaware courts use this method).
267. Cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 7, at 16 ('Neither the courts nor the minority
shareholders have the resources for constant policing and challenging of majority management
decisions.").
268. See supra Part li.D (discussing the importance of dividends to the close corporation
minority investor).
269. Cf Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 129-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)
(ordering a buyout of the complaining shareholder rather than compelling a dividend because of
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Moreover, when a court is engaged in the task of valuing a company, it
can avoid the DCF approach if the future cash flows for that particular
company are too speculative to rely upon. If necessary, courts can turn to other
valuation methods that focus more on a company's historical data than on its
projected numbers.270 At times, in other words, future numbers are too hard to
predict, and courts cannot rely on future-oriented valuation methods to any
credible degree.273 In such circumstances, it may not be possible to evaluate a
concerns about continuing dissension between the shareholders). As Professor Murdock
explains:
[I]f the problem is triggered by animosity among the shareholders, there maybe an
endless parade back to court to seek additional relief, should the animosity not be
resolved. Therefore, in many instances, the only permanent resolution to the
problem would be to eliminate the complaining minority interest by a repurchase of
shares.
Murdock, supra note 3 1, at 428 (footnote omitted). In addition, the losing party in a dividends
dispute over a particular project will likely be more reluctant to involve the courts in the next
reinvestment versus dividends dispute. Given the cost of litigation and the potential for
sanctions for frivolous pleadings, the prospect of a minority shareholder bringing project-by-
project litigation over an extended period of time seems unlikely.
270. See VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 159 (noting that "capitalizing" is "a
process applied to an amount representing some measure of economic income for some single
period to convert that economic income amount to an estimate of present value," and stating that
"capitalization procedures can be used with expected, current, historical, or 'normalized'...
measures of economic income"); id. at 206 (explaining the guideline company method of
valuation where "value measures" are developed "based on prices at which stocks of similar
companies are trading in a public market," and those measures are then "applied to the subject
company's fundamental data and correlated to reach an estimate of value for the subject
company or its shares or other interests"). See generally id. at 203-38 (discussing the guideline
company method of Valuation); id. at 253-84 (discussing asset-based methods of valuation).
But see id. at 197 ("All economic, financial, and regulatory literature makes it clear that
valuation is a function of expected prospective economic income. The past history is relevant
only to the extent that it may, in some cases, provide useful guidance in projecting future
economic income.").
271. See, e.g.,In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485,490 (Del. Ch. 1991)
("The quality of the projection as to the future benefits over some period and the residual or
terminal value is central to the reliability of the underlying methodology of the discount[ed]
cash flow method."); id. ("In Harris, this Court declined to use the discounted cash flow method
because the projections on which petitioners relied were too speculative." (citing Harris v.
Rapid-American Corp., C.A. No. 6462, 1990 WL 146488, at 15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990), revd
in part, af/Jd in part, Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992))); HARRIS&
PRrNGLE, supra note 257, at 84, 87 (noting that the discounted cash flow model "has its
limitations, especially in situations involving uncertainty" as to the expected cash flows from a
project); id. at 87 ("The numbers that go into a DCF analysis must be based on reasonable
assumptions and a full assessment of the facts; otherwise, the numbers that come out will be
unreliable."); id. at 300 (noting the "difficulty of applying" net present value rules "especially
when very uncertain cash flows need to be projected"); VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at
153 ("The discounted economic income method is practical only to the extent that the
projections used are reasonable to the decision maker for whom the valuation is being prepared.
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dividend dispute with a cost of capital inquiry that relies solely on projections
of investment returns.272 Where the returns from a project are too speculative
Without supportable projections, the discounted economic income method can convey an aura
of precision that is not justified."); Calio, supra note 259, at 50-51 (explaining that courts will
usually accept "reliable and accurate projects" of cash flows such as those "calculated by
management, for its own use, or calculated by a disinterested third party," but noting that
"estimated future cash flows calculated in preparation for litigation are generally dismissed as
speculative and unreliable"); see also VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 170, at 37 ("Historical
facts are often considered more credible evidence in the eyes of the court than projections of
what somebody thinks will happen .... The courts generally prefer provable historical results
to unproven expectations of future results.").
272. One way to avoid some of the perceived difficulties in conducting the cost of capital
inquiry is to statutorily require a close corporation to pay out a certain percentage of its net
profits each year as dividends. See 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 10:08, at 47-48 ("A statute
requiring directors to declare and pay dividends in a specified amount at periodic intervals if
consistent with state law is an obvious way to combat squeeze-outs which utilize the dividend-
withholding technique."). See generally id. at 47-52 (discussing mandatory dividend statutes).
Although such statutes would help to alleviate many of the problems discussed in this Article,
they are problematic in their "one size fits all" approach. A statute ordering a payout of 30% of
net profits each year, for example, may be too high for some companies (companies with several
projects that return at or above the cost of capital) and too low for others (more mature
companies with dwindling numbers of promising investments). The cost of capital inquiry
proposed in this Article is a superior approach (albeit a more labor-intensive approach) because
it tailors the dividend inquiry to the particular risk and return traits of the company and project
at issue. Moreover, after paying out the required percentage, the statute would presumably
allow a majority shareholder to invest the remaining profits in below cost of capital projects.
The cost of capital inquiry proposed in this Article would prohibit such conduct. Finally, if a
majority shareholder did not pay out the required statutory percentage, a court would still have
to decide whether such excessive retention was justified. See, e.g., id. at 50-51 (proposing a
statute where a close corporation could be required to pay out 30% of its earnings "in the
absence of a convincing showing by corporate management that the corporation needs to retain
all of its earnings"); Israel, supra note 66, at 99 ("If the board of directors failed to declare a
dividend or declared a dividend of less than 50% of net earnings... the burden of proof would
be on management to prove the reasonableness of their policy."). That determination should
involve a cost of capital inquiry. Even with a mandatory dividend statute, therefore, a
potentially difficult and time-consuming cost of capital inquiry is likely involved.
Nevertheless, statutes requiring a fixed dividend payout could conserve judicial resources
in some instances (e.g., where the majority does distribute the required percentage), and they are
clearly more useful in combating dividend withholding than the overly deferential business
judgment rule approach. See 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 22, § 10:08, at 50-51 ("These writers,
however, are persuaded that solid policy considerations support a tightly drawn statute
empowering holders of a substantial block of shares (say 20 or 25% of a corporation's
outstanding shares) to require the corporation to pay out as dividends a modest part of its annual
earnings (perhaps up to 30 or 35%) .. "); Israel, supra note 66, at 99 n. 108 ("Although
retention of 50% of earnings may be excessive in certain instances, it does strike a workable
balance between avoidance of shareholder oppression and conservation ofjudicial resources.").
But see Ernest L. Folk, Ill, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson
Treatise Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C. L. REv. 768, 842-45 (1964)
(criticizing North Carolina's former mandatory dividend statute).
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for a court to evaluate, however, a majority shareholder would seem to have
little justification for wanting to invest in that project. In fact, given the
conflicts of interest that a majority shareholder often faces in making dividend
decisions, 73 the majority shareholder should have the burden of proof to
demonstrate that the future returns from a proposed investment exceed the cost
of capital. If the majority cannot meet that burden because the project's future
returns are too speculative, the majority should not be able to retain funds for
investment in that project.274
VI. Conclusion
It is far from startling to observe that close corporations and public
corporations are different. What is significant, however, is the recognition that
these differences matter, particularly when dividend policy is at issue. Without
a well-developed market, a close corporation shareholder has no ability to
manufacture "homemade" dividends through sales of stock at an appreciated
value. Moreover, without a market, perhaps the most critical constraint on self-
interested managerial behavior is absent. In the close corporation context,
therefore, the majority shareholder's dividend decisions should not escape
legitimate judicial scrutiny. Instead of reflexively applying the deferential
business judgment rule, courts should employ the oppression doctrine's more
searching reasonable expectations framework.
A meaningful inquiry into close corporation dividend policy, however,
requires more than merely recognizing that the reasonable expectations
standard is a superior analytical framework. Indeed, this Article has pushed
further by developing standards for determining when a close corporation's
dividend policy warrants judicial intervention. With respect to disputes
involving de facto dividends, a minority shareholder's expectation of dividends
should be considered reasonable, and thus enforceable, whenever the majority
shareholder receives a disproportionate amount of the company's profits.
Regardless of whether such disputes arise from the fault of the majority, the
fault of the minority, or from no fault at all, such a position mirrors the
understandings that the shareholders themselves likely would have reached had
they contemplated the possibility of an exclusion from de facto dividends.
273. See supra Parts II.B.I.b, V.B (describing conflicts of interest inherent in dividend
decisions).
274. Cf Manne, supra note 88, at 280 ("In fact, it would not be too extreme [in a close
corporation] to put the burden of proving the propriety of its dividend policy on the controlling
shareholders.").
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In dividend controversies where de facto distributions are not at issue,
basic principles of financial economics provide a useful standard for when
judicial intervention is appropriate. When the majority shareholder seeks to
reinvest company profits in a project expected to pay a below cost of capital
return, the majority is committing the company's funds to a project whose
return is inadequate to compensate for its risk. From the standpoint of return
on financial capital, such a below cost of capital investment is disadvantageous
to all shareholders-majority and minority alike. As this Article has discussed,
however, the majority shareholder's desire to maximize its return on financial
capital will frequently fail to curb this behavior, as below cost of capital
investments can provide employment benefits to the majority-and often only
to the majority-that more than offset the insufficient financial return.
To combat this majority incentive to make sub-optimal investment
choices, judicial intervention is necessary. As a consequence, this Article has
argued that judicial compulsion of a dividend is warranted when the majority
seeks to retain profits for reinvestment in below cost of capital projects. A
minority shareholder has a reasonable expectation of dividends, in other words,
when the projected financial returns from the majority's investment choices are
inadequate to compensate for the risks of those choices. Once again, this is the
understanding that all of the shareholders likely would have reached if they had
bargained over the possibility of the majority refusing to declare dividends for
reinvestment purposes.
In short, the close corporation is different, and it is those differences that
make dividends critical to minority investors in such organizations. As a result,
dividend policy in close corporations cannot be free from scrutiny. By
attempting to channel that scrutiny into a principled framework, this Article
takes a needed step in the right direction.
NOTES

